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This thesis is presented in a ‘papers style’ format. 
Chapter 1: Introduction and literature review introduces the topic, covers existing 
literature and outlines the studies in the thesis.  
Chapters 2 - 6 present 5 empirical papers, each written in a format that is suitable for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals: 
Paper 1: Cutler, J. & Campbell-Meiklejohn, D. (2019) A comparative fMRI meta-analysis 
of altruistic and strategic decisions to give. Neuroimage, 184, 227-241.  
The version presented here is the accepted version, reformatted to match the rest of the 
thesis. An earlier version of this meta-analysis was included in coursework for the degree 
of MSc in Cognitive Neuroscience. The version presented here and published in 
Neuroimage includes additional data, a different approach to the analysis and a novel 
methodological development. 
JC and DC designed the study. JC identified the eligible studies, obtained the data from 
authors, ran the analysis and wrote the paper, with support from DC. 
Paper 2: Cutler, J., Radua, J. & Campbell-Meiklejohn, D. (2018) Adjusting for variable 
brain coverage in voxel-based fMRI meta-analysis. Preprint bioRxiv, 
doi.org/10.1101/457028.  
JC and DC created the concept of the method which relies on the output of software 
developed by JR. JC wrote the code and the paper with contributions to both from DC and 
JR. All authors contributed to manuscript revision, read and approved the submitted 
version. 
Paper 3: Cutler, J., Miles-Wilson, J. J. & Campbell-Meiklejohn, D. Scope insensitivity and 
proximity bias affect physiological responses to lives at risk. (in prep) 
JC and DC designed the study and JC wrote the stimulus presentation code. JC and JM 
collected the data with help from two students. JC ran the preprocessing, analysis and 
wrote the paper, with input from DC on all these aspects and from JM on analysis. 
Paper 4: Cutler, J. & Campbell-Meiklejohn, D. The neural basis of valuing the lives of 
others: value depends on the number of people and geographical location (in prep) 
JC and DC designed the study. JC wrote the stimulus presentation code, collected the data 





Paper 5: Cutler, J. & Campbell-Meiklejohn, D. Responsibility and valence determine 
interest in outcomes for others (in prep) 
JC and DC designed the studies. JC then: wrote the code and created the online survey; 
collected the data, with support from several students; analysed the data; and wrote the 
paper. 
Final chapter: Discussion of the overall findings from the empirical papers, including 
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Altruistic behaviours benefit others at a cost to the self. They can be motivated by 
valuing the lives and wellbeing of other people. However, this value can be inconsistent, 
creating biases in who is valued and receives help. In this thesis, a literature review 
differentiates motivations for prosocial behaviour and then studies using neuroimaging, 
physiology, and behaviour explore the situational and individual factors that determine the 
value of other people. 
Paper 1 uses fMRI meta-analysis to distinguish between altruistic decisions, driven 
by intrinsic value, and strategic prosocial decisions, which could be for extrinsic gain. 
Results demonstrate overlap in reward-related regions, activations unique to each context 
and differences between the two. Paper 2 presents a solution to an issue in fMRI meta-
analysis. 
The following papers focus on altruistic contexts. Papers 3 and 4 identify the 
physiological (skin conductance) and neural (fMRI) correlates respectively of valuing lives 
at risk. Results show that this value can be biased by the number of people at risk, whether 
they are at home or abroad, and how many similar situations one has already seen.  
Papers 1, 3 and 4 suggest we are affected by events that happen to others and our 
ability to help them efficiently. Paper 5 tests whether this translates to curiosity and choices 
to find out about their fate or choices to avoid this knowledge. Results from a series of 
behavioural experiments show ‘wanting to know’ about an outcome depends on who it 
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Human generosity through charitable donations and fundraising, actions for 
positive social change, and government aid programs save and improve the lives of millions 
of people every year (UNICEF, 2018). Choosing to be prosocial in the form of trust, 
cooperation or kindness also builds relationships, improves wellbeing and can increase 
overall resources (Crocker et al., 2017; Curry et al., 2018; Park et al., 2017; Tabibnia and 
Lieberman, 2007). Given these benefits, furthering the scientific understanding of prosocial 
decision making is important for social, economic, mental and physical health outcomes. 
1.1. Definitions 
In this thesis, prosocial behaviour is defined as any act that benefits others, at an 
initial cost to the self. A prosocial decision is the choice to behave prosocially. The cost of 
prosocial behaviour could be in time, money, effort, risk, or a combination of these. In 
addition to benefits for the recipient, prosocial decisions have benefits for the decider. 
These benefits can be extrinsic: external rewards, such as money gained through reciprocal 
generosity, or intrinsic: internal rewards, such as positive thoughts or emotions (Cutler and 
Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019). Altruistic decisions are a subgroup of prosocial decisions, 
defined by a lack of potential extrinsic rewards. Anonymous charitable donations are one 
example of altruistic behaviours (Moll et al., 2006). 
Research on decision making suggests the costs and benefits associated with choice 
options are integrated in value calculations (Croxson et al., 2009). Value can be generally 
defined as the importance, worth, or usefulness of something, and the process of estimating 
this. The idea of subjective value differentiates experienced desirability from objective 
worth (Peters and Büchel, 2010). For example, the value of food changes depending on how 
much one has already eaten.  
In the context of prosocial decisions, choosing to be prosocial suggests the 
subjective value of this option is greater than the value of not being prosocial. In this thesis, 
I identify why being prosocial has value. These sources of value can also be conceptualised 
as motivations to be prosocial or benefits of being prosocial, and I use the terms 
interchangeably. I also assume that prosocial behaviours occurring in contexts that isolate 
a motivation are driven by that motivation. For example, an “altruistic behaviour” is 
preceded by an “altruistic decision” with “altruistic motivations”. My research focuses on 
when and why the people who benefit from prosocial behaviour contribute value, so 




1.2. Measuring value 
Approaches to measuring value include behavioural, physiological, and 
neuroimaging methods. In this section I briefly outline the benefits of each and how I have 
applied them to the research questions. The following literature review outlines existing 
research that used these methods to study prosocial motivations. 
Measuring prosocial decisions directly can be informative, given the reasonable 
assumption that choices generally reflect the option with the highest value (Rangel et al., 
2008). To separate different motivations, based on behaviour alone, requires experimental 
conditions that isolate certain benefits and exclude others. However, choices in experiments 
can be biased if participants act in a socially desirable way, which does not reflect true 
motivations (Fernandes and Randall, 1992). A focus on behaviour may also ignore the fact 
that similar prosocial behaviours can be motivated by a wide range of factors. The 
differences between motivations are crucial to understand, predict and encourage prosocial 
behaviours (Hein et al., 2016). Fortunately, other tools from psychology and neuroscience 
can offer additional insights.  
One way to apply neuroimaging measures is in combination with traditional 
decision-making tasks. I apply this method in Paper 1 (Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 
2019) by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) meta-analysis to compare 
tasks that isolate altruistic motivations, relying on intrinsic rewards, with contexts where 
strategic motivations to gain extrinsic rewards could also be at play. Similarities and 
differences in the neural correlates of these decisions suggests potential overlap but also 
distinction between the value computations in these two contexts. 
Physiological methods, such as skin conductance, and fMRI can also measure value 
during passive responses to stimuli, removing the need for a decision or behaviour. This has 
several benefits. It removes the risk of socially desirable responding and is more like real-
world contexts in which people learn information without a requirement to make decisions. 
Papers 3 and 4 measure skin conductance responses (SCR) and blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) responses, using fMRI, to news stories describing people at risk of death, 
and then the outcome. If participants value the lives of the people in the stories, there should 
be a response when lives are at risk or lost.  
In addition to measuring the value of lives overall, experimental manipulations can 
help identify the situational factors that increase and decrease this value. By varying the 




and whether they are in the same country as the participant or abroad. Differences between 
conditions contribute to answering the question of when other people are valued most. 
Given the focus on subjective value, it is also important to consider that different 
individuals may weight components in the value calculations differently and value could be 
differentially affected by situational factors. If patterns of individual differences relate to 
measurable differences in traits, such as the tendency to empathise, there is evidence that 
trait contributes to prosocial motivations. 
Finally, behavioural paradigms are not limited to measuring decisions whether to 
be prosocial. Previous evidence suggests that people want to know about outcomes with 
positive value (Charpentier et al., 2018). Finding out more about other people and 
opportunities to help them is an important part of prosocial behaviour in the real world. 
Paper 5 presents results from behavioural tasks measuring interest in outcomes that affect 
others. This task also allows us to manipulate responsibility for the outcome and measure 
whether the value of outcomes depends on being responsible. Results from this study are 
relevant to understanding both the situational factors that increase the value of others’ 






2. Literature review 
2.1. Overview 
For a prosocial behaviour to be worthwhile, there must be benefits, so the subjective 
value of being prosocial outweighs the costs. The benefits of prosocial behaviours can take 
many forms, and these translate into different motivations to help. For example, if a 
subjective benefit of helping is feeling good from having an impact, helping is at least in part 
motivated by achieving that benefit.  
In the first half of the literature review, I aim to answer the questions: what are the 
possible motivations, do they exist and how can they be isolated? To do so, I differentiate 
prosocial motivations based on 4 dichotomies. In reality, it is likely that multiple 
motivations work together, even within a single decision. However, separating different 
motivations is of academic interest and has implications for promoting prosocial behaviour.  
First, I separate altruistic motivations, where only intrinsic rewards are available, 
from strategic motivations to gain extrinsic rewards through prosocial behaviours. The rest 
of the literature review and papers 3–5 focus on altruistic motivations and the nature of the 
intrinsic rewards. The first subdivision is between motivations linked to the recipient 
themselves (recipient-dependent motivations) and those not related to the specific recipient 
(recipient-independent motivations). Recipient-dependent motivations can also be labelled 
empathy, in the widest sense of the term.  
The next distinction is within recipient-dependent motivations and considers 
whether empathy leads to other-focused emotions or self-focused personal distress. The 
section on this distinction considers how both sets of emotions can promote helping, but in 
different ways. Finally, I distinguish action-oriented from outcome-oriented altruism. These 
are both other-focused but differ in whether the benefit of helping is linked to the action of 
personally making a difference or the positive outcome of improved wellbeing for the other. 



































The benefits associated with each motivation could have both emotional and 
cognitive components. For example, action-oriented altruism could lead to thinking about 
the difference one made, feeling good for making that difference, or both. As mentioned 
below, the relative importance of these levels may differ between motivation types. At the 
point of decision, both emotions and thoughts could be anticipated in relation to how one 
will feel or think after the prosocial behaviour (Erlandsson et al., 2016). 
In the second part of the literature review, I cover definitions and previous findings 
on the situational factors and individual differences relevant to prosocial behaviour, with a 
focus on those used in the studies in the thesis. Combining the results from the studies with 
existing literature provides insight into how altruistic motivations are affected by context, 
how they differ between individuals and what these findings tell us about motivations.  
2.2. Scope 
Making a prosocial decision involves comparing the value of outcomes for others 
with outcomes for the self, but also comparing outcomes that vary in currency, time, 
abstractness, and certainty (Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019). Each of these factors 
alone relies on complex cognitive abilities such as theory of mind, to understand the mental 
states of other people (Frith and Frith, 2006), or thinking about the future (Schacter et al., 
2017). In addition, the decision-making process must integrate these disparate signals into 
a common value to choose the most desirable option. Understanding all these factors 
presents a fascinating research challenge but is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The focus here is on the benefits of being prosocial and the costs of being selfish, as 
these define the different categories of motivation I will outline below. The costs of being 
prosocial are the money, time or effort needed to achieve the prosocial outcome and the 




are not discussed in detail, although they relate to some of the motivations, for example the 
same prosocial benefit at a lower financial cost increases how efficient the prosocial option 
is.  
I also focus the review on prosocial behaviour towards another person or human 
causes, as this is the most common operationalisation and most relevant for the studies in 
the thesis. Similar motivations and additional unique factors are likely to be relevant for 
prosocial acts towards animals and the environment (Bastian et al., 2011; Zaval et al., 2015). 
The focus is also adult populations and mostly healthy subjects, although some patient 
studies are mentioned. The developmental trajectory of prosocial behaviours, motivations 
and their neural basis are fascinating areas of study (Chernyak and Kushnir, 2018; Cowell 
et al., 2018; Knafo-Noam et al., 2018; Martin, Alia; Olson, 2015) and are only excluded for 
brevity. 
2.3. Motivations for prosocial behaviour 
2.3.1. Strategic 
Prosocial behaviour could be considered a challenge for traditional theories in 
economics that suggest humans or homo economicus are entirely self-interested (Adamus, 
2017). A related question is how such prosocial behaviours evolved if they require sacrifices 
that could decrease fitness. One answer to these questions is that prosocial behaviours can 
lead to extrinsic benefits for the person being prosocial, as well as the recipient. A possible 
motivation for prosocial behaviour is therefore to strategically gain such rewards. The value 
of other people in these contexts depends on their role in determining the extrinsic 
outcomes. 
Prosocial acts may increase the gains of both people through reciprocity (Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr et al., 2002) and cooperation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) or the 
resources of a broader group through public goods contributions (Chaudhuri, 2011). Likely 
to maintain these benefits, prosocial behaviour often has a positive effect on reputation, 
which promotes further beneficial interactions (Milinski et al., 2001; Nowak and Sigmund, 
2005) and acting selfishly can lead to punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002).  
Behavioural evidence 
A variety of economic games and experimental tasks have been developed to study 
prosocial behaviour, when these strategic benefits are available, and findings support their 
role in motivating prosocial behaviour. The ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) involves a 




proposal. This offers the opportunity to punish selfish proposals, as rejections leave both 
players with nothing. In the trust game (Berg et al., 1995), the investor chooses an amount 
of money to entrust and this is multiplied and transferred to the trustee who decides how 
much to send back, possibly reciprocating the investor’s generosity.  
The public goods game (Rapoport, 1987) asks participants to put an amount of their 
money into a group pot which is multiplied and then divided between all players, regardless 
of contribution. The greatest total benefit is gained through prosociality but each individual 
gains the most by “free riding”. Similarly, in the two person prisoners’ dilemma (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957) an individual player is better off if they defect, while their partner cooperates, 
but the total gain is enhanced by mutual cooperation. A common manipulation in these 
games is to have repeated rounds, introducing an incentive to build a positive reputation 
(King-Casas et al., 2005). 
Importantly, prosocial behaviours in these games could be entirely motivated by the 
altruistic desire to help others, as discussed below, but it is impossible to rule out strategic 
motivations. However, manipulations to increase the size or likelihood of the extrinsic 
rewards increase levels of prosocial behaviour, supporting the role of strategic motivations 
in prosocial behaviour (Camerer, 2003; Camerer and Fehr, 2003). 
Neural basis 
Research using neuroimaging during prosocial decisions in these strategic contexts 
suggests their neural basis and a meta-analysis of these findings are presented in paper 1. 
Overall, these studies show involvement of regions associated with reward processing and 
social cognition, as would be expected in such tasks. The extrinsic rewards from strategic 
prosocial decisions are often dependent on the decisions of other people, for example 
whether they will cooperate or freeride. Neural regions linked to theory of mind are 
suggested to underlie this processing (Weiland et al., 2012). 
Considering the reward aspect, social status, prosocial outcomes, cooperation, and 
money for the participant all activate the striatum (Izuma et al., 2008; Rilling et al., 2002; 
Saxe and Haushofer, 2008; Zink et al., 2004). This activity has been suggested to represent 
domain-general reward processing, across social and non-social sources, supporting the 
idea of a common neural currency for the benefits of a decision option. In strategic prosocial 
decisions, social and non-social rewards could combine if both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations apply. An interesting question is how these motivations are integrated in the 






The possible extrinsic benefits to being prosocial described above explain how these 
behaviours can be motivated by strategic incentives to benefit oneself. However, these rely 
on a mechanism for the prosocial act to benefit the decider through reciprocity, reputation, 
or being part of the group that the benefits. In the lab, this is introduced through the 
structure of the game and in the real world, often the people we help are people we know, 
including friends, family and colleagues. This creates opportunities to “return the favour” 
or cooperate.  
However, people are also prosocial in contexts where this is not the case. I will 
describe these choices, to be generous when there is no opportunity to gain extrinsic 
rewards, as altruistic. It is important to recognise that this term has been used with multiple 
meanings across multiple disciplines. The current definition reflects behavioural and 
preference altruism, rather than reproductive altruism, which requires a decrease in the 
actor’s fitness in an evolutionary sense (Clavien and Chapuisat, 2012). If people are 
altruistic, this suggests they value other people in some way. 
Behavioural evidence 
Private donations to charities, working on causes that don’t affect the donor, are 
examples of prosocial behaviour that strategic motivation cannot explain. In the UK in 2018, 
donations to overseas aid and disaster relief charities were the fifth most popular cause area 
and the second highest average donation amount. Average donations were £30 in the 4 
weeks preceding the survey (Charities Aid Foundation, 2019). 
In the lab environment, these contexts have mainly been created through the 
dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986) in which the participant splits an amount of money 
with another person and there is no opportunity for reciprocity or punishment. If 
motivation was purely based on extrinsic reward, dictators would keep the full amount. 
Despite this, a meta-analysis of 616 dictator game treatments from 131 papers showed that 
on average, dictators gave 28.35% of the total. Of the 328 treatments with full range 
information available, 16.74% of dictators gave half of the total and 5.44% gave away 
everything (Engel, 2011). 
These findings suggest that there is an intrinsic value to giving money away, which 
provides altruistic motivations for prosocial behaviour. I will refer to the benefit gained 
from acting altruistically as warm glow. This is distinct from what I will call action-oriented 




1990, 1989). In line with more recent uses of the term (Erlandsson et al., 2016; O’Brien and 
Kassirer, 2019; Västfjäll et al., 2015), I use warm glow for any intrinsic reward from giving, 
regardless of its nature, and separate the different possible sources of reward below. 
Evidence that people experience warm glow comes from findings that being 
altruistic enhances wellbeing (Dunn et al., 2008) with a recent meta-analysis suggesting a 
small to medium effect of being prosocial on happiness and no evidence of publication bias 
(Curry et al., 2018). Prosocial behaviours have also been linked to improved physical health 
outcomes (Crocker et al., 2017). These studies did not necessarily always isolate altruistic 
motivations, as participants could have been generous to people who could reciprocate, but 
evidence from two studies on volunteering found only those who help for other-focused 
reasons showed the benefits of decreased mortality (Konrath et al., 2012) and improved 
relationships (Crocker and Canevello, 2008). 
Intrinsic rewards have also been shown to enhance prosocial performance and 
persistence (Grant, 2008) and including an intrinsic reward function in evolutionary 
modelling of prosocial behaviour improved the model (Wang et al., 2018). Interestingly, 
recent evidence suggests that people adapt to warm glow of giving more slowly than the 
good feeling of getting money (O’Brien and Kassirer, 2019). These studies all suggest that 
altruistic behaviours generate intrinsic rewards or warm glow. At the point of deciding 
whether to help, it is likely that people imagine helping to some extent (Gaesser et al., 2015) 
so anticipate warm glow if they decide to help. This introduces a mechanism by which the 
intrinsically rewarding outcome of being altruistic can motivate the preceding decision to 
be altruistic. 
In contrast to warm glow as a result of helping, the emotional costs of not helping 
are guilt, shame and embarrassment. Anticipation of these negative emotions is likely to be 
integrated during decision-making in a similar way to anticipated warm glow. Research has 
often combined measures of avoiding negative emotion with seeking positive emotions. 
However, Erlandsson et al. (2016) suggest that seeking warm glow and avoiding guilt are 
separate, based on how each differentially related to personal responsibility. 
Neural basis 
Previous evidence from fMRI on the neural basis of altruistic decisions involving 
money is highlighted in paper 1, which provides results from a meta-analysis of these 
findings. These include activity in reward-related regions such as the nucleus accumbens 





In addition to fMRI research, evidence comes from methods that can suggest a causal 
relationship between neural structures and altruistic decisions. For example, a lesion study 
showed that altruistic donations were lower in patients with damage to the right posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and middle temporal gyri (Moll et al., 2018). The authors 
link the pSTS finding to diminished emotional empathy, which also follows damage to this 
area (Driscoll et al., 2012). 
While most research looks at financial donations to others, the “pain versus gain” 
paradigm (FeldmanHall et al., 2012b) involves decisions whether to give up money to 
prevent the pain of another person. Evidence from combining this paradigm with 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to the medial PFC (mPFC) supports our meta-
analysis findings that this region is involved in altruistic decisions (Liao et al., 2018). Anodal 
stimulation, associated with enhanced activity, to mPFC increased generosity compared to 
cathodal stimulation, specific to conditions where there was a high probability of their help 
being successful. 
The results and discussion of paper 1 focus on the rewards from giving. We do not 
discuss the costs of the rejected option, such as anticipated guilt. Research focusing on guilt 
finds activity in dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC), superior frontal gyrus (SFG), supramarginal 
gyrus, and anterior inferior frontal gyrus varies with the intensity of the guilt. Further, 
greater guilt was experienced when consequences were negative for others compared to 
the self. This contrast was associated with increased activity in the ventromedial PFC 
(vmPFC), dmPFC, precuneus, posterior cingulate and pSTS. The left anterior inferior frontal 
gyrus, left vmPFC and left anterior inferior parietal cortex showed an interaction between 
consequences and intensity (Morey et al., 2012). Interestingly, we found some of these 
regions also responded to lives being at risk or lost in paper 4. 
Somewhat overlapping, and in other ways contradictory, results are given in a 
review of the neural correlates of guilt, shame and embarrassment (Bastin et al., 2016). 
Guilt, considered the most other-focused of the three emotions, was associated with activity 
in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex, areas of posterior temporal cortex and the 
precuneus. These regions also come up in contrasts in paper 4. 
2.4. Motivations for altruism 
The findings outlined above suggest altruistic motivations can drive behaviour but 
do not explain why such motivations exist. In the next section, I explore different 
motivations for altruism or the ways in which other people are valuable. I will argue that 




motivations based on the nature of the input to the value calculation. This is in line with the 
neural model of prosocial decisions suggested by Luo (2018) that starts with the signal 
input. This proceeds to influence the reward system and arouse emotions that prompt the 
planning of behaviour. 
A key distinction in the valuation of other people is whether it depends on the 
recipient(s) or is independent of the person or people themselves. Next, I cover examples of 
recipient-independent and recipient-dependent information and evidence for their role in 
motivating altruism. Any of these factors could also motivate prosocial decisions in strategic 
contexts, instead of or in addition to the desire to gain extrinsic rewards. 
2.4.1. Recipient-independent 
Behavioural evidence 
One factor suggested to motivate altruistic decisions that does not depend on 
considering the recipient’s wellbeing is a preference for equity or equality (Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 1995). This factor could explain the finding that giving half of the total to the 
recipient is the most common non-zero offer in the dictator game (Engel, 2011). Another 
preference that could influence prosocial decisions without consideration of the recipient 
is for efficiency or creating the greatest impact. In dictator games, this can be established 
through multiplying the amount given to the recipient, a manipulation that does increase 
the amount given and the likelihood of giving something (Engel, 2011). There is some 
evidence that both efficiency and equality are integrated into judgements depending on 
their magnitude (Palmer et al., 2013a). 
Moral rules are another way in which people may decide to be altruistic without 
processing information about the specific recipient. This could be the case if an option is 
interpreted as the “right thing to do” from cues independent of thinking about the recipient. 
The power of this was demonstrated in two studies where participants chose the option 
labelled as “nice”, regardless of whether it was the most efficient or equitable option and 
generous people showed this effect most strongly (Capraro and Rand, 2017; Tappin and 
Capraro, 2018). Similarly, framing dictator game choices through moral words that suggest 
something is right (“donating”) or wrong (“stealing”) increases or decreases giving 
respectively (Capraro and Vanzo, 2019).  
It could also be possible for learning processes to remove the need to consider the 
recipient before making an altruistic decision, if this has been rewarded in the past. This 




habitual behaviours (Gęsiarz and Crockett, 2015) or learning through observation (Penner 
et al., 2005).  
Recipient-independent motivations to be altruistic could come from expectations 
about what most people would do or perceived social norms. For example, participants’ 
belief about the average behaviour of others, so what is appropriate, has been linked to 
choices in the dictator game (Matthey and Regner, 2014). Similarly, there is evidence people 
are more altruistic after observing others being generous (Nook et al., 2016). Finally, there 
is evidence that signalling prosociality to others is important in determining levels of 
altruism (Grossman, 2015).  
Neural basis 
Previous studies have also investigated the neural correlates of making altruistic 
decisions motivated by these factors. Considering equality, reward-related responses have 
been linked to equitable outcomes (Zaki and Mitchell, 2011) and paying to achieve equality 
(Dawes et al., 2012), whereas insula activity has been linked to inequitable outcomes and 
preferences against inequality. 
Rule following during prosocial decisions was affected by tDCS to the right lateral 
PFC, independent of what the more prosocial outcome was (Gross et al., 2018). Other 
research has implicated the vmPFC, particularly on the right, as a key hub in the moral 
decision-making network for prosocial behaviours (Mendez, 2009). By no means is morality 
limited to recipient-independent factors and instead often includes information about the 
recipient or person in need. Moral rules simply provide one way in which decisions can be 
made without thinking about the recipient(s). The neuroscience of morality more generally 
is a huge field spanning moral judgements and inferences as well as decisions (Yu et al., 
2019) and will not be covered in detail here (for reviews see Carlson and Crockett, 2018; 
Decety and Yoder, 2017; Van Bavel et al., 2015).  
Considering learning, habitual prosocial behaviour could develop through the same 
processes as non-social learning, reward prediction-error signals in the striatum (Gęsiarz 
and Crockett, 2015). Evidence for this possibility has been shown for altruistic decisions in 
nucleus accumbens (NuAcc) (Kuss et al., 2013) and non-costly learning for others in the 
sgACC (Lockwood et al., 2015).  
Finally, considering the expectations of others is likely to involve some similar 
processes and neural regions to those suggested below to underlie recipient-dependent 




other than the recipient. Considering norms and expectations is also relevant to strategic 
prosocial contexts (Chang and Sanfey, 2013), but are categorised under altruistic 
motivations when there is no way that a prosocial reputation can lead to extrinsic rewards. 
2.4.2. Recipient-dependent 
The types of recipient-independent factors described above can motivate prosocial 
or altruistic decisions without any attention to or processing of information about the 
specific person(s) who will benefit from the decision. In contrast, perhaps the most 
common, long standing ideas in psychology and outside academia on why people are 
prosocial revolve around positive outcomes for the recipient(s). This relies on processing, 
at least to some extent, information about the person or people. I will now expand on the 
types of information and then consequences of this. 
Empathy is the general term given to understanding others and is used with a 
variety of meanings. A common distinction is between a cognitive component, or theory of 
mind, and an emotional component (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Within the emotional 
component, there are further subdivisions depending on the relationship between the 
emotions felt by each person. These include: imagining how the other feels; imagining how 
one would feel in the other’s situation; matching the emotion (sometimes described as 
automatic emotional contagion); feeling a complimentary emotion, such as pity if someone 
else is sad (often called sympathy); and feeling a positive desire to help in response to 
sadness (often called compassion) (Batson, 2009). A full review of the previous behavioural 
and neural work on empathy is outside the scope of this chapter (for reviews see Bernhardt 
and Singer, 2012; Decety, 2011; Engen and Singer, 2013; Lockwood, 2016; Marsh, 2018; 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Here, I highlight some select findings on empathy in relation to 
prosocial behaviour. 
Behavioural evidence 
A concise and influential theory on the role of empathy in altruistic behaviour is 
simply that empathy motivates altruism (Batson et al., 1987). Support for this “empathy-
altruism” hypothesis has often come from negative situations, where a helper’s empathy 
motivates them to relieve the suffering of another, but can also apply in positive situations, 
where empathy generates vicarious joy during actions to make others better off (Batson et 
al., 1991). This has been suggested to create a positive loop, with altruism maintaining 
positive emotions in both the giver and the receiver (Telle and Pfister, 2015). In addition to 




trait measures, and these effects were independent of the traditional measures of empathic 
sadness (Vitaglione and Barnett, 2003). 
Evidence supporting empathy as a motivation for altruism comes from a range of 
study designs, including individual differences, and empathy is often used to explain the 
effect of situational factors on altruism. These studies will be described in the relevant 
sections below. Studies also use empathy manipulations, with one example showing 
increased altruistic behaviour in the dictator game, predicted by experienced empathy 
(Klimecki et al., 2016). However, there is some evidence that natural levels of empathy are 
in fact quite high and such manipulation methods show differences because of the control 
instructions, to stay objective, rather than the empathy instructions increasing caring above 
natural levels (McAuliffe et al., 2018). Empathy has also been supported as a good 
explanation from an evolutionary point of view for helping behaviour in situations where 
strategic motivations are not relevant (de Waal, 2008). 
Neural basis 
Neuroscience research on empathy more broadly has linked theory of mind to 
regions including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), dmPFC, and pSTS and emotional 
empathy to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula (AI; Kanske, 2018). A 
general concept from this research is self-other overlap: similar regions are involved in 
processing the emotions of others and one’s own emotions (Decety, 2015). Associations 
between activity in these regions and altruism suggest the neural basis of integrating 
information about the recipient into value calculations and support the importance of 
empathy in motivating altruistic decisions. 
Results from fMRI on emotional empathy found positive functional connectivity 
from the ACC to the AI during altruistic decisions motivated by empathy (Hein et al., 2016). 
Observing people experiencing negative social experiences has been linked with activity in 
the theory of mind network, including dmPFC and, for empathic people, AI and dorsal ACC. 
Activity in AI and dmPFC predicted later prosocial behaviour (Masten et al., 2011). Similarly, 
ACC activity during concern for someone being socially isolated was attenuated through 
helping them (Kawamichi et al., 2015), though this was not costly helping. 
Regions linked to theory of mind have also been implicated in altruism with 
suggestions that processing information about others, associated with dmPFC activity, and 
supressing information about the self is crucial (Majdandžić et al., 2016). There is also 
evidence of theory of mind and empathy regions increasing connectivity with reward 




donations to family members (Telzer et al., 2011). This suggests a mechanism by which the 
warm glow of altruism can be enhanced through processing information about the 
recipient. 
Another region linking empathy and prosocial behaviours is the septal region where 
activity was shown to be modulated by taking a compassionate attitude when viewing sad 
expressions (Kim et al., 2009). This region also showed activity across empathy for pain, 
happiness and anxiety with the levels of this activity predicting daily helping, including to 
strangers (Morelli et al., 2014). Finally, the level of synchronisation between two 
participants’ brains during a coordination task predicted levels of prosociality towards each 
other (Y. Hu et al., 2017). This finding supports the idea that neural mirroring promotes 
prosocial behaviour, although the measures were hypothetical. 
2.5. Consequences of empathy  
The translation of information about potential recipients into altruistic behaviour 
could be conceptualised as a multi-stage process, with aspects of empathy underlying the 
initial stages. Considering opportunities to relieve suffering, forms of empathy that generate 
awareness of suffering are likely to be an important initial step towards altruism. This may 
be necessary in some situations (although need could be detected without empathy, for 
example, direct requests for help) but not sufficient for altruism. There are two broad 
possible consequences of empathic understanding. These consequences may both lead to 
altruism but differ in whether the focus is on the recipient (other) or on the self. 
2.5.1. Other focus 
The evidence described in the previous section suggests that empathy can lead to 
altruism and one possible route is through integrating information about others into value 
computations. The terms empathic concern and compassion describe the awareness of 
suffering evoking an other-focused motivation to help. Different orientations within this 
process are discussed below. Supporting the idea that empathy is not sufficient for prosocial 
behaviour, a study found concern about the welfare of others, not feeling their emotions, 
predicted prosocial behaviours (Jordan et al., 2016). Similarly, a there is evidence a concern 
mechanism motivates altruistic behaviour and requires minimal theory of mind (Nichols, 
2001).  
2.5.2. Self focus 
Despite evidence that empathy promotes altruism, understanding the suffering of 




initial suggestions of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, it has been contrasted with a 
personal distress model that suggests people selfishly help to relieve their own distress 
(Batson et al., 1991, 1987). If altruism is entirely motivated by relieving personal distress, 
people will only help if it is the easiest way to reduce their distress. If escaping the situation 
is possible, this option will be taken instead of helping. 
Based on evidence from several studies, Batson (2014) argues that when empathy 
is high, people do not take even easy opportunities to escape, against the idea of personal 
distress. However, other evidence shows people avoid opportunities to donate (Andreoni 
et al., 2017; Knutsson et al., 2013), will sacrifice money to avoid a dictator game decision 
(Dana et al., 2006), and even avoid empathy itself (Cameron et al., 2019).  
Stress can have a positive effect on prosocial behaviour in some contexts (Buchanan 
and Preston, 2014). However, if self-focused negative emotions become too intense, and 
escape or avoidance is not possible, altruism may actually decline. For example, selfish 
behaviour in a virtual reality emergency was associated with neural signatures of personal 
distress (Zanon et al., 2014). Increased personal distress has also been proposed as a 
mechanism behind the bystander effect, where help is less likely when there are many 
potential helpers (Hortensius and de Gelder, 2018). Chronic experience of distress in 
response to the suffering of others can lead to burnout which undermines the capacity to 
help (Klimecki and Singer, 2012).  
Given findings that similar brain regions process experienced and empathic 
emotions, the distinction between other-focused empathy and personal distress is less clear 
than early behavioural models suggested. It is likely that similar arousal processes underlie 
both emotions and the difference is how this is interpreted (Penner et al., 2005).  
In real world altruism, often both motivations will apply and could relate to 
behaviours in different ways. For example, motivation to maintain one’s own positive mood 
was linked to decisions whether to donate, whereas empathy was more predictive of the 
amount donated (Dickert et al., 2011b). A patient lesion study also found altruistic 
motivation depends on inhibiting one’s own emotional experience to successfully generate 
empathic responses (Shdo et al., 2018). These findings emphasise the importance of 
balancing self and other focus. 
2.6. Other-focused orientations 
Evidence reviewed so far, and findings in this thesis, support the existence of 




about the recipient, which promote helping, rather than escaping the situation. The final 
aspect of my classification is whether this desire is oriented towards the outcome for the 
recipient or the action of helping itself. These motivations were originally labelled pure and 
impure altruism respectively, with impure altruism also referred to as warm glow giving 
(Andreoni, 1990). However, the term warm glow has increasingly been used more broadly, 
as I have used it, to refer to any good feeling from giving, without excluding outcome-
oriented motivations. 
2.6.1. Outcome orientation 
Outcome-oriented altruism is motivated by the benefit for the other person, 
separate from the act of being the one to help. This motivation has proven difficult to isolate 
in behaviour alone. One prediction of outcome-oriented motivations is that donations by 
oneself and donations by others are perfect substitutes for each other, if they create the 
same impact for the recipient(s). This means that if someone else contributes to a cause, an 
outcome-oriented donor should decrease their contribution by that amount, known as 
complete crowding out (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017).  
Behavioural evidence 
Experimental tests of crowding out have generally not shown support for outcome-
orientation (Andreoni, 1990). However, an issue with this paradigm is that anything less 
than complete crowding out is considered evidence against outcome orientation, so the 
power to detect it is low. In a modified paradigm that measured preferences at multiple 
levels of charitable output, outcome orientations were shown to be more influential than 
previously estimated, although their contribution depended on the context (Ottoni-Wilhelm 
et al., 2017). Another criticism is that predictions of complete crowding out are specific to 
contexts where additional donations will not increase the size or strength of the positive 
outcome, and these are very unlikely in the real world.  
Neural basis 
Work on observing others gain, not because of altruism or prosocial behaviour, has 
identified the neural mechanisms of this vicarious reward (Mobbs et al., 2009). Like the 
overlap between experiencing and observing negative emotions, seeing others receive 
money activated areas including the ventral striatum, also active when receiving money. 
This vicarious reward was powerful enough to drive learning, although learning rates were 
slower than for the self (Lockwood et al., 2016). This study also found a specific reward-




A similar study measured activity in ventral striatum during gains for the 
participant, a charity, and both the participant and a charity. Interestingly, the group results 
did not show increased activity during gains for the charity only. However, the extent to 
which this was the case correlated with participant’s self-reported empathic concern and 
how much they enjoyed winning for the charity. Empathic concern was also correlated with 
the amount donated to charity (Spaans et al., 2018).  
Finally, an event-related potential (ERP) study found greater amplitude and 
duration of responses to failed, compared to successful, attempts to help hypothetical 
others, suggesting a successful outcome was valued (Gan et al., 2016). While these results 
combined suggest that positive outcomes for others can be rewarding, they do not consider 
costly prosocial decisions to achieve these positive outcomes. As the only studies that do 
this contrast outcome with action-oriented motivations, I outline them below. 
2.6.2. Action orientation 
Action-oriented altruism is motivated by the reward of personally having a positive 
impact on another person or cause. This idea was introduced to explain the lack of complete 
crowding out found in behavioural economics experiments and anecdotal patterns of 
behaviour (Andreoni, 1990, 1989). In the present classification, I am excluding prosocial 
decisions motivated by feeling like a good person from doing the “right” thing if this comes 
from cues independent of the recipient. 
Behavioural evidence 
As described above, one line of evidence for the presence of action-orientation is the 
lack of complete crowding out, although this measure has limitations and is not very 
relevant to real-world giving. A similar but more applicable pattern of behaviour is if donors 
fail to consider the marginal benefit of their gift. For example, donating to an appeal that has 
already raised enough to meet its aims, rather than one that has not yet reached its target. 
An additional prediction to differentiate orientations is that action-oriented 
deciders will help in the way that makes their impact feel greatest, even if this diverges from 
creating the best outcome for the recipients. Anecdotal and scientific evidence support the 
idea that many altruistic behaviours are not those that would bring about the greatest 
possible impact. 
In the charitable giving domain for example, most donors do not choose causes or 
organisations based on the efficiency of their impact (Van Iwaarden et al., 2009). It is 




et al., 2014) and a lack of overhead costs promotes giving (Gneezy et al., 2014), even though 
this measure is often meaningless for comparing efficiency (Bowman, 2006). Similarly, 
despite evidence of the positive impact of directly sending cash to people living in poverty 
(Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016), most charities request donations for explicit items such as 
blankets or food, presumably as this is more effective in soliciting gifts. This could represent 
action-oriented giving if spending money on projects or set outcomes makes the donor feel 
better about their impact, at the expense of the objective impact for the beneficiary. 
Many other situational factors, which I describe below and are tested in this thesis, 
also lead to biases in altruistic behaviour as they diverge from the common view that all 
lives have equal value (Slovic et al., 2011). These biases include preferring to help certain 
recipients over others (Everett et al., 2015) and the nonlinear relationships between the 
number of people in need and responses (Dickert et al., 2012). If decisions on whether and 
who to help are made based on our subjective experience of helping, rather than the 
objective change in wellbeing, there is evidence for action-oriented altruism. Finally, 
outside the lab, models of big data also support a role of donor joy in giving (Ribar and 
Wilhelm, 2002). 
Neural basis 
Identifying outcome and action-oriented motivations for altruism is one area where 
neuroscience can add insight beyond behavioural studies. One study gave participants 
voluntary choices whether to donate to their favourite charities and took compulsory ‘tax-
like’ transfers to the same charities. There was greater striatal activity during the tax 
transfers, compared to baseline, but this was further increased by being responsible for the 
donation (Harbaugh et al., 2007). The findings suggest both the positive outcome and the 
process of deciding to give are reinforcing and may sum. Also, the participants who showed 
neural reward signatures during involuntary transfers were the most generous in real life. 
Similar findings, that action orientation dominates for less altruistic individuals but 
outcome orientation is present for altruists, were shown using a reward prediction error 
paradigm with fMRI (Kuss et al., 2013). Participants decided whether to give and then some 
donations were cancelled before they reached the beneficiaries. The presence of action-
focused motivation was suggested when a cancelled donation did not generate a reward 
prediction error. More generous participants seemed to be affected by whether the positive 
outcome of the donation was realised. They showed a reward prediction error in the 





2.7. Fit with other models 
In the above literature review I have differentiated prosocial motivations on several 
factors to create categories. At the highest level, prosocial behaviours can be driven by 
strategic motivations for extrinsic rewards or altruistic motivations for intrinsic rewards. 
Within altruistic behaviours, those motivated by recipient-independent factors are 
differentiated from those motivated by recipient-dependent information about the person 
or people being helped. Processing recipient-dependent information, through the various 
forms of empathy, can lead to other-focused emotions (empathic concern and compassion) 
or self-focused personal distress. Personal distress can promote altruism, but only if this is 
the easiest way to relieve the distress. Finally, other-focused motivations can be oriented 
towards the outcome for the recipient(s) or the action of helping. Studies measuring 
behaviour and neural activity support the presence of each of these motivations. The 
following section will consider the situational and individual differences that determine 
which is dominant in a given context for a specific individual. 
While the combination of categories as a whole is novel, it incorporates previously 
established distinctions and builds on other models of prosocial motivations. For example, 
a review of 500 articles on charitable giving identified eight drivers (Bekkers and Wiepking, 
2010), most of which can be matched to the categories I have described (in parentheses). 
These were: reputation (strategic); material costs and benefits (strategic); psychological 
benefits (altruistic); values and efficacy (recipient-independent); awareness of need 
(recipient-dependent); and “altruism” (other-focused). The final driver, solicitation, could 
elicit any of the motivations I have identified, including recipient-independent motivations 
if decisions are made without considering the potential recipient(s). 
Other reviews list motivations for prosocial behaviour as: cooperation and 
competition (strategic); fairness, equity and equality (recipient-independent); and 
reciprocity (Adamus, 2017). I have not discussed reciprocating generosity as a motivation 
for prosocial behaviour in detail as it has limited relevance to prosocial behaviour towards 
strangers. Reciprocation could be driven by increased anticipated guilt through 
expectations (Chang and Sanfey, 2013) or conceptualised as the situational factor of having 
positive information available about the recipient (that they are generous), as discussed 
below.  
Meier (2011) describes prosocial preference models, in which the utility of 
outcomes for others can influence one’s utility directly (outcome orientation); indirectly 




highlights the contribution of self-identity (recipient-independent) and reciprocity 
(strategic). Finally, an experimental paper separated conceptualisations of fairness which 
can also be aligned with the present categories: impartiality (recipient-independent); 
charity (recipient-dependent); and reciprocity (strategic or responding to generosity) 
(Niemi et al., 2018). Activation patterns in theory-of-mind regions differentiated between 
these categories. 
A core aspect of my categorisation of motivations is how the input information 
defines the benefits of being prosocial and the costs of not being prosocial. These are then 
compared with the cost of the prosocial act and the benefit of selfishly keeping resources 
instead. This idea of costs and benefits is not new and is applied from research on decision 
making outside of prosocial contexts. Gęsiarz & Crockett (2015) apply the three broad 
decision-making systems to prosocial behaviour. Cost and benefits of prosocial behaviours 
could either be predicted by a goal-directed system or affect future decisions through 
reinforcement learning. These systems likely work alongside a third system of relatively 
automatic responses, which developed through evolution, with emotional contagion an 
example relevant to prosocial behaviour. 
The role of costs and benefits is also formalised in the sociocultural appraisals, 
values, and emotions framework for prosocial behaviour (Keltner et al., 2014). This model 
includes terms for: benefits for the self (extrinsic – strategic & intrinsic – altruistic); benefits 
for the recipient (outcome-orientation); and costs of inaction (punishment – strategic & 
guilt – altruistic). The sum of these terms is weighed against the costs of the prosocial action. 
All costs and benefits are scaled depending on what the default action is, defined by the 
individual differences. Terms are also scaled by several situational factors: recipient-
independent factors; recipient-dependent factors; and the social encouragement of or 
resistance to prosocial behaviour. In the next section I consider these individual and 
situational factors  
2.8. Situational factors 
Much of the research described above used experimental manipulations to isolate 
contexts in which only certain prosocial motivations can drive behaviour, and tested 
differences in behaviour between these. For example, making donations anonymous and 
removing opportunities for reciprocity isolates altruistic motivations. This decreases levels 
of giving, compared to strategic contexts. Such situational differences are usually part 
defining and testing different motivations. In addition to these, other situational factors 




As prosocial decisions are defined by benefitting others, who they are is likely to be 
important. Previous research has identified a number of factors relevant to the recipients 
that impact prosocial and altruistic decisions. Papers 3 and 4 expand the behavioural work 
on several key examples, described below, using physiological and neural measures. 
2.8.1. The number of people 
Anecdotal evidence from events in the real world and behavioural studies outlined 
here suggest the relationship between the number of people suffering or in need and the 
response is not linear. Responses include emotional reactions such as sadness or outrage, 
media coverage, and altruistic behaviours, such as donations to charity. The balance of these 
responses is likely to depend on whether the people have already suffered or whether the 
situation can still be resolved. There is also evidence that stories of people who have already 
died can promote altruistic behaviours to help others affected by a similar issue (Slovic et 
al., 2017). 
A nonlinear scaling of responses, as the number of people increases, is known as 
scope insensitivity (Dickert et al., 2015) or psychophysical numbing (Fetherstonhaugh et 
al., 1997). An extreme example is the singularity effect, in which the largest responses are 
to just one person, creating an inverse relationship (Schelling, 1968; Västfjäll et al., 2014). 
In a study on refugees, images of large groups, compared to small groups, negatively 
impacted compassion and political attitudes (Azevedo et al., 2019). Learning about this bias 
reduced contributions to singular beneficiaries to the same, lower level as statistical 
appeals, rather than raising giving to larger numbers of people (Small et al., 2007). Greater 
humanisation of single others, compared to groups, could also explain aversions to 
sacrificing one life to save others in moral dilemma situations (Majdandžić et al., 2012). 
An alternative pattern is that as the number of people increases, the response also 
increases but not in a proportional way. This nonlinearity has been demonstrated in the 
policymaking (Olivola, 2015) and charitable giving (Cameron and Payne, 2011) domains. 
Finally, in some situations, these could patterns combine so responses increase up to a 
certain number of people, but then plateau or decrease beyond this point. There are two 
broad explanations for this collapse of compassion, an inability to feel emotional when large 
numbers of people suffering (Slovic, 2007) or a motivation to avoid doing this (Cameron 
and Payne, 2011). 
Scope insensitivity mainly relates to responses towards a whole group of different 
sizes. A related but separable bias is proportion dominance, the effect of the reference group 




also known as pseudoinefficiency (Västfjäll et al., 2015), describes situations in which the 
proportion of people saved or helped is valued over the absolute number of people.  
Proportion dominance becomes non-normative when less people are helped as a 
result. For example, in a choice between two medical aid programs, choosing to support 
option A, to save 68 of the 80 lives in one camp, over option B, to save 70 of the 680 lives in 
a second camp, sacrifices two people to help a greater proportion (Bartels, 2006). Similarly, 
the number of people who cannot be helped introduced negative emotions that damped 
positive feelings about helping (Västfjäll et al., 2015). There is evidence that proportion 
dominance is caused by faulty deliberative reasoning (Mata, 2016), such that people 
perceive greater utility from helping a higher proportion (Erlandsson et al., 2014). 
2.8.2. Amount of information 
Another factor shown to affect levels of prosocial behaviour is the amount of 
information about the recipient. This often works in tandem with the singularity effect to 
create what is known as the identifiable victim effect (Lee and Feeley, 2016) although it 
should be noted that describing beneficiaries of charitable donations as “victims” can be 
demeaning, so is avoided here. Identifiability combined with singularity is often utilised in 
charity campaigns that describe a single recipient with personal information such as their 
name and a photo.  
It could be argued that information is one possible mechanism behind scope 
insensitivity, as it is only feasible to have information about small numbers of people, but 
there is also evidence these factors are separable. For example, a meta-analysis found a 
small but significant effect of an identified person on prosocial responses, independent of 
number, particularly when a monetary appeal featured a photograph of a child suffering 
from poverty (Lee and Feeley, 2016). Similarly, a photo of the recipient was shown to 
increase activation in the nucleus accumbens during charitable donations (Genevsky et al., 
2013). 
Information about the need of the recipient has also been used as an experimental 
manipulation, to generate conditions of high empathy. In one example, information about 
need decreased negative ERP signals in response to costly transfers to others (Liu et al., 
2018). Certain types of information may promote empathy more than others, for example a 
target is sad, rather than angry (Sassenrath et al., 2016).  
Information could also be in the form of requests from the beneficiary, which were 
common when speaking was allowed in the dictator game and increased giving (Andreoni 




instructed to put themselves in the recipient’s shoes. One possible explanation is that a lack 
of information allows justifications for selfishness in the dictator game, for example that the 
recipient could be richer than the decider (Aguiar et al., 2008). Finally, greater contributions 
to beneficiaries who have already been selected, compared to those who will be selected in 
future, showed the power of minimal identifiability (Small and Loewenstein, 2003). 
2.8.3. Recipient identity 
Information about the person or people who benefit introduces several additional 
factors that affect giving, including personal attributes. Much research has focused on the 
relationship between the personal attributes of the decider and the recipient, with 
similarity predicting giving (Loewenstein and Small, 2007). A common manipulation is 
whether beneficiaries are part of the deciders ingroup or outgroup, with increased giving 
towards ingroup members (Meier, 2011). Empathy was a stronger predictor of ingroup 
than outgroup helping (Stürmer et al., 2005) and interacting with members of ones ingroup 
and outgroup activates different neural networks (Rilling et al., 2008). Giving was higher to 
liked, compared to disliked, peers and patterns of brain activity differed between conditions 
(Schreuders et al., 2018). 
Social distance can also be considered along a continuum, rather than a binary factor 
of ingroup or outgroup, with the closest others being good friends, family and partners. 
Feelings of interdependence towards friends predicted vicarious reward responses equal 
to rewards for the self (Varnum et al., 2014). Similarly, passively observing a friend, 
compared to a stranger, play a gambling game showed stronger ERP responses (Q. Ma et al., 
2011). Dorsal striatal activity was related to affective empathy when helping a romantic 
partner, but cognitive perspective taking when helping a stranger (Kawamichi et al., 2013). 
This suggests different processes underlie helping others at different social distances. 
Similar effects of social closeness on (non-costly) helping behaviours have also been shown 
in monkeys (de Waal et al., 2008). 
Much work on social closeness has contrasted very close others with strangers or 
compared ingroups with outgroups are that stigmatised or in conflict. Whether this factor 
is significant for more subtle differences in social distance is less clear. For example, ties to 
one’s home country was the least important factor in predicting donations to developing 
countries (Hansen et al., 2014). Factors representing the need, including hunger, 







In addition to social closeness, physical proximity can also increase prosocial 
behaviour. At the extreme, being in the presence of someone suffering is a powerful 
motivator. A thought experiment asks whether we should save a child from drowning in a 
pond, even if it means ruining expensive shoes and clothes. This is contrasted with donating 
the cost of shoes and clothes to save the life of a child in a distant place (Singer, 1972). 
Physical proximity was shown to increase donations, with greater expected impact 
underlying this effect (Touré-Tillery and Fishbach, 2017). Proximity also motivated 
donations following natural disasters, through counterfactual thinking that the donor could 
have been personally affected by close events (Zagefka, 2018).  
Like the overlap between singular and identified beneficiaries, social and 
geographical proximity often align, so are difficult to separate in experimental designs. 
Results from manipulating salient identity suggested that identity mechanisms are 
responsible for physical proximity effects (Levine and Thompson, 2004). Nagel and 
Waldmann (2013) also found that the distance effect on moral obligation disappeared when 
confounds, including informational directness and personal involvement, were accounted 
for. 
Proximity could also apply to closeness in time, of either the need for help or the 
impact of helping. Outside prosocial behaviour, research shows evidence of temporal 
discounting, a preference for positive outcomes closer in time (Frederick et al., 2002). How 
temporal discounting relates to prosocial decisions is likely to depend on the specific choice, 
including the delay length and whether it applies only to the cost to the self, only to the 
benefit for others, or both these outcomes. 
Interestingly, some research has looked at the relationship between social 
discounting, based on social closeness, and temporal discounting. These two forms of 
discounting were associated with common activity patterns in brain regions including 
frontal areas, linked to control, and mesolimbic reward networks (Hill et al., 2017). An 
experimental manipulation of thinking about outcomes for others, or in the future, reduced 
social discounting (Yi et al., 2016). Patterns of choices were shown to be similar between 
those affecting others and affecting oneself in the future (Pronin et al., 2007). 
2.8.5. Frame 
Another application of research outside prosocial behaviour to altruistic decisions 




losses are often perceived as more salient than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When 
giving money to another player in a dictator game, the receiver is not commonly framed as 
suffering or in need, although it may be suggested that they have experienced bad luck or 
unfairness in the allocation. The gift is likely to be conceptualised in a gain frame, increasing 
the welfare of the receiver above their current level of wellbeing.  
In contrast, donations to charity could be framed as avoiding losses, in life, health, 
and wellbeing, or the same content could be presented as opportunities to save or improve 
a life. There has been debate and mixed findings on which frame is more effective. For 
example, participants helped refugees more when their action prevented a loss, rather than 
achieved a gain (Böhm et al., 2018), whereas other theories suggest positive messages about 
the impact of help are more powerful. Erlandsson et al. (2018) argue that these differences 
can be explained by the operationalisation of effectiveness. Positive appeals generate 
favourable attitudes towards the cause, but negative appeals are better or equally as 
effective in promoting donations.  
Losses and gains may also be differentially affected by temporal discounting 
(Tanaka et al., 2014), demonstrating the potential for interactions between factors. 
Similarly, abstract statistical information in a charity appeal was most effective when 
combined with a negative frame, whereas the efficacy of anecdotal information was 
increased through a positive frame (Das et al., 2008). In contrast, another study 
manipulating message framing and whether statistical information used small (1 in 3) or 
large (700 million in 2.1 billion) numbers found positive frames better for large numbers 
but negative frames for small numbers (Chang and Lee, 2010). 
While negative information or upsetting photos may be motivating, most real-world 
giving behaviours involve several points at which the person could disengage from the need. 
For example, someone could not open appeal letters or change channels during a television 
appeal. Research on the link between valence and information seeking is also relevant to 
prosocial decisions. When information about outcomes for the self has no instrumental 
value, results showed a bias towards information likely to be positive, and avoidance of 
information likely to be negative (Sharot, 2011). Findings from corresponding 
neuroimaging studies suggest an intrinsic value of information likely to be good news 
(Charpentier et al., 2018). Optimistic updating of beliefs has also been shown in relation to 







In the above review, I have outlined some of the key situational factors, with a focus 
on those relevant to the thesis. This is by no means a comprehensive list. Other factors 
linked to the recipient that increase giving include perceived deservingness (Petersen et al., 
2011; Seu, 2016), lack of perceived responsibility for the situation (Zagefka and James, 
2015) and “reference-dependence”: whether the problem is due to a recent change rather 
than chronic (Small, 2010). 
Considering the potential contributor, mood (both state and trait) can affect 
altruism (Boenigk and Mayr, 2015; Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2014) but there were mixed 
findings on the directionality of this effect and interactions with the wider context (Weyant, 
1978). The presence of other potential contributors negatively impacted helping. 
Explanations for this “bystander effect” include freezing (Hortensius and de Gelder, 2018) 
and strategic mentalising to calculate that someone else will help (Thomas et al., 2016). In 
contrast, the presence of others who are observers, not potential helpers, increased 
prosocial behaviour, with this effect stronger for friends than strangers (Li and Zhao, 2019). 
Other relevant factors that define the wider context of prosocial behaviour include the 
salience of social norms promoting helping or sanctions for not helping (Meier, 2011). 
This chapter has focused on factors that increase the benefits of helping or the costs 
of not helping. There are also situational factors that increase the costs of helping such as 
high self-risk. Evidence from fMRI and tDCS support a role of the right dlPFC in integrating 
levels of this self-interest with other-need in decision making (J. Hu et al., 2017). In a dictator 
game where the endowments were at risk of being lost, participants actually increased their 
giving despite the risk that there would be a cost but no benefit (Engel and Goerg, 2018). 
2.8.7. Relevance to motivations 
Understanding the factors that increase and decrease the likelihood and extent of 
prosocial behaviours is crucial for organisations that rely on donations and volunteering. 
These factors also give further insight into the motivations driving prosocial decisions. 
Different factors enhance the various benefits of giving, and costs of not giving, that each 
motivation relates to. For example, the fact that information about the recipient affects 
behaviour suggests this recipient-dependent input is considered during decisions to help. 
Some situational factors create biases, where behaviour diverges from that which would be 
expected if motivations were outcome oriented. Examples are scope insensitivity and non-




promote giving in the way that makes the donor feel best, rather than maximising the 
benefits for recipients. 
A series of studies on the proportion dominance effect, identifiability effect and 
ingroup effect highlight the role of different mechanisms in explaining situational effects on 
giving (Erlandsson et al., 2017, 2015, 2014). Ratings of charitable appeals and justifications 
after donation decisions suggested emotional reactions drive the identifiability effect, 
perceived impact underlies proportion dominance, and increased responsibility for helping 
ingroups accounts for that effect. 
2.9. Individual differences 
The previous section highlights situational factors that can make people more or 
less prosocial. There is also huge variance between people in levels of prosocial behaviour 
and altruism. Individual differences along the selfish to selfless spectrum have been linked 
to biological and genetic differences (Sonne and Gash, 2018), with the heritability of helping 
behaviour estimated at 11% (Primes and Fieder, 2018). Despite situational influences, 
prosociality has been shown to be relatively stable across time and different economic 
games (Yamagishi et al., 2013), leading to claims of a ‘cooperative phenotype’ 
(Peysakhovich et al., 2014). This domain-general prosocial trait was also called a general 
benevolence dimension and there is evidence it increases with age (Hubbard et al., 2016). 
Another related term is social value orientation, measured through questions on 
hypothetical giving decisions that vary in costs and benefits to self and other (Murphy et al., 
2011). Answers categorise individuals as prosocial (cooperative or altruistic) or proself 
(competitive or individualistic). Prosocials reported more charitable donations, especially 
to causes helping the poor and the ill (Van Lange et al., 2007). There were also differences 
in brain activity, with only prosocials showing ERP sensitivity to other gain vs loss (X. Hu et 
al., 2017), and positive other-regarding reinforcement learning signals in vmPFC 
(Christopoulos and King-Casas, 2015). Finally, in a strategic cooperation task, different 
decision-making strategies were inferred from different patterns of neural activity between 
prosocials and proselfs (Emonds et al., 2011). 
There has been much debate on whether being prosocial or selfish is the default or 
intuitive response (Rand, 2016). Evidence in both directions has come from reaction time 
and brain stimulation experiments, although there are issues with these inferences 
(Hallsson et al., 2018). It now seems that recognising individual differences may explain 
these mixed results. Faster decisions resulted in choices more closely aligned with general 




showed slower responses, and more activity in neural regions linked to cognitive control, 
during non-costly prosocial decisions (Kuss et al., 2015). However, a different study 
concluded that helping is more effortful for prosocial individuals (Ruci et al., 2018). 
Identifying independent predictors of individual differences, rather than measuring 
these differences directly, provides further insight into the motivations behind prosocial 
behaviour and their neural basis. In this sense, psychological traits may be more relevant 
than demographic variables such as age, although demographics are often more practically 
useful for fundraising organisations (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2007). 
2.9.1. Empathy 
One of the most widely studied traits in relation to prosocial behaviour is empathy, 
which can be separated into cognitive and emotional components at the trait, as well as the 
state, level. Generosity in the dictator game was linked with greater theory of mind abilities 
(Lang et al., 2018). Perspective taking may also indirectly effect prosociality, through 
decreasing the relationship between negative emotions and personal distress in volunteers 
(Eisenberg et al., 1994). Perhaps perspective taking prevents self-focused responses 
dominating. Trait prosociality was also linked to resting current density in the TJP (Gianotti 
et al., 2019), a region often linked to theory of mind (Decety and Lamm, 2007). However, 
this region is also associated with attention. Prosociality has been linked with an ERP 
component associated with salience (Chiu Loke et al., 2011), in line with this alternative 
interpretation. 
Another component of empathy is emotion sharing or neural self-other overlap in 
emotion processing. Extremely altruistic individuals, who donated a kidney, showed more 
similar representations of self and other pain, both when anticipated and experienced 
(Brethel-Haurwitz et al., 2018; O’Connell et al., 2019). Extraordinary altruists also had 
increased behavioural sensitivity and right amygdala volume and responsivity to fearful 
expressions, whereas psychopathic people showed the opposite pattern (Marsh et al., 
2014). Similarly, people who struggle to recognise and experience the distress of others 
were less generous, had reduced activation in the AI and TPJ, and had greater alexithymia: 
an inability to recognise one’s own emotions (FeldmanHall et al., 2013). Finally, activity in 
networks associated with self-other resonance positively correlated with dictator game 
offers (Christov-Moore and Iacoboni, 2016). In contrast, connectivity between these regions 
and areas linked to top-down control was negatively correlated with offers.  
In addition to enhanced overlap for negative emotions promoting altruism, empathy 




negative emotions, was associated with activity in nucleus accumbens and OFC and both 
this neural marker and one for personal distress predicted charitable donations (Ashar et 
al., 2017). Empathic concern also correlated with ventral striatum activity during gains for 
a charity, reported enjoyment when winning for the charity and larger donations to charity 
(Spaans et al., 2018). Similarly, striatal activity when watching a friend win correlated with 
prosociality (Morelli et al., 2018). Finally, the reward signal in the ACC gyrus was unique to 
others’ rewards for participants high in emotion contagion, but also signalled rewards for 
the self in those low in emotion contagion (Lockwood et al., 2015). 
More broadly, empathy correlated with prosocial intervention behaviours and the 
amplitude of a prefrontal ERP response to interventions (Balconi and Canavesio, 2013). 
Empathic concern, but not compassion, was linked with increased activity in the subgenual 
cingulate during experiences of guilt (Zahn et al., 2009). Trait empathic concern, rather than 
trait personal distress, predicted costly altruism and activity in the subgenual cingulate, 
caudate, and ventral tegmental area (FeldmanHall et al., 2015). Increasing trait compassion 
through training increased altruistic behaviour, activity in the inferior parietal cortex and 
dlPFC, and connectivity from dlPFC to NuAcc (Weng et al., 2013). 
In addition to evidence from neuroimaging, research has linked other biological 
mechanisms with empathy and prosocial behaviour. Vagus nerve activity is one example, 
with evidence that this regulates the physiology underlying emotional expression and 
experience, emotional and cognitive empathy, and personal distress (Kogan et al., 2014). 
These authors show a quadratic relationship between vagal activity and prosocial measures 
including traits, emotions, and observer ratings, such that a medium level of activity 
predicts prosociality. 
The heart is one organ innervated by the vagus nerve and direct measures of the 
heart have also been linked to prosocial behaviour, in particular heartrate variability, which 
differs between people. Those with high heartrate variability were better at identifying 
others’ positive mental states but there was no difference for negative states (Lischke et al., 
2017). Heartrate variability can also be regulated voluntarily and individual differences in 
how well participants could do so predicted differences in altruistic behaviours 
(Bornemann et al., 2016). 
In summary, empathic concern has been associated with a variety of different 
prosocial behaviours. However, in one study, meaningful correlations were only found for 
spontaneous, informal helping behaviours towards someone in need who was present 




not present. Differences in neural activity between people high in empathy and 
‘systemisers’ also seem to disappear during explicit empathy tasks (Riekki et al., 2018). 
Although empathy is commonly linked with positive increases in prosocial 
behaviour, there can be downsides. Empathy can lead to helping behaviours more defined 
by social preferences and biased by partiality, drivers which may conflict with fairness and 
justice (Batson et al., 1995; Bloom, 2017; Decety and Cowell, 2015; Ugazio et al., 2014). 
2.9.2. Guilt 
Like empathy, guilt is a process underlying prosocial behaviour across people, but 
also differs as a trait between people. An association between traits such as empathy and 
guilt support their role in prosocial behaviour more broadly. While empathy is the process 
of understanding others’ thoughts and emotions that can affect one’s own emotions, guilt is 
the negative emotion associated with not helping, so anticipating guilt promotes helping. 
Proneness to guilt at the trait level improved models of prosocial behaviour above 
empathy alone and this effect was stronger for women (Torstveit et al., 2016). It could be 
suggested that guilt is a product of empathy, if it relies on understanding others, but there 
is not strong evidence for this relationship (Lindsey et al., 2007). 
2.9.3. Ambiguity 
An interesting but often overlooked aspect of prosocial behaviour is uncertainty 
which can be separated into risk (known probabilities of outcomes) and ambiguity 
(unknown probabilities). In strategic games, the probability that a cooperative decision 
increases extrinsic reward depends on predictions about the others’ behaviour. Tolerance 
to ambiguity, but not risk, predicted increased cooperation and trust in strategic games, but 
only when there was some level of ambiguity about the other player’s actions (Vives and 
Feldmanhall, 2018). In the real-world, it is unlikely that altruistic decisions lead to outcomes 
for the beneficiary with 100% certainty. Individual levels of risk aversion were shown to be 
positively associated with inequity aversion in a distributive justice task (Palmer et al., 
2013b).  
2.9.4. Other 
As with the section on situational factors, many more individual-difference 
measures have been studied in relation to prosocial behaviour than are covered here. 
Generally desirable traits that show positive relationships with prosocial behaviour include 
agreeableness (Habashi et al., 2016), gratitude (Yost-Dubrow and Dunham, 2018), self-




Interestingly, narcissism (Chen et al., 2019) and neuroticism (Pinazo et al., 2016) are also 
linked to increased prosocial behaviour. In support of strategic or recipient-independent 
motivations, trait reputational concern increases helping towards strangers (Kawamura 
and Kusumi, 2018), but so does belief in other-focused altruistic motivation (Carlson and 
Zaki, 2019).  
Other traits show more nuanced associations with prosocial behaviour, for example 
justice sensitivity predicted the stability of altruism (Lotz et al., 2013). Emotional 
intelligence moderated the impact of successful or unsuccessful outcomes on helping 
behaviour (Agnoli et al., 2015). Two traits associated with mindfulness also both predicted 
helping behaviour (Cameron and Fredrickson, 2015). Present-focused attention was related 
to positive emotions, whereas non-judgmental acceptance negatively correlated with 
negative emotions, like stress and guilt, during helping.  
Socioeconomic status is an interesting demographic variable as it combines 
financial and identity components. While wealthier individuals give more overall, the 
relationship between wealth and proportion of income donated is not so clear (Bekkers and 
Wiepking, 2007). There is evidence that individuals of a lower social status are more 
prosocial (Guinote et al., 2015) and suggestions that the relationship between class and 
helping depends on motivation, identity and inequality (Piff and Robinson, 2017). In the 
brain, stronger responses to others’ pain was positively associated with donations in high 
subjective socioeconomic status, but negatively associated with donations in low status 
individuals (Y. Ma et al., 2011). 
2.10. Interactions between situational and individual factors 
The above sections summarise some of the main individual differences and 
contextual factors that affect prosocial behaviour, but these can also interact in different 
ways. A simple interaction is that the contextual factors may have different strength 
relationships with prosocial behaviour between individuals. For example, only some people 
showed an ingroup effect in prosocial behaviour and those who didn’t actually preferred 
rewards for the outgroup (Hackel et al., 2017). There may be trait measures that account 
for these differences, for example powerful people dehumanised outgroup members to a 
greater extent (Lammers and Stapel, 2011). Individual differences in the strength of other 
situational effects are accounted for by decreased trait empathy. These include greater 
temporal discounting for distant others (O’Connell et al., 2013) and a greater detriment of 




Considering the situational factors relevant to the number of people, those low in 
analytic thinking donated more to one identified beneficiary, compared to statistical need 
or both. In contrast, those higher in the analytic thinking trait did not show this effect 
(Friedrich and McGuire, 2010). There was no evidence for a mediating role of emotion in 
these results. Trait numeracy ability also interacted with the format of donation requests 
(Dickert et al., 2011a). Only those low in numeracy ability were affected by mental images, 
whereas perceived impact of a donation correlated positively with donations, regardless of 
numeracy ability. Numeracy ability was also negatively associated with donations in 
response to requests with a loss frame (Mayr, 2012). 
Another final possible pattern of interaction is when trait differences in prosociality 
predict different responses to situational manipulations. For example, in experimental 
conditions to create empathy and reciprocity-motivated altruism, selfish people only 
increased their altruistic behaviour in response to empathy inductions, whereas altruistic 
people only increased altruism in response to reciprocity inductions (Hein et al., 2016). 
Traits have also showed relationships with specific aspects of helping situations, such as 
empathy increasing perceived injustice (Urbanska et al., 2019) or agreeableness promoting 




3. Overview of the thesis 
The above review covers the existing literature on motivations for prosocial 
behaviour and the neural basis of these, as well as the situational and individual factors that 
increase or decrease prosociality. The following section highlights outstanding gaps in the 
literature and the contribution of the studies in this thesis. 
3.1. Summary of papers 1 and 2 
The studies described above support the existence of both strategic and altruistic 
motivations for prosocial behaviour and begin to suggest their neural correlates, but some 
results are mixed. Two previous studies comparing the strategic ultimatum game with the 
altruistic dictator game found different results (Weiland et al., 2012; Zheng and Zhu, 2013).  
Paper 1 uses fMRI meta-analysis to identify the neural correlates of altruistic 
decisions, strategic decisions, commonalities across, and differences between these 
categories of prosocial decision. The paradigms that create opportunities for strategic 
motivations, through extrinsic rewards for being prosocial, do not exclude the possibility 
that altruistic motivations also play a role in these decisions. However, a comparison of 
contexts where extrinsic rewards are possible, with those where they are not, can identify 
the additional processes involved in strategic motivations for prosocial behaviour.  
An fMRI meta-analysis also increases statistical power and overcomes issues with 
existing single-study fMRI papers, including small sample sizes (Button et al., 2013; Cremers 
et al., 2017) and low statistical thresholds (Eklund et al., 2016). However, results of meta-
analysis are still affected by variable coverage in the original studies caused by lack of signal. 
Paper 2 presents a novel technique to account for this issue and demonstrates its effect on 
two data sets. 
One of the key results from paper 1 shows that both types of prosocial decision, 
compared to choosing the selfish alternative, correlated with activity in reward-related 
regions, including the NuAcc and vmPFC. These findings support the idea that other people 
can have value in both an intrinsic and extrinsic way. Others offer opportunities for 
collaboration and cooperation, which can increase extrinsic benefits, such as money or 
other resources. For altruistic decisions, this shows the neural basis of the intrinsic reward 






3.2. Summary of papers 3 and 4 
As identified in the literature review, one possible reason that altruism is rewarding 
is that people value the lives of others. If this is the case, we can then consider when and why 
people value the lives of others. Based on the findings in the literature review, particularly 
on empathy and vicarious reward, we can predict that if people do value the lives of others 
they will: 
i. Get distressed when bad things happen to others 
ii. Feel good when good things happen to others 
iii. Be interested in what happens to others 
iv. Show similar biases in valuing outcomes for self and other (on the basis that 
people value their own life and wellbeing) 
v. Take actions to improve outcomes for others 
Papers 3 and 4 test the first four of these predictions to some extent by measuring 
physiological and neural responses respectively to others’ lives being at risk and the 
outcome of whether they live or die. 
We created the stimuli used in these studies from real news stories. In addition to 
testing overall responses to deaths and threats to life, the designs also manipulate whether 
the story happened in the UK or abroad and how many people were affected. These factors 
relate to two biases I described in the section on situational factors: geographical proximity 
and scope insensitivity. So far, these biases have only been researched using behavioural 
measures.  
However, widely used self-report techniques are not well suited to measuring 
biases, particularly within-subjects. Participants may be unaware of their biases or the true 
motivations behind their decisions. A further issue with any measure that participants have 
conscious control over is the social desirability of the responses or behaviours of interest 
(Fernandes and Randall, 1992). Participants may act differently in experimental settings 
than they would in the real world, undermining the relevance and utility of the findings.  
Overall, we find physiological arousal responses and activity in areas associated 
with negative emotions and empathy when lives are at risk and lost. In some contexts, 
deaths are differentiated from the people surviving. These findings are in line with people 
valuing the lives of others.  
However, our results also show that skin conductance and fMRI measures reveal 




and neural responses vary, based on geographical location, and show a non-linear 
relationship with the number of people. These findings suggest the extent to which the 
suffering of others affects us varies along these factors. The value of a life is not constant.  
3.3. Summary of paper 5 
Papers 3 and 4 give evidence that the lives of others are valued, from physiological 
and neural responses to passively viewing information about other people. The next 
question is how this translates into motivations to improve outcomes for others. As 
described in the literature review, altruism can be outcome oriented, focused on the change 
in wellbeing for the other, or action oriented, focused on personal responsibility for that 
change. 
Paper 5 presents five experiments that aim to develop a behavioural measure of the 
role of responsibility for an outcome in determining interest in that outcome. The design 
was inspired by previous work showing that participants were more interested in outcomes 
that are likely to be positive, than those likely to be negative, when they affect the 
participant themselves (Charpentier et al., 2018). We first test whether this bias towards 
positive outcomes extends to outcomes affecting other people, then examine whether it 
depends on being responsible for that outcome. 
The general method used in paper 5 involved participants completing rounds of a 
task to win money on behalf of themselves and another person. Another participant did this 
task simultaneously and a fourth person had already completed the task. Participants could 
then find out about outcomes. The multiple players provide a 2x2 design of who was 
responsible for the outcome (I play or they play) and who was affected by it (for me or for 
someone else). Outcomes in these 4 conditions also had either a positive or a negative frame. 
The main measure of interest was whether participants chose to find out the outcome of the 
trial.  
We find evidence of outcome-oriented motivations to some extent, as participants 
did find out about outcomes affecting others that they were not responsible for. In some 
contexts, they showed a similar effect of frame (positive or negative) for outcomes affecting 
others and themselves. However, we also find evidence that being responsible for an 
outcome increases interest, in line with action orientations. Both interest and the extent of 
a bias towards positive information were increased when the participant was involved in 
some way – either responsible for or affected by the outcome.  
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The decision to share resources is fundamental for cohesive societies. Humans can be 
motivated to give for many reasons. Some generosity incurs a definite cost, with no extrinsic 
reward to the act, but instead provides intrinsic satisfaction (labelled here as ‘altruistic’ 
giving). Other giving behaviours are done with the prospect of improving one’s own 
situation via reciprocity, reputation, or public good (labelled here as ‘strategic’ giving). 
These contexts differ in the source, certainty, and timing of rewards as well as the inferences 
made about others’ mental states. We executed a combined statistical map and coordinate-
based fMRI meta-analysis of decisions to give (36 studies, 1150 participants). Methods 
included a novel approach for accommodating variable signal dropout between studies in 
meta-analysis. Results reveal consistent, cross-paradigm neural correlates of each decision 
type, commonalities, and informative differences. Relative to being selfish, altruistic and 
strategic giving activate overlapping reward networks. However, strategic decisions 
showed greater activity in striatal regions than altruistic choices. Altruistic giving, more 
than strategic, activated subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC). Ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is consistently involved during generous decisions and 
processing across a posterior to anterior axis differentiates the altruistic/strategic context. 
Posterior vmPFC was preferentially recruited during altruistic decisions. Regions of the 
‘social brain’ showed distinct patterns of activity between choice types, reflecting the 
different use of theory of mind in the two contexts. We provide the consistent neural 







The decision to share resources is a cornerstone of any cooperative society. The 
motivations that drive these choices, however, will vary. Giving can be driven by intrinsic 
rewards, such as conditioned satisfaction from performing a generous act or the image of 
oneself as a ‘good person'. On the other hand, giving can also be driven by strategic 
forethought of extrinsic rewards that might be gained through reciprocity, avoidance of 
punishment, or a public good. Some may argue that ‘why’ we give does not matter, as long 
as we do. However, understanding the ‘why’ is essential for determining the likelihood of 
prosocial behaviour in the absence of extrinsic benefit, such as when the beneficiary could 
never return the favour or when societies, which depend on prosocial behaviour, do not 
provide defined incentives. It can also help us understand how intrinsic and extrinsic drives 
interact in the decision process. 
Over a decade of innovative neuroimaging studies have provided a fresh window 
into the old problem of why we give. Through this lens, we can see whether different 
motivations to help one another use different neural (and therefore cognitive) mechanisms. 
This then provides the basis for studying how these neurocognitive mechanisms may vary 
independently between contexts and individuals. This insight could also help to explain 
other phenomena. For instance, overlapping anatomy of intrinsic and extrinsic drives could 
underpin the effect of extrinsic incentives ‘crowding out’ altruistic motivations (Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), or make clear how intrinsic and extrinsic benefits sum in strategic 
decisions to help each other. 
 However, no systematic meta-analysis has examined the consistency of these 
findings on prosocial decision-making (see Filkowski et al., 2016 and Luo, 2018 for 
descriptive reviews, Gabay et al., 2014 for neuroimaging meta-analysis of ultimatum game 
responders and Bellucci et al., 2017 for trust games). With this meta-analysis, we 
investigated the consistent neural correlates of decisions to give and differences in these 
correlates that depend on whether there is potential for extrinsic gain through the 
interaction. 
We define altruistic choices to give as generous acts with no opportunity to gain 
extrinsic rewards as a direct result of that interaction. Motivations for giving in these 
contexts rely on intrinsic rewards. Sources of intrinsic reward or ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 
1990, 1989) can include vicarious reward experience (Mobbs et al., 2009); relief of 
empathic concern (FeldmanHall et al., 2015); self-enhancement from adherence to moral 




parental feedback). Warm glow could also result from inferences of enhanced reputation 
(Izuma et al., 2010) in the eyes of an experimenter or omniscient religious figure, despite 
no defined benefit of that enhanced reputation. Intrinsic incentives to give are often studied 
with dictator games (Kahneman et al., 1986), donations to charities, or payments to prevent 
others from coming to harm (Table 1).  
We define strategic choices to give as generous acts that might increase the 
probability of a defined extrinsic reward. Strategic choices can involve the intrinsic rewards 
of altruistic choices (Capraro, 2017), but add the possibility of extrinsic gain, which is 
thought to be the dominant weight in the decision process (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
Extrinsic benefits could come through avoiding punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002); 
reciprocity of the recipient (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr et al., 2002); collective 
contributions to a public good (Chaudhuri, 2011); enhanced gains from cooperation (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004) or rewards from defined future interactions through having an 
enhanced reputation (Milinski et al., 2001; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). Paradigms used to 
study strategic giving (Table 1) include the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982); trust game 
(Berg et al., 1995); public goods game (Rapoport, 1987); prisoners’ dilemma (Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957); and repeated versions of these games which include opportunities for 
reputation building.  
For altruistic choices, goal-attainment based on most intrinsic incentives begins at 
the time of the action, without delay. As a result, most intrinsic rewards are relatively 
certain. Warm glow can be modulated, in part, by the gift’s (delayed and uncertain) impact 
on the recipient, but for most paradigms (all those included here), the participant does not 
observe this impact. Strategic rewards, on the other hand, are weighted to the uncertain 
effects of the gift on extrinsic outcomes. In these cases, goal attainment comes after the 
action, when others respond. Keeping money (which we label ‘selfish’, as opposed to being 
‘prosocial’ by giving, cooperating, or trusting) in a strategic context enhances certainty and 
immediacy of reward, but could also lead to less money. In the altruistic context, a selfish 
choice does not change outcome certainty to the same degree, and will always leave the 








Table 1.  
Explanation and categorisation of tasks used in studies  
Task Description Group 
Dictator game Participant either chooses an amount of their money to 
give or accepts / rejects a proposed split between 




Participant either chooses an amount of their money to 
donate or accepts / rejects a proposed split between the 
participant and a charity. 
Altruistic 
Pain vs. gain Participant can give up varying amounts of money, the 
more given the less painful the electric shock given to a 
partner 
Altruistic 
Ultimatum game Participant proposes a split between themselves and 
their partner that is only implemented if the partner 
accepts it. 
Strategic 
Trust game Participant transfers an amount of money to the trustee 
that is multiplied by some factor (often 3). The trustee 
then chooses an amount to send back which decides the 




Participant and partner decide whether to cooperate or 
defect. They gain mutual benefit if both cooperate but 





Participants invest an amount in a communal fund that is 
then multiplied and divided among all players, including 





The use of theory of mind – inferring others’ mental states (Frith and Frith, 2006), 
also differs between altruistic and strategic decisions to give. In altruistic contexts, theory 
of mind is likely to be more weighted on how another will feel, rather than what they will 
do, considering appreciation, change of emotion, or disappointment of the other. This could 
occur via empathy processes (Lockwood et al., 2015) – feeling what the other is feeling 
(Decety et al., 2015), mentalising, or both, with variability across different people (Tusche 
et al., 2016). Assuming that the inferred appreciation of a gift by the recipient would 
increase motivation to give, greater theory of mind is expected during altruistic decisions 




degree. Intention inferences can motivate either generous or selfish choices and therefore 
be equally associated with selfish and generous decisions.  
In sum, both altruistic and strategic choices incur immediate costs that benefit 
others but differ in the sources, certainty, and immediacy of the associated reward. Theory 
of mind is likely to contribute to both decision types, but differently in each, with different 
dissociations between the prosocial and the selfish choice alternatives, see Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Theoretical presence in altruistic and strategic decisions to give compared 
to a selfish choice and to rest. This can act as a rough roadmap for interpreting 
neural differences between the two types of decision to give as well as each decision 
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Two previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, which 
compared prosocial decisions in the altruistic dictator game with the strategic ultimatum 
game, report inconsistent findings and interpretations (Weiland et al., 2012; Zheng and Zhu, 
2013). There was qualitatively no overlap of activation between them, creating concerns for 
the consistency and generalisability of reported differences. A third fMRI study using both 
ultimatum and dictator games to study childhood development of strategic social behaviour 
did not focus on the contrast between generous and selfish choices, but interestingly the 
difference in gift sizes between the two games (Steinbeis et al., 2012). 
An fMRI meta-analysis integrates prior findings to increase the statistical power to 
detect reliable, consistent neural correlates of decision types (Müller et al., 2018; Wager et 
al., 2009, 2007). This is vital given that many fMRI reports are based on small sample sizes 
(Button et al., 2013; Cremers et al., 2017) and do not meet the new standards of high 
statistical thresholds recently shown to be required for confidence in effects (Eklund et al., 
2016). In addition to the advantages associated with coordinate-based meta-analysis, our 
use of unthresholded maps enhances sensitivity (Radua and Mataix-Cols, 2012) and reduces 
assumptions of the spatial extent of activations. Our meta-analysis also allows new 
combinations and contrasts of different task types. 
In this study, we do not make firm predictions of specific neural regions, remaining 
agnostic to previous findings as much as possible with a data-driven approach. One area 
that was identified as a region of interest a priori, however, was the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC), as it is has been reliably linked to subjective value and decision-making 
(Bartra et al., 2013; Levy and Glimcher, 2012) including prosocial choices (Hare et al., 2010). 
It is also a large, cytoarchitecturally heterogeneous region (Mackey and Petrides, 2010) 
with varying connectivity (Sepulcre et al., 2010) and different sources of value show 
different activity patterns across it (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2016; Sescousse et al., 
2013). We therefore looked at activation across this region in more detail than the rest of 





The present meta-analysis aims to answer four basic questions across the whole 
brain, with added focus on vmPFC: 
i) What is common to altruistic and strategic decisions to give? 
ii) What is consistent about altruistic decisions?  
iii) What is consistent about strategic decisions?  
iv) How do altruistic and strategic decisions differ? 
There are examples of real-world decisions that do not fit into our defined groups, such as 
tax deductions from charitable giving or defined payments for blood donation. We also do 
not cover outcomes of decisions such learning a person appreciated a gift or rewards 
associated with choosing a winning strategy. The scope of this meta-analysis is fMRI 
paradigms for which the data at the point of a decision is available. By better understanding 
the neural basis of altruistic and strategic decisions as defined here, we provide a foundation 
for investigations in other contexts, as well as a milestone for research over the last fifteen 
years.  
2. Method 
2.1. Literature search and study selection 
Literature searches using PubMed and Web of Science identified research added 
before September 2016. Keywords were either “fMRI” or “neur*” as well as one of: “altruis*”, 
“charity”, “charitable”, “prosocial”, “cooperation”, “public goods”, “social value orientation”, 
“reputation”, “dictator”, “ultimatum”, “trust game”, “prisoner*”. We identified additional 
potential articles from reference lists of selected articles or those offered by authors (Figure 
2). Articles were considered if they reported novel fMRI data, not reported elsewhere, 
collected while participants made decisions, and analysed whole-brain data. For studies 
that either used psychopharmacological manipulations or tested populations other than 
healthy participants, we requested data from just the control group.  
In addition, studies were screened for eligibility for the two groupings. Decisions in 
the altruistic group were defined as decisions that benefitted at least one other person at a 
cost to the self, with no potential for an extrinsic benefit. Paradigms were dictator games, 
pain vs gain or donation tasks. Decisions in the strategic group benefitted at least one other 
person but could also benefit the decision-maker. Common paradigms included trust and 
ultimatum games. Almost all selected studies focused on deciders rather than responders 
in these games. Responders, who may be prosocial due to reciprocity norms, have been 




the responder role in a trust game but with a clear incentive for participants to build up a 
prosocial and trustworthy reputation in order to receive future investments. All 
participants thought partners were human, which was true in some cases but not others. 
For all studies, the data were from the decision phase of the task. 
Overall, we identified 35 altruistic and 45 strategic fMRI studies and requested 
statistical maps from the authors. Due to substantial methodological variation across 
studies, letters requested the decision of interest contrasted with as many as possible of a 
high-level control, baseline of some kind and the selfish choice. Obtaining multiple maps for 
a study maximised the likelihood of similarities between studies and shows whether 
specific contrasts affected results. If maps were not available, we requested coordinates for 
contrasts of interests or extracted them from manuscripts. Of these, a coordinate-based 
analysis was available for eight studies, while others did not report the required contrasts 
in manuscripts.  
Of 35 altruistic studies, 18 authors provided usable maps (51% response rate) and 
three had coordinates, resulting in data from 557 participants in this group. Of 45 strategic 
studies, 10 authors provided maps (22%) and five had coordinates, giving data from 593 
participants in this group. 
2.2. Analysis 
A combined image and coordinate-based meta-analysis of retrieved data was 
conducted using Anisotropic Effect Size Signed Differential Mapping software (AES:SDM, 
Version 4.31; Radua et al., 2014). When available, statistical maps enhance the sensitivity of 
the analysis and allow incorporation of both positive and negative differences. With 
coordinates, the software recreates estimated statistical maps from coordinates and their 
effect sizes using an anisotropic kernel. If the contrast of interest was available in both 
directions (e.g. cooperate > defect and defect > cooperate), the opposite peaks became 
negative t-values. The incorporation of study sample size increases the weight of larger 
studies. 
A random-effects model, using the recommended 50 permutations, implemented all 
maps. This creates 50 random models with the same number of foci as the map of interest 
and tests the null hypothesis that the map’s activations are the result of random distribution 
throughout the brain. Thresholding parameters used were those recommended by Radua 
et al. (2012) who found a voxel-level threshold of p<0.005 to approximate p<0.05 corrected 
and optimally balance specificity and sensitivity. Reported z-scores are specified as SDM-Z 




2.3. Contrasts and covariate 
The available datasets used a range of control conditions broadly classified as rest 
(including one-sample tests), visuomotor controls, or selfish decisions. These controls vary 
significantly across multiple processes so we used an overall covariate in our models that 
codes for comparator complexity to control for differences, rating control conditions from 1 
to 4 (see Supplementary Materials S1.2. for details).  
For separate analyses of altruistic and strategic decisions, variance attributed to 
complexity was used to model contrasts between prosocial (generous) decisions and rest 
(a contrast where the covariate is at its modelled minimum) and between prosocial and 
selfish decisions (where the effect of the covariate is at its modelled maximum). By including 
the covariate in the model, we aimed to allow specificity in our interpretations of activity 
while maintaining statistical power (by including all available data). In addition, we 
specifically contrasted prosocial choices to the selfish alternative, only in the studies that 
had this comparison. This enabled tests of robustness that require a relatively homogenous 
group (see Supplementary Materials for details S1.3. and results S2.1.1.).  
We used SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) 
to extract areas of overlapping activation common to altruistic and strategic decisions, for 
example areas significant in both the altruistic > selfish and strategic > selfish maps. These 
maps were those from the overall analyses described above which use the comparator 
complexity covariate to model contrasts with rest and selfish decisions while incorporating 
all studies. 
Differences between the decision types were calculated in both directions (altruistic 
> strategic and strategic > altruistic) using linear models in AES:SDM. For these 
comparisons, we entered comparator complexity as a covariate of no interest. Comparisons 

































Figure 2. Flow diagram of studies included and excluded at each stage of 
identification and verification following PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009). 
 
Records identified through 
Pubmed database searching  


































Additional relevant records identified 
through Web of Science  
(n = 23) 
Records after duplicates removed  
(n = 720) 
Titles relevant  
(n = 325) 
Records excluded  
(n = 395) 
Full-text articles assessed for 
eligibility  
(n = 510) 
Full-text articles 
excluded  
(n = 431) 
Studies with maps included  
(n = 28) 
(altruistic = 18, strategic = 10) 
Additional relevant records 
identified through reference lists  
(n = 162) 
Eligible papers identified for inclusion  
(n = 80) 
(altruistic = 35, strategic = 45) 
Studies with coordinates included  
(n = 8) 
(altruistic = 3, strategic = 5) 
 
Reasons for unavailability of maps / coordinates: 
(altruistic, strategic) 
Same data as another paper included (n = 2, 2) 
Data needed doesn’t exist (n = 3, 2) 
Author not able to send data (n = 7, 18) 
No response from author (n = 0, 8) 





2.4. Labels and atlases 
As AES:SDM uses a white matter template for labels, these were converted to grey 
matter labels with the Harvard-Oxford atlas in FSL (FMRIB Software Library, 
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). We also labelled regions according to labels used in relevant 
literature. The temporoparietal junction (TPJ), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) and dorsomedial PFC 
(dmPFC), coordinates were used from the a priori regions of interest constructed by Telzer 
et al. (2011). However, we refer to their medial PFC here as the vmPFC and extend this 
region further ventral and posterior compared to the boundaries of that paper for our ROIs 
(see below). We also used connectivity-based parcellation atlases in FSL for further 
subdivision of the dorsal PFC (Sallet et al., 2013) and medial PFC and cingulate (Neubert et 
al., 2015). 
2.5. ROI Analysis 
To test the prediction that different types of prosocial decision may show different 
patterns of activation across the heterogenous vmPFC, values were extracted from across 
an anatomical axis. These regions were defined a priori by spheres used previously 
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2016) and similar to methods used in recent studies (De 
Martino et al., 2017; Nicolle et al., 2012; Sul et al., 2015; Yankouskaya et al., 2017). Effect 
sizes were extracted from single voxels along the same axis for our analysis (see details in 
Supplementary Materials S1.4. & Figure 8).  
2.6. Accounting for dropout 
 A key region of interest, the vmPFC, is known to suffer from distortion and dropout 
during fMRI scanning due to factors including proximity to air and bone around the sinuses 
(Ojemann et al., 1997). While techniques have been developed to minimise this (Weiskopf 
et al., 2007) they are not universally employed and the inclusion of older studies in the meta-
analysis meant that the coverage needed to be examined. This was done by binarising each 
map, after registration to a common template, based on whether there was signal in each 






Figure 3. Coverage maps showing the number of studies with data in each region, x 
= 0, n = the number of studies available and the maximum possible coverage. 
 
These maps show a decline in coverage around the anterior and inferior edge of the 
vmPFC, particularly for altruistic studies. With missing data represented as values of 0, this 
lack of coverage risked false negatives in reported results. To overcome this, we ran an 
adjusted analysis by modifying the calculations run by AES:SDM using SPM12 to only include 
studies with data present, on a voxel by voxel basis (see details in Supplementary Materials 





Details of studies included in the meta-analysis 








Sig Contrast selected Definition & additional info 
Control / 
code 
The focus of the study The method used in the study 
Altruistic group  
Hare 2010 22 22/22 22 Map 3T 8 SPM5 <.05 C PM by amount given Free trials only S / 4 
Social value computations Accept or decline proposed (doubled) payoff to charity  
Izuma 2010 29 12/23 23 Map 3T 6 SPM5 <.001 U Donation vs fixation Only when not observed R / 1 
Effect of an observer Accept or decline the same payoff each time to a charity  
Telzer 2011 25 13/25 25 Map 3T 8 SPM5 <.05 FDR 
Costly donation vs 
fixation 
Across ethnicity R / 1 
Whether self-control and mentalising activation when giving to 
family and if moderated by family obligation values 
Accept or decline proposed payoff to self and family - costly / non-costly reward / donation 
Brosch 2011 19 11/19 19 Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.05 FWE 
Costly donation vs 
control 
Control = self and charity -1 V / 3 
Self-interest and openness to change values Accept or decline proposed payoff to self and charity - reward, (non)costly donation, control 
FeldmanHall 2012 20 8/14 14 Peaks 3T 8 SPM <.001 U 
PM by amount given (+) 
and amount kept (-) 
Only in real decisions S / 4 
Real vs hypothetical moral decisions Real and imagined pain vs gain task  
Morishima 2012 30 17/30 27 Map / 8 SPM8 <.05 FWE Donation vs selfish  S / 4 
Whether altruism correlates with TPJ structure and function Choose between 2 proposed payoffs for self and other - advantageous or disadvantageous inequality 
Gunther Moor 2012 53  31/53 49 Map 3T 8 SPM5 <.001 U Generous vs fixation 
Across ages (22 age 10-12, 16 
age 14-16, 15 age 19-21) 
R / 1 
Developmental differences in dictator game after exclusion Dictator allocations to people who included or excluded participants during previous cyberball game 
Lelieveld 2012 26 17/26 18 Map 3T 6 SPM5 <.001 U  
Prosocial decision vs 
selfish 
Data doesn’t separate response 
from decision 
S / 4 
Effect of receiver's emotional reaction Participants who split 6-4 in dictator game split again after emotional feedback from receivers 
Genevsky 2013 30 14/22 22 Peaks 3T 4 AFNI <.05 C Donation vs not donating Across conditions S / 4 




Kuss 2013 33 17/33 33 Map 3T 6 SPM8 <.001 U 
Costly donation vs pure 
self-interest 
Control: self-interest choices V / 3 
Motivation for donating using reward prediction error Choose between 2 proposed payoffs for self and other – (non)costly donations, self-interest or efficiency 
Guroglu 2014 28 17/28 22 Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.001 U Generous vs selfish  S / 4 
Activations linked to inequity, regardless of benefactor Choose between 2 proposed payoffs for self and other – fair or unequal benefitting either self or other 
Pulcu 2014 15 9/15 14 Map 3T 5 SPM8 <.05 FWE Generous vs control 
Healthy controls only, control: 
no gains 
V / 3 
Altruism activity in remitted major depressive disorder Accept or decline proposed payoff to self and charity – (non)costly donations, both gain, P gains, no gains 
Koban 2014 22 10/22 17 Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.001 U Sharing vs keeping Human partner, conflict trials S / 4 
Activity related to interpersonal conflict for resources Participant to share or keep resources when they and another player chose the same token (conflict) 
FeldmanHall 2015 19 11/17 17 Peaks 3T 8 SPM5 <.001 U  PM by amount kept (-)  With no covariates S / 4 
Personal distress vs empathic concern explanations Pain vs gain task 
Hutcherson 2015 61 0/61 51 Map 3T 8 SPM5 <.05 FWE 
Prosocial decision vs 
selfish 
Decisions always created a 
selfish and a prosocial choice 
S / 4 
Propose and test a model of altruistic choice Accept and rate 1-4 (strong no, no, yes, strong yes) split between self and other, 40% decisions reversed 
Strombach 2015 27 13/27 23 Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.005 U Generous vs selfish Across social distances S / 4 
Effect of social distance on prosocial decision activity Choose between 2 proposed payoffs for self and other (diff social distances) - one selfish and one generous 
Telzer 2015 29 13/29 26 Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.05 FWE Generous vs fixation Across ethnicity and recipients R / 1 
Cultural differences in ingroup and outgroup helping Choose between 2 proposals for self or other - ingroup donations, outgroup donations and pure reward 
Will 2015 28 16/26 26 Map 3T 8 SPM5 <.001 U Generous vs fixation Across includes and excluders R / 1 
Correlates of punishment and forgiveness after exclusion Dictator allocations to people who included or excluded participants during previous cyberball game 
Kuss 2015 40 22/40 36 Map 
1.5
T 
 SPM <.05 FWE 
Costly donation vs 
control 
Across prosocials and proselfs, 
control: both benefit 
V / 3 
Impact of social value orientation individual differences Choose between 2 proposed payoffs for self and other – (non)costly donations, self-interest or efficiency 
Tusche 2016 33 15/33 32 Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.05 FWE High vs low donations 
Scale $0-$50, ‘selfish’ = lowest 
½ donations 
S / 4 
Differences in neural patterns for different giving motives  Decide on a scale how much to donate to a charity 
Will 2016 46 28/46 46 Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.001 U Costly prosocial vs selfish Across stable and rejected S / 4 







Delgado 2005 14 6/14 12 Peaks 3T 4 
Brain 
Voyager 
<.001 U Trust vs defect Across reputations S / 4 
Effect of responder's responses and reputation Repeated trust game after reading description of responder and getting feedback on their decisions 
Krueger 2007 44 22/44 44 Peaks 3T 8 
Brain 
Voyager 
<.005 U Trust vs control Control similar to trust game V / 3 
Neural mechanisms of building trust Alternating non-anonymous multi-round trust game 
Sharp 2011 10 0/10 10 Map 3T 4 AFNI <.001 U 
Trust vs keep / 
rest 
Healthy controls only, across partners  
S&R / 
4&1 
Reputation and reward processing in young boys with 
externalising behaviour problems 
Trust game with peers rated aggressive, kind or neutral 





control / one 
sample 
Used data from both participants as 
alternated roles, control: lottery 
V&R / 
3&1 
Effect of being excluded Trust game after being excluded or not by different players 
Stanley 2012 51 22/40 40 Peaks 3T 6 SPM8 <.05 C  
PM by amount 
sent 
Human only, across exclusion S / 4 
Effect of race as a reputation proxy on trust Trust game with people of different races 
Fouragnan 2013 20 0/20 18 Peaks 4T 8 SPM8 <.05 FWE Trust vs keep Across partners S / 4 
Effect of reputation on response to trust violations Trust game with cooperative and individualistic partners with a reputation for being one or the other 
Smith-Collins 2013 27 27/27 24 Peaks 
1.5
T 
8 SPM8 <.001 U 
Cooperate vs 
control / defect 




How brain updates representations of partners to learn Two round trust game with the same players, receiving feedback on trustworthiness after first 
Bault 2014 29 12/29 25 Map 3T 5 FSL <.05 FWE 
PM by amount 
sent 
Across social distances S / 4 
Dynamic model of social tie development Repeated public goods game with the same partner 






Across ethnicity and group given to S / 4 
Differences between prosocials and proselfs in neural activity 
and impact of trust 












Giving back vs not 
/ rest 




Gender differences in reputation building  Act as trustees in trust game with either reputation being monitored or not 
Fett 2014 45 0/45 45 Map 3T 8.8 XBAM  Trust vs control Control: put cursor to target V / 2 
Modulation of mentalising by attachment style Prisoner’s dilemma game with measures of attachment style 
Ramsøy 2015 14 11/14 14 Peaks 3T 8 SPM8 <.05 FWE 
Cooperate vs 
defect 
Across frames S / 4 










Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.001 U 
Cooperate vs 
control / defect 
Control: “#” appeared in matrix – no 
points or partner 
S&V / 
4&2 






93 Map 3T 5 FSL <.05 FWE 
Cooperate vs 
defect 
Only placebo group with humans S / 4 
Oxytocin & vasopressin effects during cooperation Iterated prisoner’s dilemma following administration with human or computer partner (total N = 304) 
Fermin 2016 41 18/33 33 Map 3T 8 SPM8 <.005 U 
Cooperate vs one 
sample / defect 
Across prosocials and proselfs 
S&R / 
4&1 
Differences between prosocials and proselfs in structure and 
function 
Prisoner’s dilemma with measures of SVO 
 
Note. tN = total sample in study, N = sample used in analysis, F = number of female participants as a fraction of tN or N depending on information 
provided, T = field strength of scanner in tesla, FWHM = full width half maximum size of smoothing kernel, sig = significance threshold used in 
study (this is relevant for studies with peaks but provided for those with maps to show peak thresholds are in line with other research), U = 
uncorrected for multiple comparisons, C = corrected for multiple comparisons, FWE = with family-wise error correction, FDR = with false 
discovery rate correction, PM = parametric modulation. Control: R = rest (including one sample t-tests), V = visuomotor control, S = selfish 






3.1. Mean analyses 
3.1.1. Altruistic 
Compared to being selfish, making a prosocial choice in an altruistic context showed 
significant activation in nucleus accumbens (NuAcc), subgenual (subcallosal) area of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), vmPFC, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), left dlPFC (Sallet et 
al., 2013 area 8B), pre-supplementary motor areas (pre-SMA), posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC) and right cerebellum. Regions showing greater activation during selfish than 
altruistic decisions included bilateral dlPFC (areas 46 & 9), bilateral putamen, right caudate 
nucleus, bilateral posterior STS, bilateral frontal poles, and left amygdala (Figure 4a & Table 
3). 
Comparisons to ‘rest’ tell us how the brain is responding generally, in the decision 
context. These maps can be useful for making future predictions, but also aid the 
interpretation of the other contrasts. For instance, a region being ‘more active’ in one 
condition compared to another may counterintuitively actually reflect relatively less 
deactivation in that condition, relative to a common baseline.  
Figure 4. Mean activations from altruistic meta-analytic maps from modelled 
contrasts using the complexity covariate modelled A: at maximum – selfish control 
and B: at minimum – rest control (thresholded with permutation analysis run in 







Peak activations from modelled contrasts using complexity coordinate for altruistic vs. selfish 
Peak label BA* coordinates SDM-Z Vox 
  x y z   
Altruistic > selfish       
L striatum 25 -4 6 -12 3.38 1798 
R orbitofrontal cortex 11 22 16 -20 2.81 360 
R inferior temporal gyrus 20 44 -10 -36 2.37 158 
L orbitofrontal cortex 11 -22 16 -22 2.61 97 
Posterior cingulate gyrus  0 -38 2 2.39 92 
L frontal operculum cortex 47 -40 28 4 1.96 67 
L middle frontal gyrus 44 -54 24 30 2.04 65 
L superior frontal gyrus  -16 34 44 1.72 46 
L inferior temporal gyrus 37 -56 -56 -14 2.23 38 
R parahippocampal gyrus  24 -14 -34 1.75 17 
R cerebellum, crus II  46 -68 -42 1.67 16 
R middle temporal gyrus 21 60 0 -18 1.67 13 
L orbitofrontal cortex  -34 32 -8 1.85 12 
R cerebellum, hemispheric lobule VI 37 34 -38 -34 1.71 12 
R inferior temporal gyrus 20 60 -28 -24 1.85 10 
       
Selfish > altruistic       
L supramarginal gyrus 22 -52 -46 14 3.38 526 
R middle temporal gyrus  46 -34 -4 3.75 374 
L temporal occipital fusiform cortex 19 -30 -62 -6 2.96 332 
L frontal pole  -22 44 24 2.76 225 
R putamen  26 -2 6 2.58 73 
R caudate  18 -16 26 2.95 66 
L putamen  -26 2 4 2.58 60 
R inferior lateral occipital cortex  34 -72 12 3.08 57 
R inferior frontal gyrus 45 50 34 6 2.53 29 
L amygdala  -26 -10 -16 2.41 19 
L superior lateral occipital cortex  -20 -78 18 2.43 17 
R frontal pole  26 38 22 2.23 15 
L precentral gyrus 6 -28 -12 54 2.32 11 
L lingual gyrus  -26 -54 4 2.25 11 
L precentral gyrus  -40 -10 40 2.37 10 
L precentral gyrus  -50 -6 50 2.32 10 
R precentral gyrus 6 54 0 46 2.41 10 
R frontal pole 47 48 38 -6 2.17 10 
Note. L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z= SDM 
z-value of activation, Vox = number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than 





Altruistic decisions contrasted with rest showed significant activation in ACC 
(Neubert et al. 2015 area 8m), right anterior insula (AI), bilateral dlPFC (area 46V), SMA 
and occipital cortex. Areas less active during the decision were vmPFC extending into left 
dmPFC, posterior insula, left precuneus, separate dlPFC regions (areas 8B & 46D), bilateral 
vlPFC, and temporal sulci, including TPJ and the pSTS in both hemispheres (Figure 4b & 
Supplementary Table 1).  
3.1.2. Strategic 
Strategic prosocial decisions, compared to selfish decisions, related to significantly 
higher activation in bilateral NuAcc, sgACC, vmPFC, ACC, right precuneus, right amygdala 
and regions of the cerebellum. Selfish strategic choices related to more activity in left TPJ, 
anterior middle temporal regions, right temporal pole and pre and postcentral gyri (Figure 
5a & Table 4).  
 
Figure 5. Mean activations from strategic meta-analytic maps from modelled 
contrasts using the complexity covariate modelled A: at maximum – selfish control 
and B: at minimum – rest control (thresholded with permutation analysis run in 









Table 4.  
Peak activations from modelled contrasts using complexity coordinate for strategic vs. selfish 
Note. L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z= SDM 
z-value of activation, Vox = number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than 
one BA, none is reported either by AES:SDM software, or here. 
 
Compared to rest, strategic prosocial choices evoked similar results to altruistic 
prosocial choices in the equivalent analysis: activation in ACC (area 8m), bilateral AI, 
widespread bilateral dlPFC regions, SMA and occipital cortex. In addition, strategic 
decisions showed activation in bilateral putamen and the right caudate. Deactivation was 
across vmPFC, left dmPFC, bilateral posterior insula, bilateral precuneus, left dlPFC (area 
8B), left vlPFC, bilateral TPJ and posterior & anterior STS regions (Figure 5b & 
Supplementary Table 2). 
Peak label BA* coordinates SDM-Z Vox 
  x y z   
Strategic > selfish       
Paracingulate / anterior cingulate cortex  14 48 10 4.14 1017 
L striatum  -6 2 -12 5.47 659 
R precuneus cortex  12 -54 34 3.39 82 
Cerebellum, vermic lobule VIII  18 -58 -42 4.45 26 
R orbitofrontal cortex  22 28 -10 3.73 26 
R amygdala  18 4 -18 3.11 26 
Middle cerebellar peduncles  28 -46 -38 3.32 14 
R superior lateral occipital cortex 39 42 -68 42 2.91 15 
R cerebellum, crus I  28 -86 -28 3.19 11 
L cerebellum, hemispheric lobule VIII  -14 -60 -44 3.12 11 
R cerebellum, hemispheric lobule IX  6 -54 -46 2.96 10 
       
Selfish > strategic       
R postcentral gyrus  54 -10 20 2.07 65 
R temporal pole 21 52 6 -32 2.65 44 
R brainstem  16 -28 18 3.03 41 
R precentral gyrus  8 -20 56 2.09 36 
L angular gyrus 39 -40 -56 22 2.63 32 
R precentral gyrus  18 -12 60 2.51 29 
L postcentral gyrus 43 -62 -8 32 2.47 13 
L middle temporal gyrus 20 -58 -14 -28 2.06 12 





Overlaps were analysed using SPM to identify regions significant in both altruistic 
and strategic maps for a given contrast. These maps use the complexity covariate to model 
contrasts with rest and selfish decisions while incorporating all studies.  
Compared to the selfish alternative, both types of prosocial choice showed 
overlapping activity in left NuAcc, ACC (sgACC and area 32), vmPFC and right OFC (Figure 
6a). There was no overlap of areas responding more to the selfish choice (selfish > 
prosocial). 
 
Figure 6. Overlap between altruistic and strategic decisions maps from modelled 
contrasts using the complexity covariate A: vs. selfish decisions and B: vs. rest.  
 
When contrasted with rest, altruistic and strategic decisions both activated bilateral 
ACC (area 8m), right AI, bilateral thalamus, bilateral SMA, pre-SMA, bilateral occipital and 
parietal cortices. Altruistic and strategic decisions showed overlapping deactivations in 
vmPFC, right temporal pole, left precuneus, left dlPFC (area 8B), right posterior insula, left 
OFC and bilateral TPJ & posterior STS (Figure 6b).  
3.3. Comparison 
Areas more active during altruistic prosocial choices than strategic prosocial 
choices were the sgACC, left TPJ, left anterior STS, left inferior frontal gyrus, right temporal 
pole, right inferior temporal gyrus and bilateral thalamus. Strategic prosocial choices, 
compared to altruistic prosocial choices, showed more activity in the right NuAcc, left 






Figure 7. Comparisons between altruistic and strategic decisions controlling for 
complexity (thresholded with permutation analysis run in AES:SDM). Coronal image 
in radiological orientation (right = left). 
 
Table 5. 
Regions showing significantly greater activation in altruistic or strategic studies. 
Note. L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z= SDM 
z-value of activation, Vox = number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than 
one BA, none is reported either by AES:SDM software, or here. Activations are after 
controlling for the complexity of the control task. 
  
Peak label BA* coordinates SDM-Z Vox 
  x y z   
Altruistic > strategic       
R temporal pole 21 52 6 -32 2.45 27 
L angular gyrus 39 -40 -54 22 2.55 26 
L inferior frontal gyrus  -40 32 2 2.40 21 
L thalamus  -14 -28 18 2.79 14 
Subcallosal cortex 11 4 22 -20 2.10 15 
R thalamus  16 -28 18 2.37 12 
L middle temporal gyrus 21 -66 -30 -4 2.25 12 
R inferior temporal gyrus 20 46 -18 -30 2.57 10 
       
Strategic > altruistic       
R middle temporal gyrus  52 -38 -4 3.98 110 
R inferior frontal gyrus 45 50 34 6 3.42 76 
R middle temporal gyrus  52 -22 -16 4.23 49 
R striatum 25 4 6 -8 3.72 13 
R frontal pole 46 30 44 34 3.17 13 




3.4. ROI analysis 
Previous findings have shown that trajectories across the vmPFC can delineate 
decision types. Values were examined at the same 20 y and z coordinates (see 
Supplementary Figure 1) for x = 0, x= 4 and x = -4. Results reported here are from x = 4 as 
this plane showed the most striking differentiation but results for x = 0 and x = -4 were 
similar (see Supplementary Materials S2.2. and Supplementary Figure 5).  
We ran linear models on each study’s extracted effect sizes for each voxel using (i) 
all the data, including zero values and (ii) only the studies with data in that voxel, on a voxel-
by-voxel basis. In both cases, a mixed-effects model was a better fit than a fixed-effects 
model. 
Both analyses revealed an interaction between vmPFC voxel location and decision 
group, (i) t(22)=3.11, p=.005; (ii) t(21.1)=3.31, p=.003. Altruistic activation was greatest in 
posterior vmPFC, as suggested by the whole brain results, and decreased moving anterior, 
whilst strategic activation increased along this axis (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. vmPFC ROI analysis: average effect sizes of activation for each group for 
each voxel at x = 4, not including studies with no data in that voxel (see 
Supplementary Figure 1 for exact location of voxels and Supplementary Figure 5 for 





3.5. Adjustment for dropout 
As predicted, the analysis adjusting for missing data (see Supplementary Materials 
S1.5. for details) showed increased effect sizes across the lower vmPFC where dropout was 
most severe (Figure 3). Activations based on SDM-Z > 2.3 uncorrected were larger in the 
adjusted than the original analysis for the altruistic mean activations (Figure 9a). This 
threshold was chosen as a common value for thresholding, close to the average of the critical 
SDM-Z values generated in the permutation tests for the original analyses and AES:SDM 
analyses run with the 50% of maps with the best coverage.  
For the comparison where altruistic > strategic prosocial choices, posterior vmPFC 
activations were either larger than the original analysis or shown only in the adjusted 
analysis (Figure 9b). In the original comparison where strategic > altruistic prosocial 
choices, no vmPFC activation was significant when thresholded using AES:SDM permutation 
analysis and very little showed SDM-Z > 2.3. However, when adjusting for dropout, a small 
region of activation in anterior vmPFC shows SDM-Z scores greater than 2.3 (Figure 9b). 
 
Figure 9. Adjusted analysis accounting for vmPFC dropout. Increased effect sizes 
(Hedges’ G; top row) and larger regions showing SDM-Z > 2.3 (bottom row) in the 
adjusted analysis compared to the original. A: altruistic contrasted with selfish 
decisions (n = 12), B: comparison between altruistic and strategic decisions (n = 24). 








This meta-analysis shows there is consistency in neural processes during decisions 
to give, using over a decade of fMRI research and over one thousand participants. Within 
each type of decision to give (altruistic and strategic), activations are present across a 
variety of tasks, suggesting common core processes. There are also differences between the 
two types of decisions to give, which are thought to reflect the differences in the source of 
reward, timing, certainty, and application of theory of mind.  
We structure our discussion around the basic questions for the meta-analysis, 
though some discussion of contrasts inevitably crosses into more than one section. We focus 
on established social cognition and reward networks, given these are the most common 
networks discussed in the independent studies, but also highlight activations outside of this 
familiar territory.  
All thresholded and unthresholded statistical brain maps are available at 
https://neurovault.org/collections/3987 and details of peaks (as well as maps) can be 
downloaded from https://doi.org/10.25377/sussex.c.4155923. Since a discussion of each 
individual activation is not feasible in this discussion, we encourage the reader to use these 
maps, together with provided tables, for their reference, inference, and convenience in 
future research.  
4.1. What is common to altruistic and strategic decisions to give? 
Sharing with others in either context consistently activates regions associated with 
reward. Compared to selfish decisions, NuAcc, vmPFC, OFC sgACC and ACC (area 32) are 
more active when an individual decides to give. These regions are established elements of 
the reward and value-computation networks (Bartra et al., 2013). A NuAcc activation, for 
instance, gives a moderately strong likelihood that a reward process is occurring (Ariely 
and Berns, 2010) and responds to multiple reward types (Levy and Glimcher, 2012) 
including money, intrinsic reward (Genevsky et al., 2013; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Moll et al., 
2006) and strategic cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002).  
These signals may represent different concepts in the two contexts. While intrinsic 
reward may accompany strategic prosocial choices, these activations could also signal 
anticipation of an extrinsic benefit. This would suggest intrinsic altruistic motivation shares 
neural circuits with extrinsic motivation, supporting the common neural currency proposal 
(Levy and Glimcher, 2012) for multiple aspects of prosocial decision-making. Speculatively, 




was once freely given, following introduction of extrinsic incentives, by ‘crowding out’ the 
intrinsic motivations represented within the same neural circuits (Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997). Such a conclusion however, would need direct experimentation. 
Being selfish, relative to being prosocial, does not overlap much between strategic 
and altruistic contexts, save for a small region of the parietal operculum. This suggests the 
underlying processes and expectations are likely to be rather different. In altruistic 
contexts, the contrast may represent a preference for self over others or loss aversion (Tom 
et al., 2007). In strategic contexts, the choice is more likely driven by predictions of others’ 
behaviour and the desire to reduce uncertainty.  
As expected for any contrast with rest, altruistic and strategic generosity show 
overlapping widespread deactivation of the ‘default mode’ network and activation of the 
‘task-activated’ network (Fox et al., 2005). These activations, such as in ACC and AI, could 
reflect domain-general processes such as deciding between multiple options (Kennerley et 
al., 2009). They could also reflect more specific processes common to both contexts, for 
example negative aspects of the prosocial choice including disutility (Zaki and Mitchell, 
2011), distress (Zanon et al., 2014), and conflict (Koban et al., 2014). Finally, these 
activations could represent different processes in each context. For altruistic giving 
compared to rest, AI and ACC activity could underlie empathy (FeldmanHall et al., 2012a; 
Gospic et al., 2013; Hein et al., 2010). More relevant for risky strategic giving (Apps et al., 
2016), ACC activation could reflect greater ambiguity or risk (Krain et al., 2006) or an 
increase in effort and prediction (Vassena et al., 2017).  
Regions less active than baseline during both types of decision to give include 
vmPFC, TPJ and STS which are implicated in both social decision-making (Decety and Lamm, 
2007; Frith and Frith, 2003; Schurz et al., 2014) and resting-state networks (Damoiseaux et 
al., 2006; Mak et al., 2017). This fits with previous demonstrations of quantitative overlap 
(Acikalin et al., 2017) and discussion on what these processes may share (Mars et al., 2012). 
Critically, these effects highlight the importance of the control task when making inferences; 
the ‘activation’ associated with a prosocial decision might actually be less deactivation which 
only becomes evident with a comparison to rest. 
4.2. What is consistent about altruistic decisions?  
During altruistic decisions, the consistent activation of reward networks 





In addition to regions common to both types of choices to give, generous altruistic 
decisions compared to selfish choices activate other regions, including left dlPFC (area 8B), 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), pre-SMA and right cerebellum. In an analysis restricted to 
studies with a selfish choice contrast, we also found bilateral precuneus. See below for 
discussion of these regions.  
The reverse contrast identifies additional activation for selfish choices over 
altruistic ones in putamen, caudate, pSTS, dlPFC (areas 46 & 9), left amygdala and, in the 
subgroup with selfish contrasts, bilateral posterior insula. The putamen, caudate and 
amygdalae have all been linked to aspects of reward processing (Haruno and Kawato, 2006; 
Holland and Gallagher, 2004; but see also Miller et al., 2014) and have high levels of 
interconnectivity (Roy et al., 2009). These parts of the reward network may be less sensitive 
to intrinsic rewards and more sensitive to extrinsic benefits of keeping the goods.  
There have been claims the dlPFC inhibits selfish tendencies to produce prosocial 
decisions (Feng et al., 2015; Knoch et al., 2009, 2006; Strang et al., 2014) but also findings 
supporting the reverse, that the inhibition is of prosocial impulses (Christov-Moore et al., 
2016; Yamagishi et al., 2016). Our finding in area 8B corresponds with the former model 
but our pattern of results for areas 46 and 9 fits with the latter. This anatomical 
differentiation could explain the differences in previous conclusions if, for example, these 
stimulation studies targeted different subregions. Other theories (Buckholtz, 2015; 
Gershman et al., 2014) suggest the lPFC could be integrating norms into decisions – 
disrupting right lPFC affects adherence to rules in gift-giving contexts (Gross et al., 2018). 
Altogether, these results provide the signature activations of altruistic giving 
decisions to use in future investigations of their connectivity and more specific roles in 
prosocial behaviour. 
4.3. What is consistent about strategic decisions?  
During strategic decisions to give, reward circuit activation could represent either 
extrinsic reward expectancy, which is usually higher for the prosocial choice contingent on 
the partner’s behaviour, or intrinsic satisfaction. The signature of a generous strategic 
decision also includes activation of precuneus, right amygdala and regions of the 
cerebellum. Analysis limited to studies with the selfish contrast also shows activity in right 
dlPFC (area 46), left amygdala and the right frontal pole.  
The precuneus shows similar, but not overlapping, activation for both altruistic 




the PCC being more active for altruistic than selfish decisions, these regions linked to 
mentalising (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Schurz et al., 2014; Waytz and Mitchell, 2011), 
empathy (Jackson et al., 2006) and guilt (Morey et al., 2012) did show results in line with 
increased perspective taking during prosocial choices. 
Activation in the amygdala for strategic decisions fits with our interpretation of 
reward expectancy during selfishness in altruistic paradigms. In strategic tasks it could also 
be interpreted as encoding estimated immediate cost of the gift (Gospic et al., 2013). 
Previous studies have shown activity scales with the amount entrusted to another (Stanley 
et al., 2012) and is greater in real than imagined decisions (FeldmanHall et al., 2012a; Gospic 
et al., 2013). Outside of prosocial decisions, the amygdala is associated with many other 
relevant processes, including loss aversion (De Martino et al., 2010), fear (Tovote et al., 
2015), aggression (Haller, 2018) and emotion processing (Janak and Tye, 2015) to name 
but a few. Due to the low resolution of a meta-analysis from averaging images and the broad 
scope of the tasks used, this study does not differentiate between specific explanations. 
The consistent neural signature of keeping money in strategic contexts includes 
increased activity in left TPJ, anterior middle temporal regions, right temporal pole and pre 
and postcentral gyri. The specific analysis with selfish controls also showed activity in 
bilateral posterior temporal sulci, left temporal pole, left hippocampus, right supplementary 
motor area, right cerebellum and right posterior insula. If TPJ and pSTS activations 
represent mentalising in this context, these results suggest increased processing about the 
second player is associated with not trusting, valuing, or cooperating with them. For 
altruistic decisions, this was also the pattern for pSTS. 
These findings overall show the consistent pattern of activations during strategic 
giving for extrinsic rewards. Like for altruistic decisions, future work can use this to reveal 
the exact roles and connectivity of regions. 
4.4. How do altruistic and strategic decisions (statistically) differ? 
Contrasts between altruistic and strategic choices make a clear case that that these 
groups of tasks rely on different processes and should not be considered interchangeable in 
the literature. 
4.4.1. Altruistic > Strategic 
Altruistic choices to give correlate with greater activation in a set of reward and 
social cognition regions. These include sgACC, TPJ and various regions of the temporal lobes. 




activity during altruistic choices challenges the idea that strategic decisions encompass all 
the elements of altruistic decisions. 
The sgACC, which is involved in both altruistic and strategic prosocial behaviours 
independently, is particularly active when only intrinsic motivations are available. This 
region also activates during charitable donations (Moll et al., 2006), distinguishes altruism 
from decisions which benefit the individual (Pulcu et al., 2014) and signals prosocial 
learning prediction errors (Lockwood et al., 2016) as well as emotional processing in social 
contexts (Drevets et al., 2008). Activity in sgACC is also linked to a reduced propensity to 
harm others in utilitarian judgements (Wiech et al., 2013). The current meta-analytic 
finding adds weight to the idea that sgACC, together with a network of social cognition 
regions, may play a defining role in altruistic decisions to give.  
4.4.2. Strategic > altruistic 
Strategic decisions correlate with more activity in ventral and dorsal striatum, right 
dlPFC (areas 46 & 46D), right pSTS and right frontal pole. Isolating studies with a selfish 
contrast additionally showed posterior insula and fusiform face area activity.  
Greater right NuAcc activity for strategic than altruistic choices suggests that 
intrinsic and extrinsic responses sum in this region, or extrinsic rewards (if supplanting 
intrinsic rewards) evoke stronger responses. This finding fits with behavioural findings that 
prosocial choices are more frequent in strategic than altruistic paradigms (Zheng and Zhu, 
2013).  
The left caudate also activates more for strategic than altruistic decisions, a pattern 
previously limited to the putamen (Weiland et al., 2012). A closer look suggests that 
differences in dorsal striatum between the task groups may be partly driven by greater 
activity for the selfish choice in altruistic contexts (a difference absent in strategic contexts). 
That may be due to the increase in extrinsic reward obtained by being selfish in an altruistic 
task whereas in strategic scenarios, selfishness often leads to a more certain but lower 
payment than optimum cooperation. The dorsal striatum has also been linked to habitual 
responses (Balleine et al., 2007; Burton et al., 2015; Everitt and Robbins, 2016) which could 
suggest that selfish decisions in altruistic contexts are more habitual and less goal-directed 
than strategic decisions to keep resources (and less sensitive to devaluation).  
As expected, inferences from mentalising-associated regions are not 
straightforward. Compared to strategic gifts, altruistic gifts recruit more left TPJ and left 
anterior STS activity. Overall, when using all studies, strategic activity in right pSTS is 




However, when limited to comparisons with a selfish choice, the altruistic choice to give 
shows greater activity in this region. This discrepancy may result from relatively high but 
similar levels of mentalising activity prior to either response in strategic contexts. In 
contrast, the differential between gifts and selfish choices is higher in altruistic contexts – 
gifts likely involve more other-oriented processing than selfish choices (e.g. representing 
the other’s need or appreciation). 
Outside of mentalising, previous findings show TPJ activation and connectivity also 
peak at maximum conflict, near the maximum one is willing to give and when temptation to 
be selfish is greatest (Morishima et al., 2012; Strombach et al., 2015). This conflict is likely 
to be highest in an altruistic context, when there is no opportunity for financial gain. Overall, 
these social brain regions may have different roles which are recruited to varying extents 
depending on the context of task and what control is used. More work is required to 
understand precisely what they are doing in each context.  
The results for right dlPFC areas 46 and 46D are in line with findings that levels of 
strategic behaviour correlate with differences between ultimatum and dictator game 
activation and cortical thickness (on the left) in dlPFC (Steinbeis et al., 2012). Moreover, 
right dlPFC transcranial direct current stimulation had opposing effects on giving behaviour 
under altruistic and strategic conditions (Ruff et al., 2013), suggesting the exact role of the 
region depends on the context. 
4.4.3. The vmPFC  
Analysis across a ROI axis in the vmPFC, particularly when adjusted for signal 
dropout, suggests altruistic activation declines moving anteriorly in the brain as strategic 
activation increases. Along the same axis, regions of vmPFC show differing connectivity 
patterns (Gallardo et al., 2017): posterior areas connect locally and to limbic regions while 
anterior areas are grouped with distant mentalising regions (Alcalá-López et al., 2017). 
Anterior areas are also directly involved in mentalising under conditions of ambiguity, a key 
feature of strategic tasks (Jenkins and Mitchell, 2010). A similar axis identifies the influence 
of certain social inferences on value judgements (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2016; De 
Martino et al., 2017). Contrasts of this meta-analysis reflect within-participant comparisons. 
Looking between participants, selfish and prosocial individuals also differentially activate a 
similar vmPFC axis during consideration of benefits to the self and benefits to others (Sul et 
al., 2015).  
With relevance to the nature of intrinsic reward, previous meta-analyses have 




are represented more posterior and anterior respectively (Clithero and Rangel, 2013; 
Sescousse et al., 2013). By this, increased strategic activation further forward in vmPFC 
could be interpreted as a reflection of secondary (primarily monetary) rewards, whereas 
altruistic warm glow may activate areas similar to primary rewards.  
There are also other differences between altruistic and strategic decisions, such as 
the certainty and timing of available rewards that may underlie differences this trajectory, 
requiring further study to rule these in or out as explanations.  
4.5. Methodological contributions 
We developed a novel method to adjust for dropout when combining effect sizes in 
a random-effects model that may be useful in future meta-analyses. Results suggests the 
role of vmPFC in prosocial decision-making may be underestimated due to a lack of 
coverage in the region. Future fMRI studies on this topic should always utilise methods to 
minimise this problem (Domsch et al., 2013; Fernandez et al., 2017; Weiskopf et al., 2007) 
and report the coverage of the region if focusing on the vmPFC. 
This study also highlights the importance of a comparison to a selfish control for 
interpretation of findings. Generous and selfish choices in strategic tasks similarly involve 
mentalising and extrinsic rewards, making them more similar than altruistic gifts and their 
selfish alternatives. The latter put extrinsic and intrinsic motivations in direct competition. 
This point may explain discrepancies between the two previous studies comparing 
altruistic dictator and strategic ultimatum games (Weiland et al., 2012; Zheng and Zhu, 
2013).  
4.6. Limitations 
Applying fMRI meta-analysis to prosocial decisions identifies consistent activations 
across studies, tasks and controls. However, averaging ignores connectivity (Hein et al., 
2016) and individual differences such as social value orientation (Emonds et al., 2014, 2011; 
Fermin et al., 2016), attachment style (Schneider-Hassloff et al., 2015), age (Fett et al., 
2014), gender (Krach et al., 2009) and personality (Garbarini et al., 2014). This paper 
includes the decisions of 1150 participants but there are more published studies than had 
maps or coordinates available for analysis.  
Even if all published papers on prosocial decisions had been included, conclusions 
would be limited to specific experimental settings. The separation between altruistic and 
strategic decisions which arises from tightly controlled games is only an abstraction of real-




motivations to work together (e.g. picking the ideal present, effective altruism and others) 
that neuroimaging studies are now only beginning to explore. Moreover the lab differs from 
the real world in other respects. For instance, is difficult to measure reputational motivation 
in lab-based altruistic studies. There is no way to completely prevent the participant 
considering the experimenter’s view of them or their decisions so reputational concerns 
may differ from real-world donation contexts. 
The selfish choice was the most common control condition used in the data we 
received. However, some research suggests that the contrast of prosocial with selfish 
choices can be complicated to interpret and can be influenced by context (Krajbich et al., 
2015). The vmPFC region identified in this meta-analysis has been linked to the overall 
value of a prosocial decision and therefore how long it takes to make (Hutcherson et al., 
2015). It was not possible to incorporate response time into the present analysis, due to 
under reporting of reaction times and reliance on group averages. 
This meta-analysis also grouped different paradigms together under themes (i.e. 
multiple economic games). To precisely control for and differentiate the effects unique to 
individual paradigms would require tightly controlled individual studies or many times the 






This study is the first systematic fMRI meta-analysis to demonstrate the consistency 
and differentiation of neural correlates for strategic and altruistic prosocial decisions. We 
identify the locations of reliable activations for two different types of prosocial choice.  
While we knew both types of gift benefit others, we show that both are also 
consistently rewarding to the giver and share many neural substrates. In contrast, 
mechanisms for the decision not to give appears to vary, depending on the strategic context. 
Despite some similarities, altruistic and strategic decisions to give are not 
interchangeable in the brain. The potential for an extrinsic benefit changes the neural 
mechanism at the point of choice in both level and location of activation. Of the regions 
involved in prosocial choices overall, sgACC activated more for altruistic than strategic 
decisions and NuAcc was more active for strategic than altruistic choices. That any region 
is more involved in altruistic decisions suggests that there is something additive and special 
about giving when the only benefit is a warm glow. Greater reward-network activity for 
strategic decisions is in line with and may account for higher rates of prosocial choices in 
these contexts, compared to altruistic ones. 
Across regions linked to social cognition, results were mixed, reflecting the 
complexity and diversity of theory of mind application in our social lives.  
The changing cytoarchitecture across the vmPFC also differentiates strategic and 
altruistic gifts. Activity increased for strategic and decreased for altruistic choices along a 
posterior to anterior axis in a way that relates well to what we know about the connectivity 
and functions across this region. 
Methodologically, we provide an additional step forward in the methods of meta-
analyses to account for variable signal dropout between fMRI studies.  
With consistent effects in hand, the field can move forward with focused 
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Meta-analyses of fMRI studies are vital to establish consistent findings across the 
literature. However, fMRI data are susceptible to signal dropout (i.e. incomplete brain 
coverage), which varies across studies and brain regions. In other words, for some brain 
regions, only a variable subset of the studies included in an fMRI meta-analysis have data 
present. These missing data can mean activations in fMRI meta-analysis are 
underestimated (type II errors). Here we present SPM (MATLAB) code to run a novel 
method of adjusting random-effects models for meta-analytic averaging of a group of 
studies and mixed-effects models for comparison between two groups of studies. In two 
separate datasets, meta-analytic effect sizes and z-scores were larger in the adjusted, 
compared to the unadjusted analysis. Relevantly, these changes were in regions such as 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex where coverage was lowest. Limitations of the method, 
including issues of how to threshold the adjusted maps are discussed. Code and 







Echo-planar images for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are 
susceptible to signal dropout (Ojemann et al., 1997) leaving gaps in activation maps. The 
level of coverage can vary widely between individuals, scanners, and scan protocols. This 
presents a problem of false negatives (type II errors – wrongly concluding no effect exists) 
for both individual studies and for map-based fMRI meta-analyses.  
The problem of missing data from lack of coverage is limited to a subset of regions, 
including ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and temporal lobes, due to factors such 
as nearby air and bone. False negatives are therefore localised to these regions and not 
uniformly distributed throughout the brain. Research on topics and tasks which rely on 
these regions, for example value-based decision-making in vmPFC (Levy and Glimcher, 
2012), will be disproportionately affected by issues of coverage. In addition, if meta-
analyses test for convergence, incomplete brain coverages may lead to incorrect p-values, 
because the test assumes that “false foci” are uniformly distributed across the brain 
(Albajes-Eizagirre and Radua, 2018). 
While techniques have been developed to maximise coverage (Weiskopf et al., 
2007), they are not uniformly successful or universally applied. In this report, we discuss 
an approach to reducing these type II errors in map-based fMRI meta-analyses. 
Using meta-analysis techniques on neuroimaging data is vital to establish consistent 
neural correlates across studies (Müller et al., 2018; Wager et al., 2009, 2007). Several tools 
are available. One technique for meta-analysis is Anisotropic Effect Size Signed Differential 
Mapping software (AES-SDM, Radua et al., 2014) which combines coordinate-based meta-
analysis with unthresholded maps (Radua and Mataix-Cols, 2012) to reduce assumptions of 
the spatial extent of activations. 
Dropout in where signal is present can mean activations in fMRI meta-analysis are 
missed or underestimated. This will be, at least in part, due to voxels where no effect size 
was measured, being attributed the same variance estimates as voxels where effect sizes 
were measured. Here we present code which runs a novel method of adjusting both random 
and mixed-effects models, for meta-analytic averaging across a single group or comparison 
between two groups of studies respectively. The code adjusts each type of variance (within-
study & between-study) in the models used in AES-SDM, which are usually assigned to every 





2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Data selection 
This technique to account for variable coverage was developed as part of an fMRI 
meta-analysis on prosocial behaviour so a detailed description of selection methods is 
provided elsewhere (Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019). Briefly, meta-analyses were 
calculated for each of two groups of decision type, “altruistic” and “strategic”, using random-
effects models and these groups were compared with a mixed-effects model. The altruistic 
group contained 18 maps and 3 coordinates sets (n = 21, 557 participants) while the 
strategic group had 10 maps and 5 coordinates sets (n = 15, 593 participants). Due to 
different control conditions across studies, the adjusted analysis was only run on studies 
which contrast altruistic (n = 12) or strategic (n = 12) with selfish decisions. 
To establish the wider relevance of the method, we conducted a second meta-
analysis using data which researchers have made available through NeuroVault 
(Gorgolewski et al., 2015). It is vital to stress that this is in no way a comprehensive meta-
analysis of any tasks and it is unlikely that a genuine meta-analysis would group these maps 
together. These maps were simply used as their CC0 license enables sharing as a 
demonstration set with the code (available at 
https://doi.org/10.25377/sussex.c.4223411). 
Searches on NeuroVault were conducted for “choice” and “deci*” (for decision, 
decide etc.). Maps were selected if they had data from any decision task in the scanner with 
a contrast to no decision or a decision which varied on a parameter, for example complexity. 
This crude selection technique resulted in 18 maps (see Table 1).  
Coverage was investigated by binarising each map, after registration to a common 
template, based on whether there was signal in each voxel and summing these images to 
create coverage maps (Figure 2). Both the dataset on prosocial decisions and the 
NeuroVault dataset on decisions showed decreased coverage around the periphery, 





Table 1. Details of the studies with data available from NeuroVault included in the second meta-analysis 







Integration of individual and social information for decision-making in groups of different 
sizes 
Brain regions for changing judgments to 




Great expectations: neural computations underlying the use of social norms in decision-
making 
Offer3_BetweenExpect Z 17 
 
Bang 2018 Distinct encoding of decision confidence in human medial prefrontal cortex 




Fleming 2018 Neural mediators of changes of mind about perceptual decisions Parametric effect of reported confidence T 22  
Gonzalez Alam 2018 Meaningful inhibition: Exploring the role of meaning and modality in response inhibition 




Tom 2007 The Neural Basis of Loss Aversion in Decision-Making Under Risk task001_cope03_parametric gain T 16  
Waskom 2016 Adaptive Engagement of Cognitive Control in Context-Dependent Decision Making Context prediction error Z 15  
Op de Macks 2018 
Supplement: Neural correlates of adolescent decision-making and outcome processing 
during the Yellow Light Game 




Suzuki 2015 Neural Mechanisms Underlying Human Consensus Decision-Making Fig.4A (Main + Control) T 20  
Rahnev 2016 Causal evidence for frontal cortex organization for perceptual decision making Stimulus/perceptual judgment epoch T 17  
Li 2017 
Reason's Enemy Is Not Emotion: Engagement of Cognitive Control Networks Explains 





Aridan PreP Neural correlates of effort-based valuation with prospective choices effort_gain_pos Z 40  
Cho 2016 
Reward Sensitivity Enhances Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex Activation during Free 
Choice 
Figure2 Free vs Forced TEPS unthresh Z 33 
 
Kameda 2016 
Rawlsian maximin rule operates as a common cognitive anchor in distributive justice and 
risky decisions 
Activity of the right temporo-parietal 
junction (RTPJ) during decision making. 
T 30 
 
van der Laan 2014 
Sweet lies: neural, visual, and behavioral measures reveal a lack of self-control conflict 
during food choice in weight-concerned women 
Choice periods SC vs NSC T 20 
 
Hunt 2014 Hierarchical competitions subserving multi-attribute choice Integrated value competition Z 19  
Korn 2018 
Heuristic and optimal policy computations in the human brain during sequential decision-
making 
GLM2: Participants’ choices (binary 








2.2. Combined image and coordinate meta-analysis 
Using maps in fMRI meta-analysis has a number of benefits including enhanced 
sensitivity and detection of consistent but subthreshold effects. When maps are unavailable, 
AES-SDM recreates estimated maps from coordinates and their effect sizes using an 
anisotropic kernel. If obtainable, peaks can be entered in both directions of the contrast. 
Statistics other than T are transformed before all maps, including those recreated 
from coordinates, are aligned to a common template. The software then implements a 
permutation-based analysis. The recommendation is 50 permutations which creates 50 
randomisations with the same number of foci as the map of interest. These preprocessing 
steps result in recreated NIfTI maps of effect sizes and within-study variance for each study. 
These maps are used in the both the original, unadjusted method by the software and the 
adjusted technique described here. Adjusted analysis uses custom scripts in SPM12 
(Statistical Parametric Mapping, http://www.fil.ion. ucl.ac.uk/spm) which are available 
under an MIT license from https://doi.org/10.25377/sussex.c.4223411 and 
github.com/jocutler/adjusting-dropout-fMRI-meta. 
2.3. Random-effects model 
2.3.1. Unadjusted model 
One widespread use of meta-analysis is to calculate mean effect sizes across studies. 
A common method, and the method used in AES-SDM, is a random-effects model. In the 
model, AES-SDM weights each study by the inverse of the total (within-study and between-
study) variance. The between-study variance, τ2, is obtained by the DerSimonian-Laird 
estimator (Dersimonian and Laird, 1986) as: 
𝜏2 =  max {0, 𝑄𝑤 − (𝑘 − 1)} / [∑ 𝑤𝑖 −
𝑖
 (∑ 𝑤𝑖
2 / ∑ 𝑤𝑖)
𝑖𝑖
]} 
Where wi is a weighting calculated as the inverse of the ith study’s within-study variance, k 
is the number of studies and Qw is calculated as: 
𝑄𝑤 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑖
(𝑦𝑖 −  ?̅?𝑤)
2 
Where yi is the ith study effect size estimate, wi is a weighting calculated as the inverse of 
the ith study’s within-study variance and ȳw is the weighted estimate of the overall effect 




?̅?𝑤  =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑖
𝑦𝑖  /  ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑖
 
In simplified terms, used in the code: 
 𝜏2 =  numerator / 𝐶  
Where: 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  max {0, Q − 𝐷𝑜𝐹} 
With Q calculated as above, degrees of freedom (DoF) the number of studies -1 and: 




Where FE weightings are the inverse of the studies’ within-study variance. These are 
referred to as fixed-effects (FE) weightings as they are the ones used for a fixed-effects 
model, which just takes into account within-study (not between-study) variance. 
In practice, these equations demonstrate that the between-study variance (τ2) 
depends on the sum of the weightings (wi) which are the inverse of the within-study 
variance.  
2.3.2. Adjusting random-effects models 
In fMRI meta-analysis, the within-study variance is a single number which is applied 
as the variance across every voxel in the brain within the mask of interest. The effect size 
for that voxel is the transformed effect size created during preprocessing. However, if signal 
dropout has occurred, the effect size is zero. This means that voxels with no recorded signal 
are attributed variance but no effect size. When the FE weightings and effect sizes are each 
summed during calculation of the between-study variance, these voxels are contributing to 
the total variance without contributing an effect size. This could underestimate meta-
analytic effect size due to inflated variance. 
To account for this, calculations for the meta-analysis can be adjusted so only 
studies where data was recorded contribute weightings to the calculation of τ2. This can be 
done either at the single-voxel level with a spreadsheet (Figure 1) or across the whole brain, 
voxel-by-voxel, by masking variance maps with their coverage. The DoF value is also 
adjusted to be the number of studies with data – 1. 
It is important to note that maps recreated from coordinates should not be adjusted 




not necessarily imply lack of signal and could meaningfully demonstrate the voxel is too far 
from any peaks to be attributed effect size. Of course, the maps which these coordinates 
were generated from could also suffer from signal dropout but this cannot be confirmed. 
This is another reason to obtain maps wherever possible.  
If the coverage is known, for example if the paper states the cerebellum was not 
analysed, a coverage map reflecting this could be created and entered into the analysis as 
the mask for that study. This was not done for any of the studies in the current analyses. 
Once τ2 has been calculated as a single number for the between-study variance, it is 
added to the within-study variance for each study to provide total variance. The inverse of 
this total variance provides the random-effects (RE) weightings for each study, by which the 
effect-size estimates are multiplied. 
The issue of variable coverage affects results again at this stage as the overall meta-
analytic effect size (Hedges’ g) is calculated by the sum of the weighted effect sizes divided 
by the RE weightings summed: 





The meta-analytic variance map, used to calculate standard error and z-scores, is 
calculated as the inverse of the RE weightings summed: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  1 / ∑ 𝑅𝐸 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
Again, voxels with no effect-size estimate due to missing data will contribute zero to 
the effect sizes but increase the sum of the RE weightings in both of these calculations. A 
greater value of summed weightings leads to underestimation of g and overestimation of 
variance. 
The same principle can be applied here as with the FE weightings, where studies are 
only included in the weightings sum if they have an effect size present. 
2.4. Mixed-effects model 
2.4.1. Unadjusted model 
In addition to calculating the mean effect size for a group of studies, meta-analysis 
can calculate the difference between two groups using a mixed-effects model. The 
calculations and method of adjusting are similar to random-effects models, except the DoF 
equals the total number of studies across groups -2, the calculation of Q is: 
𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  𝑄𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 0 +  𝑄𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 
And the calculation of C is: 
𝐶𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  𝐶𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 0 +  𝐶𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 
Where Q and C for each group separately are calculated as above. Groups are referred to as 










Figure 1. Demonstration of an adjusted random-effects model on a single voxel for five studies. Shaded rows (studies 1, 3 & 4) are those which 
are still taken into account in the adjusted analysis. “All” refers to the unadjusted analysis with all studies. Study 1 is from coordinates so this is 
included despite having an effect-size estimate of zero as this could be meaningful (see section 2.3.2 for details and exception to this rule). 
Studies 3 and 4 are maps with non-zero effect-size estimates in the voxel of interest, so are included. Studies 2 and 5 are maps with zero effect-
size estimates, suggesting missing data due to signal dropout, so these are not included in the adjusted analysis. The fixed-effects section is 
purely used to calculate the between-study variance (τ2: tau-sq) with the calculations for this shown in the box “calculating between-study 
variance”. Although τ2 increases from 0.20 to 0.29 in the adjusted analysis, likely linked to having less studies, the meta-analytic effect size (g) 
increases substantially from 0.36 to 0.61 as the sum of the RE weightings (which the sum of the weighted effect sizes is divided by) decreases 
from 19.20 to 8.59. An interactive spreadsheet in this format can be downloaded from https://doi.org/10.25377/sussex.c.4223411 to run this 




























1 0.00 0.05 0 0.05 20.92 0.00 0.00 437.67 0.20 0.25 4.02 0.00 0.29 0.34 2.95 0.00
2 0.00 0.06 1 0.06 16.39 0.00 0.00 268.74 0.20 0.26 3.82 0.00 0.29 0.35 2.84 0.00
3 0.63 0.04 1 0.04 23.81 14.93 9.36 566.89 0.20 0.24 4.12 2.58 0.29 0.33 3.00 1.88
4 1.28 0.09 1 0.09 11.17 14.30 18.30 124.81 0.20 0.29 3.44 4.41 0.29 0.38 2.63 3.37
5 0.00 0.06 1 0.06 16.17 0.00 0.00 261.60 0.20 0.26 3.81 0.00 0.29 0.35 2.84 0.00
Sum: All: 88.47 29.23 27.66 1659.72 All: 19.20 6.99 Adjusted: 8.59 5.25
Sum: Adjusted: 55.90 29.23 27.66 1129.37
N all. 5
N adj. 3 All All Adj All Adj
Q Q 18.01 12.38 Effect size 0.36 0.61
DoF N all. - 1 DoF 4 2 Variance 0.05 0.12
Numerator Numerator 14.01 10.38 Stnd error 0.23 0.34
C C 69.71 35.70 SDM-Z 1.59 1.79
Tau-sq Tau-sq 0.20 0.29
∑(Es2*FEWt) - (∑Es*FEWt)2 / ∑FEWt
max(Q -DoF, 0)




N adj. - 1
Between-study variance
Fixed effects (FE) Random effects (RE)





Calculating τ2 follows the same process as above to produce a single number for the 
between-study variance across all the studies in both groups. This is added to the within-
study variance and the inverse of this total variance provides the study’s mixed-effects (ME) 
weighting.  
The meta-analytic effect size (Hedges’ g) is then calculated with the formula shown 
above for each group of studies separately - the sum of ME weighted effect sizes divided by 
the sum of ME weightings for that group. The meta-analytic variance is also calculated as 
above for each group of studies separately: the inverse of the ME weightings sum for that 
group. 
The Hedges’ g effect-size map for the difference between groups is the calculated by 
subtracting the two separate effect-size maps: 
𝑔1−0 =  𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 − 𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 0 
The meta-analytic variance for the difference between groups is calculated by 
summing the two separate variance estimates: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒1−0 =  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 0 +  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 
 
2.4.2. Adjusted model 
As with random-effects models, voxels with zero effect sizes due to dropout are 
attributed within-study variance and so increase the sums of FE and ME weightings. This is 
likely to underestimate average effect sizes. The same adjustments can avoid this problem 
in a mixed-effects model by excluding weightings of voxels where no effect size is present, 
unless the map was recreated from peaks with unknown coverage. This adjustment can 
again be done for a single voxel or across the whole brain. The DoF becomes the total 





2.5. Z-maps and thresholding 
Once the effect-size and variance maps have been adjusted, maps of standard error 
and z-scores can be produced. As the input came from permutations in AES-SDM, z-scores 
are “SDM-Z” because they do not follow a normal distribution. 
Standard error (SE) is the square root of the meta-analytic variance, either for a 
single group or the difference between groups (shown): 
𝑆𝐸1−0 =  √𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒1−0 
SDM-Z is the effect size (Hedges’ g) divided by the standard error, either for a single 
group or the difference between groups (shown): 
𝑆𝐷𝑀-𝑍1−0 =  𝑔1−0 / 𝑆𝐸1−0 
Thresholding in AES-SDM uses a voxel-level threshold of p<0.005 which 
approximates p<0.05 corrected and balances specificity and sensitivity (Radua et al., 2012). 
However, in SDM-Z maps from the adjusted method, voxels have differing DoF meaning 
thresholding is not straightforward.  
In the prosocial decisions meta-analysis (Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019), 
maps were thresholded with SDM-Z > 2.3. This was chosen as a common value for 
thresholding, close to the average of the critical SDM-Z values generated in the original, 
unadjusted analyses (with all studies) and AES-SDM analyses run with the 50% of maps 
with the best coverage. Here, we apply the same threshold to the NeuroVault data. We 
recognise this is not a perfect solution but it provides continuity and this analysis is not 







In both random and mixed-effects analyses, in both datasets, the adjusted method 
increased effect sizes across the lower vmPFC where coverage was worst (Figure 2). 
Activations based on SDM-Z > 2.3 uncorrected were larger in the adjusted than the 
unadjusted analysis. 
3.1. Prosocial decisions 
In the prosocial decisions data, effect sizes and the size of SDM-Z > 3 activations 
increased in the adjusted analysis for altruistic vs. selfish (Figure 2b iii) and altruistic vs. 
strategic (Figure 2b iv). For altruistic > strategic in posterior vmPFC and strategic > 
altruistic in anterior vmPFC, some activations were shown only in the adjusted analysis. 
This dissociation fits with findings of a posterior to anterior vmPFC axis differentiating 
altruistic from strategic decisions (Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019).  
3.2. Decision-making (NeuroVault data) 
Results from the second dataset from NeuroVault on decision-making further 
support the use of the adjusted method to account for coverage. Again, it is vital to stress 
that this analysis purely provides a second application of the adjustments for signal dropout 
and results are not a comprehensive meta-analysis or a meaningful group. 
Effect sizes across vmPFC increased in the adjusted analysis in both the random-
effects model on all 18 studies’ decision-making condition vs. control (Figure 2b i) and the 
mixed-effects model comparing 2 randomly-allocated groups of 9 studies each (Figure 2b 




Figure 2. Coverage maps and results. (A) Coverage maps showing the number of studies with data in each region, x = 0, n = the number of studies 
available and the maximum possible coverage. (B) Increased effect sizes (Hedges’ g; top rows) and larger regions of SDM-Z > 2.3 (bottom rows) 
in the adjusted analysis accounting for vmPFC signal dropout, compared to the unadjusted analysis with all studies. Decisions (data from 
NeuroVault; n = 18) (i) average (random-effects) and (ii) comparison (mixed-effects). Prosocial decisions (iii) altruistic average (n = 12; random-






This paper presents a novel method of adjusting voxel-based fMRI meta-analysis 
technique AES-SDM (Radua et al., 2014) to account for variable brain coverage between 
studies. Increased effect sizes and larger regions with substantial z-scores were found in the 
adjusted, compared to the unadjusted analysis, using two datasets. 
Our results suggest that regions that suffer from signal dropout, such as vmPFC, can 
show false negatives if coverage is not accounted for. The role of these regions may be 
underestimated or overlooked, preventing a complete understanding of their function. In 
meta-analyses, lack of coverage in some studies may obscure an activation despite high 
consistency in the studies with data in that region. 
The uneven spatial distribution of signal dropout may also increase false positive 
results in the rest of the brain. Specifically, the test for convergence used in current 
coordinate-based meta-analyses assumes a uniform distribution of false positive study 
peaks (Albajes-Eizagirre and Radua, 2018), but this assumptions is incorrect if some brain 
regions have no data in some studies. This additional problem should not happen in the 
upcoming version of SDM, which no longer conducts tests for convergence. 
To overcome these issues, our method adjusts random and mixed-effects meta-
analysis models to only include variance, at each calculation stage, from voxels with study-
level effect-size data. This means the number of contributing studies ranges between one 
and the total number of studies. The voxel degrees of freedom will be the number of 
contributing studies -1 (random-effects model) or -2 (mixed-effects model). For some 
voxels with only a few studies contributing, single studies could dominate and prevent the 
benefits of meta-analysis from being realised. In comparisons between two groups, 
differences between the sizes of each group could be driven by coverage. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge from varying degrees of freedom across voxels is 
thresholding the adjusted meta-analytic map. In the prosocial decisions meta-analysis, 
SDM-Z > 2.3 was applied to the adjusted and unadjusted analysis as a comparison (Cutler 
and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019). Although this is liberal for z-scores which follow a normal 
distribution, SDM-Z scores do not follow a normal distribution (Radua et al., 2012) 2.3 was 
close to the threshold SDM-Z score generated in the unadjusted analysis with all studies and 
the half with the best coverage. Here, we also threshold the second meta-analysis with SDM-





This is not a perfect solution and this adjusted method is perhaps best used 
alongside unadjusted analyses thresholded in a more appropriate way. The usefulness of a 
simple SDM-Z threshold may be limited to visual comparisons between unadjusted and 
adjusted maps. Comparing adjusted and unadjusted effect-size maps (Hedges’ g) can also 
reveal the impact of coverage deficits. 
Evidence for the importance of adjusting calculations is presented using two 
datasets. One is a comprehensive meta-analysis of prosocial decisions. The second group is 
studies with data on NeuroVault for decision tasks. Decision-making was chosen as it 
activates vmPFC (Levy and Glimcher, 2012), a region prone to reduced coverage. This data 
was purely used as the availability enables sharing to demonstrate the code and results are 
not be meaningful in any other way. That the NeuroVault data did not show large vmPFC 
activations is likely due to variety in tasks, which would not be grouped together in a 
genuine meta-analysis. 
5. Conclusion 
Using meta-analysis techniques on fMRI data establishes consistent findings across 
samples, scanning sites and tasks, providing many benefits and overcoming issues with 
single studies. Including statistical maps enhances some of these benefits and methods like 
AES-SDM, which combine maps with coordinates, increase the chances of including a study. 
However, fMRI meta-analyses are prone to false negatives if lacking coverage leaves missing 
data in study-level statistical maps. Several key regions, including vmPFC and temporal 
areas suffer from signal dropout, meaning false negatives are unevenly distributed 
throughout the brain.  
To account for and overcome these issues, we present a novel method of adjusting 
calculations for random and mixed-effects models for meta-analytic group averages and 
comparisons respectively. By adjusting models to only include variance for voxels with data 
present in the study’s effect-size map, we demonstrate increased meta-analytic effect sizes 
in regions with the worst coverage. This highlights that failing to account for coverage 
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Enhanced emotional and physical responses to the experiences of other people are 
linked with behaviours that save and improve lives (Brethel-Haurwitz et al., 2018; Marsh et 
al., 2014). Individual responses to people suffering include empathy and personal distress, 
which can both motivate helping for different reasons (Batson, 2014; Batson et al., 1991, 
1987). These individual responses also contribute to a collective response, which can 
impact political decisions and outcomes for those affected (Slovic et al., 2017). 
However, the suffering of others can also be overwhelming (Cameron and Payne, 
2011). Events and issues that prompt emotional and prosocial responses are too numerous 
to all be acted on. Each day there are reports about the most recent natural disasters, violent 
conflicts and health issues. These feature people who have already died and people who are 
still at risk, in need, and often suffering. Some reports of these tragedies lead to huge 
responses, both from the public and on an individual level (Slovic et al., 2017). In contrast, 
others are largely ignored, or the response is not proportional to the scale of the tragedy. 
Here we present a novel stimulus set, adapted from news stories about people at risk of 
death and the outcomes. 
Previous work has identified multiple factors that shape emotional and behavioural 
responses to lives at risk and to the deaths of strangers. These will be described here as 
biases when they lead to responses that are not in line with the commonly held moral view 
that all lives are equal (Dickert et al., 2012).  
One important factor is where the people are. While overseas aid and disaster relief 
charities receive sizable donations, they are less popular than causes that affect people in 
one’s own country (UK data, Charities Aid Foundation, 2019). Differences in responses to 
events in different locations have been explored and explained along a range of dimensions, 
which often overlap. We designed the stimuli to be inclusive of all of them. 
Another factor that creates biased responses is the number of people in need or 
suffering. A range of non-linear shapes have been suggested to reflect the relationship 
between the number of people and emotional or behavioural responses. One possibility is 
that responses show a negative correlation with the number of people, such that the 
greatest responses are to a single person in need. This singularity effect often coincides with 
increased information about the person, such as a name or photo, which also promote giving 






At the opposite end of the number spectrum, there is evidence that information 
about large numbers of people can decrease giving (Schelling, 1968; Västfjäll et al., 2014), 
weaken compassion and worsen political attitudes (Azevedo et al., 2019). There are two 
competing explanations for this compassion collapse when the number of people suffering 
gets very large. First, that it is due to an inability to empathise with too many people (Slovic, 
2007) and second, that people are able to empathise but motivated to avoid processing this 
much suffering (Cameron and Payne, 2011).  
A decrease in compassion towards high numbers of people could lead to an overall 
drop in responses or mean that the additional value of each life decreases. This can mean 
responses do increase with the number of people but in a non-linear way, known as scope 
insensitivity (Dickert et al., 2015) or psychophysical numbing (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997). 
Taken from findings in economics, this bias describes any situation in which incremental 
increases (or decreases) in value decrease as the total absolute value increases (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Applied to the valuation of other’s lives, this means the difference 
between 10,001 and 10,002 people suffering feels much smaller than the difference 
between 1 and 2 people suffering. Evidence for this bias has been shown in decisions 
whether to give to charity (Cameron and Payne, 2011) and on life-saving policy 
interventions (Olivola, 2015). 
Most previous studies on this topic have used behavioural measures of willingness 
to pay or amount donated to quantify these biases. While such measures do show evidence 
of biases, these may be underestimated if participants feel social pressure to report lower 
levels of bias than their true beliefs (Fernandes and Randall, 1992). Having to answer 
questions may also put participants in a more deliberative or analytical state of mind, which 
has been linked to more utilitarian judgements (Li et al., 2018). These tasks are not 
representative of passively viewing information about others suffering, for example on 
television news. Much of the information we receive about the suffering of others is not 
directly as part of an appeal for help. Instead we often hear news of an event and then must 
seek opportunities to help if we are moved to do so. 
In this research, we use a physiological measure of skin conductance to overcome 
limitations of self-report. Previous applications of physiological measures to relevant topics 
include differentiation of perspective taking approaches through a composite physiological 
stress measure (Buffone et al., 2017) and the development of prosociality (Miller, 2018). 
Research measuring skin conductance responses (SCRs) specifically has shown arousal 





(Forgiarini et al., 2011); increases with age (Sze et al., 2012); and predicts costly helping 
(Hein et al., 2011). 
As SCRs have been linked to anticipation of negative outcomes and uncertainty 
(Bach et al., 2009; Critchley et al., 2001; Feldmanhall et al., 2016) and negatively framed 
outcomes (Ring, 2015), we designed our task to maximise these elements. Due to the noisy 
nature of SCR data, it was necessary to have many trials for each condition. However, this 
also gave us an opportunity to look at how responses, and the impact of number and 
location, change over time. This reflects the repeated exposure to news of tragedies in the 
real world. 
We also measured participants’ scores on the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI), 
designed to measure empathy (Davis, 1983). This allowed us to test whether the effect of 
the number of people and location of the news story differed between those high and low 
on this trait. Differences would suggest that the emotions the scale measures as a trait are 
involved in the effect of our variables. While empathy is generally linked with altruism and 
concern for others (FeldmanHall et al., 2015) there is also evidence that empathy can bias 
responses leading to greater partiality in who receives help (Batson et al., 1995; Bloom, 
2017; Decety and Cowell, 2015; Ugazio et al., 2014). If this is the case, we would predict 
participants scoring high on the IRI would differentiate events in the UK from those abroad 










189 participants (138 female, 50 male, 1 non-binary) in total completed the study. 
Ages ranged from 18 to 65 with an average age of 21.2. All participants were UK residents. 
122 participants self-identified as having a UK nationality, 65 reported a non-UK nationality 
and 2 did not disclose their nationality. Participants with dual nationalities including the UK 
were categorised in the UK group, as were those who reported Irish nationality without 
specifying the Republic of Ireland. The majority (149) were Psychology students taking part 
for course credit as well as the available prizes, 37 were students in other disciplines and 3 
were not students. The procedure was approved by the Sussex Sciences & Technology 
Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee. 
Participants were compensated up to £5 for their time, depending on the control 
task, and were also entered into two prize draws of £25. Participants were tested in two 
rounds, with the outcomes of the news stories (alive or dead; see below) either truthful (95 
participants) or swapped (94 participants) to balance how surprising the outcomes were. 
Participants in the truthful round also completed an extra control task which related to an 
additional prize draw of £50. 
Usable skin conductance data was available from 186 participants for the news 
stories task, 184 for control task 1 and 90 for the additional control task 2 completed by just 
one round of 95 participants. Data from the other participants was either lost during testing 
due to technical issues or had issues discovered during analysis. 
2.2. Stimuli 
2.2.1. News stories 
In the social ‘news stories’ task, 120 summaries of events were presented in the 
form “[number] people in [country] were identified as at risk of death from [cause]”. This 
presentation sentence appeared and then 1 second later, a “>” appeared in the right bottom 
corner indicating that participants could press the space bar as soon as they had read the 
sentence and were ready to continue. Their press was followed by an anticipation period 
of 4 seconds ± 30% jitter where “…” was presented on the screen. Then a fixation cross 
appeared for 0.5 seconds before the outcome phase: either “they are alive” or “they are 
dead” appeared and remained on screen for 2s ± 30%. A fixation cross period of 2s ± 30% 





Stimuli for the news stories paradigm were taken from real news stories in which 
varying numbers of people were at risk of dying. Initially 156 were obtained and rated by 
32 independent participants through an online survey for course credit. For these ratings, 
the number of people and the country were hidden to isolate the cause of death. The stories 
were rated at both the anticipation phase, for example “X people were identified at risk of 
death from a fire” and the outcome phase, for example “X people survived breast cancer”. 
Participants rated these statements on how emotional they felt, whether the emotion was 
positive or negative, and how much empathy they felt for the people involved. 
 
Figure 1. Structure 
of the task. After 
the “>” appeared, 
participants could 
press space bar 
when they finished 
reading the 
sentence to move 
on. During the 
anticipation phase 
the dots appeared 
one after the other. 
 
These pilot ratings were combined with the number of people involved and whether 
the story took place in the UK or in a named foreign country to balance the chosen stories 
across conditions. The final stimulus set consisted of 120 stories: 5 for each of 24 conditions 
in a 6 (number bin) x 2 (location: UK vs. abroad) x 2 (outcome: positive: alive vs. negative: 
dead) design. Event type (natural disasters, accidents, violence, disease or long-term issues) 














News stories task  Control task 1  Control task 2 
Bin  UK  Abroad  Money  Credits 
















1  1  1  £1  1 
2  2 - 10  2 - 10  £2  2 - 10 
3  11 - 50  11 - 50  £3  11 - 50 
4  51 - 500  51 - 500  £4  51 - 500 
5  501 – 10,000  501 – 10,000  £5  501 – 10,000 
6  10,001 +  10,001 +    10,001 + 
Note. (+): positive outcome, (-): negative outcome. 
 
2.2.2. Control task 1: money 
To provide a non-social comparison, two control tasks presented stimuli with 
similar manipulations of number and outcome. Both matched the structure and timing of 
the news stories trials, as shown in figure 1. These tasks were also both in a loss frame, 
meaning the best outcome was just to keep the resources. 
Control task 1 involved the possibility of losing some or all of the £5 payment for 
participation. One trial was chosen at random and the payment of £5 minus anything lost 
on that trial was implemented. Each trial in this task presented a number of pounds (£1, £2, 
£3, £4 or £5) that could be lost. After 1 second a “>” appeared in the bottom right corner of 
the screen to indicate participants could press a button to move on. An anticipation phase 
(4s ± 30% jitter, “…” on the screen) followed this, before the outcome (2s ± 30%) of whether 
the participant kept (positive) or lost (negative) the money and a fixation cross (2s ± 30%) 
before the next trial.  
Half of trials for each amount lead to a positive outcome and the other half a negative 
outcome. Participants were told that overall, there was a 50:50 chance on each trial. This 
created a 5 (number) x 2 (outcome: positive: keep or negative: lose) design with 5 trials in 
each of the 10 conditions. All 189 participants completed this task in a counterbalanced 







2.2.3. Control task 2: credits 
A second control task was only completed by one of the two rounds of participants 
(95 of the total 189). This involved the possibility of losing credits which translated into 
participants’ chances to win an additional prize of £50. Participants started the task with 
500,000 credits but each trial of this task could take some away. The presentation phase 
showed an amount of credits that might be lost, matched to the 6 number bins in the news 
stories task. The timing and details of the anticipation and outcome phases were identical 
to control task 1. This task had 60 trials in total, 5 in each of 12 conditions, fulling crossing 
number bin (1-6) with outcome (positive: keep) or (negative: lose), with participants aware 
of the 50% chance of each outcome. 
2.3. Measures 
2.3.1. Willingness to pay 
To provide a behavioural measure of the value of a life in each condition, we adapted 
a willingness to pay measure (Frederick and Fischhoff, 1998). Participants were asked to 
imagine they were a “UK government minister in charge of allocating resources to stop 
people dying from flooding both in the UK and abroad”. Participants then filled in the 
amount, from £0 - £100,000, to allocate to 12 projects, 6 in the UK and 6 in a named foreign 
country, to save different numbers of people. The numbers corresponded to the average 
numbers in each bin of the news stories stimuli. 
Instructions read “You must consider the following proposals and allocate funding. 
For each project, there is a maximum of £100,000 available which you should allocate if the 
project is very important. You must not spend unnecessary money because the money can 
also go to other worthy causes. If a project is not worthwhile you can decide to give it £0. 
However, you cannot use the money you save on one project now for another one of the 
projects listed, imagine any money you save would be used on different future projects.” 
2.3.2.  Interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) 
Participants completed the 28-item version of the IRI measure (Davis, 1983). This 
includes 7 items of each subscale; Perspective Taking, Fantasy, Empathic Concern and 








2.3.3.  UK identity 
Participants’ level of identification with the UK were measured by 3 items adapted 
from Vroome et al. (2014). These were “My UK national identity is important to me”, “I 
identify strongly with the UK”, and “I feel really connected to the UK”. Each were rated on a 
5-point scale from “does not describe me” to “describes me extremely well”. An average of 
these items was used in analysis. 
2.4. Procedure 
On arrival at the lab, participants washed and dried their hands thoroughly, 
removed any jewellery from their hand and arm and were seated in an experimental cubicle. 
With consent, we attached the electrodes for the skin conductance recording (index and 
middle finger) and pulse oximeter (ring finger) immediately. This allowed maximum time 
for them to settle on the skin before recording, while we obtained full informed consent. 
Participants then completed several questionnaire measures not reported here via 
Qualtrics Online Survey Software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT).  
Before starting the main tasks, the maximum payment of £5 was placed in cash 
beside participants, clearly in view, to maximise the salience of the loss frame used in the 
control task. Participants then completed the main tasks with instructions presented 
immediately before each started. All tasks were run in MATLAB (2017b, Mathworks, Inc., 
Natick, MA) using Psychophysics Toolbox extensions version 3 (Brainard, 1997). The lights 
were turned off for the duration of the experimental tasks.  
The order of the tasks was counterbalanced such that some participants completed 
the control task then the news stories task and for others it was the opposite. Three further 
tasks not reported here were completed next. For the 95 participants who completed 
control task 2, this and a further task not reported here followed, then all participants 
completed further questionnaire measures, including willingness to pay and UK identity, as 
the final part of the study. 
During the debrief, participants were asked a) whether there were any of the stories 
that they recognised during the presentation period, so knew the outcome before it was 
presented; b) whether there were any foreign countries or c) causes of death they have a 
personal link to; and d) whether they believed the news stories were real. One trial was 






2.5. Data acquisition 
Skin conductance and heart rate data were collected using a Biopac MP36 sampling 
at 1000Hz. All equipment was put on the left hand when possible and most left-handed 
participants were happy to complete the simple button presses required for the study with 
their non-dominant hand. We measured skin conductance with two EL507 EDA isotonic gel 
electrodes with 11mm Ag/AgCl contact attached to the head of the index and middle fingers. 
Heart rate data were collected using a pulse oximeter on the ring finger. Here we do not 
report the heart rate data as there was too much noise, even after manual cleaning. 
2.6. Analysis 
2.6.1. Skin conductance preprocessing 
Parameters for the response to each event were extracted using the dynamic causal 
modelling (DCM) function (Bach et al., 2010; Staib et al., 2015) from the PsychoPhysiological 
Modelling Toolbox version 4.0.1 (Bach et al., 2018; Bach and Friston, 2013) in MATLAB 
(2017b, Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA). The toolbox enables separation of responses to 
stimuli with inter-stimulus intervals shorter than the skin conductance response. DCM was 
chosen over the general linear model function for the option to model events with flexible 
timing. The model searches a specified time window for the responses and estimates the 
dispersion and latency, as well as the amplitude. Default settings were used, except the 
minimum dispersion was increased to 0.3. 
Due to the novelty of our paradigm, and small number of previous papers measuring 
SCR to complex social stimuli, we generated 15 different timing models for the events in a 
trial. These varied in which events were modelled (for example presentation onset or an 
anticipatory response to the preceding fixation cross), whether each was fixed or flexible 
and the specified time windows. For example, some models included a flexible event that 
started at the presentation and continued throughout the anticipation period, whereas 
others modelled the presentation and anticipation separately. 
All these models were run on data from the news stories task and control tasks 
separately. Models were compared through the residual sum of squares for each model for 
each participant. Importantly, this whole process was completely blind to conditions and 
represents the fit to all events across all trials. Of participants with usable data, the same 
two models showed the best fit for 126 (62+64) of 186 on the news stories task, 131 
(72+59) of 184 on the monetary control task and 71 (41+30) of 90 on the credits control 





the fixation cross preceding it by 0.5s. Latency parameters for this outcome event changed 
by 0.5 seconds in almost all cases, suggesting the same peak was being detected. The 
parameter estimates (response amplitude, latency and dispersion) from the model starting 
the outcome at its onset were used for all participants in all further analyses, as this was the 
better fit in slightly more cases (175 vs. 153).  
The chosen model consisted of a flexible presentation event that started as soon as 
the stimulus was presented and continued until participants pressed to indicate they had 
read the sentence and the screen moved on. The next flexible anticipation event started at 
this button press and continued until just before the outcome appeared. The third and final 
flexible outcome event started as the outcome appeared and continued through the outcome 
being displayed and following fixation cross before the next trial. The end time of one event 
was always 1ms before the start time of the following event, meaning the modelled time 
was continuous. 
The SCR amplitude, latency and dispersion estimated by PsPM DCM relate to the 
sudomotor burst that causes a change in skin conductance. The area under the SCR curve, 
as measured with traditional methods, is a product of the amplitude and dispersion but here 
we analyse each separately. Despite possible physiological reasons that participants may 
not show any SCRs, we did not exclude any participants as “non-responders”, as it is 
impossible to separate these explanations from psychological reasons to not show 
responses during the current tasks. 
2.6.2. Group-level models 
We extracted and Z-scored amplitude parameter estimates for each presentation 
and each outcome event, for each participant, as recommended for SCR data (Bach, 2014; 
Staib et al., 2015). This was done on each task separately, to account for the different order 
of tasks, so absolute values of responses cannot be compared between tasks. We also 
extracted the raw dispersion parameters. We did not analyse parameters for responses 
during the anticipation phase as it is not clear how these relate to responses to the 
presentation while no new information is available. 
We then analysed all trial-by-trial SCR parameters and behavioural willingness to 
pay responses using lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2017) with RStudio 
(RStudio Team, 2015). For analysis of physiological measures, due to the skewed nature 
(even after Z-scoring in the case of the amplitudes), a gamma distribution was used, based 





(Lo and Andrews, 2015). This required Z-scores to be rescaled to become positive. All 
continuous variables were mean-centred.  
For the number of people (news stories task) or credits (control task 2) we also 
transformed the raw number of people with log10 before mean-centring, as physiology could 
never change on the same scale as the number of people variable. The number of pounds 
(£1-£5) was analysed on that scale which is comparable to the average number of credits or 
people from each bin, once transformed with log10.  
As identified in the introduction, previous research has found non-linear effects of 
the number of people on responses or behaviours. To test for these in our data, we include 
polynomial terms for the number, creating a linear, a quadratic and a cubic shape. These 
were removed in order of complexity if they did not improve the model fit but if a quadratic 
or cubic term was kept, so was the lower term(s). 
All analyses started with the maximal random-effects model (Barr et al., 2013) but 
this was too complex so we used the Analysis of Factorial EXperiments (afex) (Singmann et 
al., 2019) package to enable removal of the correlation between random effects of a binary 
factor (UK vs. abroad). The model reported in each case is the optimal converging one, 







3.1. Behavioural results 
The optimal multilevel model of the responses to the willingness to pay questions 
only included the number of people, as a fixed and random term. This showed a highly 
significant relationship between number of people and willingness to pay (figure 2A; t = 
16.22, p < .0001). Although participants allocated more money to save larger numbers of 
people, the increase was not linear as the amount per person declined drastically as the 
group size increased (figure 2B). 
Adding location (UK or abroad) did not improve the model (∆AIC = 1, χ²(1) = 1.26, p 
= .26) and was not a significant predictor when included. The lack of differentiation between 
the value of a life in the UK and abroad is further supported by a strong positive correlation 
between willingness to pay in the two locations (r = .91, p < .001). 
  
 
Figure 2. Amounts given on the willingness to pay task to save A: groups of different sizes 












3.2. Skin conductance results: presentation phase 
3.2.1. People (news stories task) 
The best model of SCR amplitudes at the presentation phase included main effects 
of trial number, location, and number of people (log10 scale with both linear and quadratic 
shapes) plus the interaction between trial number and the number of people. These factors 
were all included as fixed and random terms, except for the quadratic shape for the number 
of people as a random term. 
Results showed a significant main effect of location, such that responses to learning 
people are at risk in the UK were larger than to learning people are at risk abroad (t = 2.39, 
p = .017). On a log10 scale, the number of people showed a significant negative quadratic 
relationship with SCR amplitude (t = -2.23, p = .026). As shown in figure 3, responses initially 
increased as the number of people increased but then declined at higher numbers of people. 
This quadratic effect was moderated by trial number (t = -4.12, p < .0001; see below). 
In addition to analysing the amplitude parameters, we also analysed the dispersion 
parameters as these two measures combine to determine the area under the curve of the 
SCR response. For the presentation phase, the best model of dispersions was like the one 
for amplitudes in including main effects of trial number, number of people, and location (UK 
or abroad), plus an interaction between trial number and number of people. However, there 
was only a linear shape for the number of people, no quadratic. Each of these variables was 
included as a fixed and a random term. 
Results revealed a significant linear relationship between SCR dispersion and the 
(log10) number of people with larger dispersion for higher numbers of people (t = 7.14, p < 
.0001; figure 3). There was also a significant effect of trial number, with dispersions 
decreasing over time (t = -6.34, p < .0001). The fixed-term interaction between these factors 
was not significant (p = .20) but removing the fixed and random interaction significantly 
worsened the model fit (∆AIC = 15, χ²(2) = 18.65, p < .001). Finally, there was no evidence 






Figure 3. Left: amplitude and right: dispersion estimates of SCRs to the presentation of lives 
at risk in the news stories task. 
 
To explore the interaction between trial number and the number of people for SCR 
amplitudes, we split the 120 trials into two halves (figure 4) and ran the model without trial 
number on each section. This showed a significant inverse quadratic relationship with 
(log10) number of people in the first half (t = -4.15, p < .001) of trials but not the second (p = 
.153; note the random term for number had to be removed to achieve convergence in the 
second half). 
The increase in responses to lives at risk in the UK, compared to abroad, did not 
interact with participants’ nationality (p = 0.96) or level of identification with the UK (p = 
0.14). The model fit did not improve when adding nationality (∆AIC = 4, χ²(2) = 0.015, p = 
.99) or UK identity (∆AIC = 1, χ²(2) = 2.45, p = .29). 
To test for individual differences based on IRI, we added the mean-centred total 
score to the model, interacting with the key variables. IRI scores showed a significant three-
way interaction with the quadratic term for the number of people and trial number (t = 2.25, 
p = .024). To interpret this interaction, we plotted the data for high and low IRI participants 
separately, based on a median split, for the first and second half of the task (figure 4). This 
shows high IRI participants started the task with responses peaking at numbers in the 
hundreds then declining, whereas lower IRI participants responses initially peaked at 
numbers in the thousands. As the task went on, the peak for all participants shifted to 
numbers in the tens, although for high IRI participants there were still strong responses to 





 Figure 4. Effect of number of people and location on SCR amplitudes, split by A: first 60 
trials and second 60 trials of the task and B: high or low IRI score (median split) and first or 








3.2.2. Money (control task 1) 
SCR amplitudes during the presentation phase when money was at risk were not 
significantly predicted by any factor in the model (the number of pounds – linear, quadratic 
or cubic terms, or trial number). 
A model of SCR dispersions during responses to the presentation showed a 
significant linear relationship with the number of pounds (t = 3.44, p = .0005; figure 5). The 




Figure 5. Relationship between the 
number of pounds at risk and SCR 







3.2.3. Credits (control task 2) 
The best model of SCR amplitudes for the presentation phase, during the control 
task with a risk of losing credits, included main effects of trial number and the number of 
credits (log10 scale), with a linear, a quadratic and a cubic term. There were also interactions 
between trial number and each of these shapes for the number of credits. Random terms 
were trial number, a linear effect of the number of credits, and the interaction between 
these. 
Results showed that the shape of the relationship between the number of credits 
and SCR amplitude varied across the course of the task. There were significant interactions 
between trial number and both the quadratic shape (t = -2.29, p = .022) and cubic shape (t 
= -2.25, p = .025; figure 6). Results from the same model predicting the SCR dispersion 





credits and trial number (t = -2.46, p = .013). However, the interaction between the cubic 
shape for number of credits and trial number was the exact opposite to the matching term 
predicting amplitude (t = 2.62, p = .009). Plotting these relationships, split into the first and 




Figure 6. Relationship between SCR amplitude (top) and dispersion (bottom) and the 








3.3. Skin conductance results: outcome phase 
3.3.1. People (news stories task) 
The best model for SCR amplitudes to finding out whether people in the news stories 
lived or died included main effects of trial number, number of people (log10 scale; linear and 
quadratic), outcome valence (positive or negative), and location (UK or abroad). Each main 
effect was modelled as a fixed and a random term but the only interaction, between number 
of people and location, just a fixed term. Results revealed a significant effect of valence, with 
positive outcomes generating larger responses than negative ones (t = -2.16, p = .031; figure 
7). The number of people showed an inverse quadratic effect on responses (t = -2.19, p = 
.029). The effect of abroad was not significant but removing the main effect, interaction, and 
random terms for this variable significantly decreased the model fit (∆AIC = 100, χ²(4) = 
108.16, p = .0001).  
 
Figure 7. Effect of the number of people and outcome valence on SCR amplitude (top) and 






A model for SCR dispersions with the 4 main effects, as fixed and random terms, only 
showed a main effect of valence. Negative outcomes resulted in longer dispersions than 
positive outcomes (t = 1.98, p = .047; figure 7). 
3.3.2. Money (control task 1) 
Model comparison analysing the SCR amplitudes during responses to outcomes of 
keeping or losing money produced a model with fixed main effects of trial number, number 
of pounds (linear and quadratic), and outcome valence. Fixed interactions were trial 
number with the number of pounds and outcome valence with the number of pounds. Only 
random terms for trial number and outcome valence were present. 
Results showed a main effect of valence (t = -2.09, p = .037) with negative outcomes 
generating a greater response than positive outcomes. This effect changed over the task (t 
= -2.25, p = .025), at the start positive outcomes lead to larger responses. The effect of the 
number of pounds also varied across the task with trial number interacting with both the 
linear relationship (t = -1.96, p = .050) and quadratic relationship (t = -4.25, p < .0001). To 
interpret these interactions, we plotted the relationship between amplitude and number of 
pounds separately for the first and second half of trials (figure 8). The dispersion of 
responses was not significantly predicted by any of the variables in the model. 
3.3.3. Credits (control task 2) 
The best model of SCR amplitudes for the outcome phase revealing whether 
participants had lost or kept the credits included main effects and all interactions between 
trial number, number of credits (linear and quadratic), and outcome valence at the fixed 
level. The random terms were the same except the quadratic element. The only significant 
effect was the interaction between the quadratic shape for the number of credits and 
outcome valence (t = -3.21, p = .001). This showed a positive peak at bin 3 for negative 
outcomes and a negative dip at bin 3 for positive outcomes (figure 8). No variables 





Figure 8. Top: effect of the number of pounds and outcome valence on SCR amplitude during 
the outcome phase of control task 1 (C1), split into the first and second half of trials. Bottom: 
effect of the number of credits and outcome valence on SCR amplitude across all trials at the 
outcome phase of control task 2 (C2). 
 
4. Discussion 
Previous research has identified biases, where the reported value of a life departs 
from the idea that all lives have equal value. Here we show that physiological responses 
reveal further biases, not captured with a behavioural measure. Responses were greater 
when lives at risk were in the participants’ home country, compared to abroad. Responses 
also declined as the number of people increased above several hundred. Over time, seeing 
multiple stories about people dying and at risk shifted the maximal response to stories of 
even smaller groups – numbers in the single digits or tens of people. Interestingly, responses 
to financial resources being at risk or lost also showed non-linear relationships with 







The news stories task involved a presentation phase showing a number of lives at 
risk, an anticipation phase, and an outcome phase revealing whether the people survived or 
died. Half of these events happened in the UK, where all participants lived, and the other 
half happened abroad. At the presentation phase, the amplitude of SCRs was higher for 
events in the UK, compared to abroad. This was in contrast to no evidence of a difference 
between the amount participants said should be spent to save lives in the UK or abroad. 
Bias towards one’s own geographical location could be due to identity or proximity 
factors. The people described in the stimuli were explicitly presented as “in” the given 
country rather than “from” it, to avoid priming identity and as in many cases, it is unlikely 
that all the people affected in a story were the same nationality. 
People who are physically closer are more likely to have a shared or similar identity 
and a large body of work suggests a role for shared identity in promoting empathy (Azevedo 
et al., 2013) and prosocial behaviour (Levine et al., 2005). Social closeness has been 
considered as binary (ingroup vs. outgroup), as in these studies, but also along a continuum 
(Strombach et al., 2014). In one study, increased donations towards one’s ingroup were fully 
mediated by perceived responsibility to help (Erlandsson et al., 2015). However, 
responsibility to help could not explain the effect of location in our task, which did not 
involve donations. 
Other studies that have manipulated physical proximity, rather than identity 
directly, also find an effect on donation behaviours and the perceived impact of donations 
(Touré-Tillery and Fishbach, 2017). Increased donations following disasters in closer 
locations have also been linked to counterfactual thinking, the idea that “it could have been 
me” (Zagefka, 2018). If this counterfactual thinking occurs in relation to a past, resolved 
threat, it is reasonable to predict that current, ongoing threats are more salient when they 
are close as “it could affect me or someone I care about”. 
These explanations for the effect of location on prosocial responses and behaviours 
could be considered as complimentary or competing with identity-based mechanisms. One 
direct comparison showed support for identity completely accounting for proximity effects 
(Levine and Thompson, 2004) but it is difficult to completely rule out multiple mechanisms. 
Our paradigm was not designed to distinguish between these potential 
explanations. If identity was the main motivation, we would have predicted that the 





those who scored higher on identification with the UK. However, these factors did not 
significantly improve the models of or significantly predict SCR amplitude. While this is a 
lack of evidence for identity motivations it cannot necessarily be considered as supporting 
a proximity mechanism. 
4.2. Number 
In addition to the effect of location, we also tested the effect of number on responses 
to lives and financial resources at risk and lost. When a number of lives at risk was presented 
and when whether they survived or died was revealed, SCR amplitudes showed an inverse 
quadratic relationship with the number of people on a log10 scale. Responses increased as 
the number of people rose from 1 to tens or hundreds but then declined as the number of 
people increased further. For SCR amplitudes at the presentation phase, this relationship 
changed over the course of the task and by the second half, the peak response was to 
numbers of people in the tens. 
By using DCM to extract the SCR parameters, we were able to analyse the dispersion 
of responses as well as the amplitude. For the presentation phase of both the number of 
people and the number of pounds at risk in control task 1, dispersion increased with larger 
numbers. This is in line with a slower, less intense response at high numbers which are 
suggested to elicit less emotion than smaller groups of people (Dickert et al., 2015). 
However, interpreting the decline in SCR amplitudes for responses to large numbers 
of people as due to a lack of empathy is difficult, given number also had a non-linear 
relationship with responses during trials involving financial resources. Of the amplitude 
measures, only positive outcomes of keeping money in the first half of control task 1 showed 
a linear relationship with number. For negative outcomes, the greatest responses were to 
small amounts.  
One possible explanation for large responses to small amounts of money being lost 
is that participants knew that they would keep money on 50% of trials and lose money on 
50% of trials. They did not know that this proportion would apply to each amount too. 
Keeping a small amount would become undesirable if interpreted as increasing the chance 
of losing larger amounts. There are also limits on how relevant results from control task 1 
are for the news stories task, as the largest number was £5. 
For credits in control task 2, the numbers were more closely matched to the 
numbers of people, going up to tens of thousands. The decline in responses to large numbers 





processing, as has been suggested in relation to people (Small et al., 2007), if this processing 
is necessary to produce a SCR. Mechanisms proposed to underlie scope insensitivity in 
valuing lives such as mental imagery and attention (Dickert et al., 2012) could also be 
relevant to large numbers of non-social resources, particularly when they are abstract as 
credits towards chances to win money are. 
4.3. Outcome 
In addition to number and, for people, location, the third variable we manipulated 
was whether the outcome was positive or negative. Negative outcomes in the news stories 
task were the people dying and for the control task losing the money or credits. ‘Positive’ 
outcomes were in fact maintaining the status quo – the people surviving but not necessarily 
free of suffering and the money or credits kept but none gained. 
For outcomes affecting people, positive outcomes increased the amplitude of 
responses but reduced the dispersion of responses, compared to negative outcomes. At the 
start of control task 1, keeping money increased response amplitude, compared to losing it, 
but this changed during the task and over all trials, responses to negative outcomes were 
higher. While SCRs are linked with potential losses (Ring, 2015), previous research using 
gambling tasks has found greater SCRs to wins than losses (Lole et al., 2012; Wilkes et al., 
2017). 
4.4. Individual differences in IRI 
The individual difference measure of identification with the UK is discussed above 
and we also measured participants’ interpersonal reactivity or empathy. If this trait is 
related to the impact of our manipulations, it suggests the tendencies measured in the 
questionnaire are relevant for the mechanism of the effects. At the presentation phase, 
participants high and low on the IRI were differentially affected by the number of people, 
particularly at the start of the task, with those with higher empathy having maximal 
responses to a lower number of people at risk than those lower in empathy. This supports 
the idea that empathy is related to the decline in responses to high numbers of people at 
risk. Comparisons between the overall amplitude of responses between participants 
differing in IRI score is not relevant as the amplitudes were Z-scored and even the raw data 
can be confounded by irrelevant factors affecting the baseline skin conductance. 
4.5. Limitations and future directions 
The results presented here make several contributions to the literature, but it is also 





self-report but lacks a benefit of another physiological measure, heart rate, due to a lack of 
forward mechanism from the skin to the brain. Unlike SCR, changes in heart rate can affect 
cognition (Critchley and Harrison, 2013), and the ability to accurately perceive heartbeats 
has been linked to empathy (Grynberg and Pollatos, 2015). 
Another limitation of SCR as a measure is the inability to distinguish positive from 
negative arousal. In tasks with clear positive and negative outcomes, such as gambling tasks 
(Lole et al., 2012; Wilkes et al., 2017), this is less of an issue but it complicates the 
interpretation of our trials in which outcomes in the control tasks may not have been 
perceived as independent. A potential solution is to apply fMRI to this task as there are 
regions of the brain more associated with positive outcomes and others more associated 
with negative outcomes, although these still overlap (see paper 4). 
Considering the task, there is a risk that participants’ expectations about the 
outcome of the event could have affected responses. This could have confounded our results 
if it was more relevant, for example, to the large numbers of people in the UK, stories which 
participants may have been more aware of. During the debrief, we asked participants 
whether there were stories that they remembered so knew the outcome before it appeared. 
These trials were too few to analyse separately. For half of the participants the outcomes 
were reversed – the outcome said the people died when in real-life they survived. Averaging 
across participants should therefore control for the effect of surprise and did not seem to 
affect whether or not participants believed the task. 
Finally, a further issue with the task is the lack of detail or images associated with 
the stories, which would likely be present in real-world situations, and the large number of 
trials. However, removing detail was necessary to standardise the trials across conditions 
and having many trials allowed us to quantify changes in the effect of our variables over 
time. Our efforts to balance conditions on number, proportion of positive and negative 
outcomes, and ratings from pilot participants on experienced empathy and emotion provide 
a novel stimulus set we hope will be useful in future research.  
5. Conclusion 
Physiological responses to lives at risk and the outcome of whether the people survived 
showed biases, not revealed in a behavioural measure. Responses were greater when the 
people were in the same country as the participants, compared to abroad. Responses also 
showed scope insensitivity. As the number of people increased, responses did too, but only 
up to a certain point, then they declined for the largest numbers. Scope insensitivity also got 
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Every day we make decisions that impact other people. Often these have minor 
consequences, but some choices determine who and how many people live or die. Those 
with influence over policy and resource allocation make such decisions regularly but 
everyone with a vote or the power to donate can also have an impact. To understand these 
decisions, it is crucial to understand how people value the lives of others. 
Value is often measured using decisions between different options. However, 
valuing the lives of others is likely to be determined by the cognitive and emotional response 
to the prospect of other people dying (Li et al., 2010; Olivola, 2015). Physiological measures 
such as skin conductance (paper 3) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) offer 
an alternative to decision-making tasks. These techniques allow us to measure responses to 
lives at risk, people dying and people surviving without the issues of social desirability 
associated with self-report (Fernandes and Randall, 1992). Contrasting neural responses to 
lives being lost, compared to people surviving, is one way of quantifying value. We can also 
measure the impact of factors that may increase or decrease the value of a life. 
According to egalitarian normative moral perspectives, there should be no 
differences between the value of individual lives (Dickert et al., 2012). These egalitarian 
principles describe how we ought to value lives and are reflected in many modern societies. 
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 1) states “all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. However, research shows choices are 
inconsistent with this equal value (Slovic, 2000) and are prone to biases. Here we present 
results on the neural correlates of two such biases, relating to the number of people and 
their location. 
 One bias affecting the valuation of human lives is the number of people at risk or in 
need. When responses do not scale linearly with the number of people, each life is not valued 
equally. This is known as scope insensitivity (Dickert et al., 2015) or psychophysical 
numbing (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997). A common pattern, shown in previous literature, 
is that the value of each additional life decreases as the number of people increases, creating 
relative apathy towards large-scale humanitarian catastrophes (Dickert, et al., 2015). 
There are also situations where emotional and behavioural responses decrease as 
the number of people increases. A striking example is the singularity effect, donations to 
one person in need were higher than to two or more people (Västfjäll et al., 2014). At the 
opposite end of the spectrum is the ‘collapse of compassion’ when the number of people 





inability to empathise with, and feel emotional about, large numbers of people suffering 
(Slovic, 2007). A competing explanation is that we are able to comprehend mass suffering, 
but are motivated to avoid doing so and regulate our emotions to prevent being 
overwhelmed (Cameron and Payne, 2011). 
A second bias that affects sympathy and valuation of human lives is proximity, both 
social and geographical. Proximity tends to strengthen responses towards people in need 
whereas distance tends to decrease it (Molenberghs, 2013; Strombach et al., 2015). 
Potential mechanisms for this effect include those due to identity factors, such as similarity 
(Loewenstein and Small, 2007) or being part of an ingroup (Meier, 2011), and physical 
proximity, such as the threat of being personally affected (Zagefka, 2018).  
While these biases have been established in the behavioural domain, research on 
their neural basis is lacking, particularly for scope insensitivity. Neuroimaging allows us to 
see similarities and differences between the processing of different stimuli. For example, 
whether the valuation of people’s lives is associated with the same areas as the valuation of 
non-social resources. Unlike physiological measures such as skin conductance that give a 
single measure of overall arousal, different regions of the brain may respond to stimuli 
differently. 
To apply these benefits of fMRI to the topic of valuing the lives of others, we 
measured activation during a novel ‘news stories’ task. This presented information about 
different numbers of people at risk of death in the UK and abroad and then whether they 
died or survived. Matched non-social control trials presented different numbers of credits, 
which translated to chances to win money, at risk and whether they were lost or kept. Both 
the social and control trials were in a negative frame with the ‘positive’ outcome a lack of 
loss: surviving the risk of death or keeping the credits. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to apply fMRI to scope insensitivity. A 
previous fMRI study on the effect of identifiability showed increased activity in the nucleus 
accumbens (NuAcc) when donating to a beneficiary identified with a photo (Genevsky et al., 
2013). Identifiability often coincides with the singularity effect but the two are distinct (Lee 
and Feeley, 2016). Increased NuAcc activity suggests helping an identified person is 
particularly rewarding. Regions active during rewards for the self are also active when 
observing others receive rewards (Morelli et al., 2015). However, this positive aspect is less 
likely to be relevant in our task that uses a negative frame to align with most news reports. 
Previous work using fMRI on a range of related topics provide hypotheses for our 





subjective value. This has been shown to depart from absolute value in the non-social 
domain and have different value functions in the gain and loss domains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 2013). Across gain and loss frames, a meta-analysis linked the subjective value of 
outcomes to activity in AI, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), striatum, and thalamus 
(Bartra et al., 2013). The authors suggest activations could represent salience or arousal. 
Other relevant topics include empathy for pain and risk. A meta-analysis on the 
neural correlates of risk, uncertain outcomes with known probabilities, identified the AI as 
a key region, across paradigms involving choice or no choice (Feldmanhall et al., 2016). In 
our task, we defined the probabilities by telling participants that there were equal numbers 
of positive and negative outcomes for both the social and non-social elements. 
Given the focus on other people suffering and negative frame, the most relevant 
concept from previous fMRI research is vicarious pain or empathy for pain. Experiencing 
empathy activates a network, including bilateral anterior insula (AI) and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), that overlaps with regions involved in directly experiencing pain (Lamm et al., 
2011). In comparisons between different people suffering, greater activations in AI were 
shown during empathy for pain for ingroups, compared to outgroups (Hein et al., 2010). 
We determined regions of interest based on the fMRI meta-analysis on empathy for 
pain, as this provided a contrast closest to the current task: responses to others suffering 
(Lamm et al., 2011). The key regions identified in this meta-analysis for the contrast other 
pain > other no pain were the ACC and bilateral AI. Increased activity in these regions was 
reliable across studies and was also related to self-pain. These three regions form the focus 
of our analysis as they have also been associated with other relevant processes such as risk 




26 healthy participants (13 female, 13 male, aged 20-37, mean = 26.69, SD = 5.29) 
took part in the study. All participants were right-handed and UK residents, born in the UK 
and having lived most of their lives in the UK. One female participant was excluded due to 
scanner issues, leaving 25 participants for analysis (12 female, 13 male, aged 20-37, mean 
= 26.56, SD = 5.35). Exclusion criteria in addition to those required for MRI research were 





economics, maths or physics at degree level or above; and being born or living for more than 
half one’s life outside the UK. All participants identified themselves as British, except for one 
who identified as Irish. 
Of the 25 participants in the analysis, 13 were currently students, 11 were in 
employment and 1 was unemployed. 11 had completed undergraduate degrees, 1 had 
completed an MSc and for 13 their highest completed qualification was A-levels. Politically, 
the participants were more representative of the local area than the country, with all but 
two reporting voting ‘remain’ in the Brexit referendum (1 did not vote, 1 preferred not to 
say). When asked who they would vote for if a general election were tomorrow, 12 
answered Green, 6 Labour, 3 Liberal Democrat, 2 didn’t say, 2 would not vote. Participants 
were compensated for their time with a payment of £30, which they could give some or all 
of to charity, and entry into 3 prize draws linked to the tasks (see below). The procedure 
was approved by the Brighton and Sussex Medical School Research Governance and Ethics 
Committee [ER/JC620/5]. 
2.2. Stimuli & measures 
2.2.1. News stories stimuli 
Stimuli for the news stories were taken from real events in which varying numbers 
of people were at risk of dying in the UK and abroad. Each was summarised with just the 
number of people, country, and cause of death. The cause types were natural disasters, 
accidents, violence, diseases, or long-term issues. Participants were informed before the 
task that in half the stories the people survived but in the other half they died. The 20 
conditions were created with a 5 (number bin) x 2 (location: UK or abroad) x 2 (outcome: 
positive: alive or negative: dead) design (see table 1). There were 10 stories in each 
condition, meaning 200 in total. 
Stories across these conditions were balanced on the number of each cause type and 
on emotion strength, emotion valence (positive or negative) and experienced empathy for 
the people involved, based on ratings from independent pilot participants. For these ratings, 
the number of people and the country were hidden to isolate the cause of death. Ratings 
were obtained for sentences summarising both the presentation (for example “X people 
were identified at risk of death from a fire”) and the outcome (for example “X people 






2.2.2. Non-social control stimuli 
Stimuli to provide non-social control trials involved a risk of losing credits that 
translated to the participant’s chance to win one of two £50 prizes. Participants started with 
1,000,000 credits in their “Pot”, but on each trial, some could be lost. We also informed 
participants there was a 50:50 chance of keeping or losing the credits. The 100 non-social 
trials were in 10 conditions with a 5 (number bin) x 2 (outcome: positive: keep or negative: 
lose) design (see table 1), with 10 trials per condition. To match the different causes of 
death, credits also had different causes of being lost, for example “stolen” or “decayed”. 
Table 1 




UK  Abroad  
Alive (+) Dead (-)  Alive (+) Dead (-)  Keep (+) Lose (-) 
1 1 person  1 person  1 credit 
2 2 – 10 people  2 – 10 people  2 – 10 credits 
3 11 – 50 people  11 – 50 people  11 – 50 credits 
4 51 – 500 people  51 – 500 people  51 – 500 credits 
5 501 + people  501 + people  501 + credits 
Note. (+): positive outcome, (-): negative outcome. 
2.2.3. Task structure 
In the main task, the 200 news stories and 100 non-social control tasks were 
intermixed. This created 30 conditions with a 3 (trial type: credits or people (location: UK 
or abroad)) x 5 (number bin) x 2 (outcome: positive or negative) design. Trial order was 
determined for each participant pseudo-randomly by dividing the 300 trials into 10 blocks 
of 30 trials that each had one trial from each of the 30 conditions (see table 1). The order of 
conditions within each block was then randomised, as was the order of blocks, and this 
sequence presented with no breaks or change between blocks. 













Figure 1. Structure of the task. The 
fixation cross was either a + or a x 
and the participant pressed a button 
to indicate which. The timing was 





This presentation sentence appeared for 2s. Then the outcome phase showed 
either “ALIVE” or “DEAD” for news stories and “KEEP” or “LOSE” for credits appeared below 
and all the information remained on the screen for 2s. A fixation period of 2s preceded the 
next trial, meaning each trial took 6s (figure 1). 
To ensure and measure concentration during tasks, participants were asked to 
indicate whether the fixation cross was a + or a × by pressing one of two buttons. The type 
of cross was randomised on each trial. This data was lost for four participants but 
monitoring during the scan showed they had responded on most trials. 
2.2.4. Willingness to pay 
To provide a behavioural measure of the value of a life in each condition, we adapted 
a willingness to pay measure (Frederick and Fischhoff, 1998). Participants were asked to 
imagine they were a “UK government minister in charge of allocating resources to stop 
people dying from flooding both in the UK and abroad”. Participants then filled in the 
amount, from £0 - £100,000, to allocate to 12 projects, 6 in the UK and 6 in a named foreign 
country, to save different numbers of people. The numbers corresponded to the average 
numbers in each condition of the fMRI stimuli but with an additional bin to split the top bin 
from the fMRI stimuli in two (approximately 5,000 and approximately 10,000 people). 
Instructions read “You must consider the following proposals and allocate funding. 
For each project, there is a maximum of £100,000 available which you should allocate if the 
project is very important. You must not spend unnecessary money because the money can 
also go to other worthy causes. If a project is not worthwhile you can decide to give it £0. 
However, you cannot use the money you save on one project now for another one of the 






Following informed consent and MRI safety checks, participants indicated how 
much they wanted to know the outcome for a news story representative of each condition. 
They then received instructions for the task in the scanner, including some example trials 
and completed most of the trait measures. 
In the scanner, stimuli were presented in MATLAB (2018a, Mathworks, Inc., Natick, 
MA) using Psychophysics Toolbox extensions version 3 (Brainard, 1997) on a screen 
viewed via a mirror mounted on the head coil. Participants categorised the fixation cross 
using two buttons on an MR-safe response box. The task lasted 30 minutes so combined 
with the field maps and structural scan participants were in the scanner for approximately 
45 minutes.  
After the scan, participants rated all the news stories, including their outcome, in a 
random order on two 0-100 scales. One measured surprise: “In the scanner, how surprising 
did you find this?” [Not at all surprising – Very surprising] and the other emotion: “In the 
scanner, how did you feel about this?” [Very negative – Positive]. Participants then 
completed final trait measures, including the willingness to pay questions. All measures 
outside the scanner were completed through Qualtrics Online Survey Software (Qualtrics, 
Provo, UT). 
During the debrief, we asked participants whether there were any news stories for 
which they had a personal link to either the country or the cause involved, or any that during 
the scan they recognised and remembered from the news. We also asked whether 
participants believed that the news stories were real and categorised responses between 1 
(did not believe) to 4 (believed) with 2 and 3 representing major and minor doubts 
respectively. No participants reported not believing the stories at all, 19 believed them 
completely, 4 had only minor doubts, 1 had major doubts and for 1 participant this was not 
recorded. 
2.4. fMRI data acquisition 
Data were acquired using a Siemens Prisma 3T scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, 
Erlangen, Germany) fitted with a 32-channel head-coil at the Clinical Imaging Sciences 
Centre, Brighton and Sussex Medical School. Field maps were collected in the anterior–
posterior and posterior–anterior directions to adjust for distortions. Functional T2-
weighted echo-planar images were acquired in an interleaved order with multiband factor 





flip angle, and voxel size of 2.19*2.19*2mm. Finally, whole-brain high-resolution T1-
weighted structural images were collected using the MPR sequence with the following 
parameters: 208 slices, 0.8mm3 voxel size, 2.4s TR, 2.22ms TE, 8° flip angle, 6.38 minutes 
total time. 
2.5. Analysis 
We used several tools from FMRIB’s Software Library (FSL, version 6.0) (Jenkinson 
et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2004) during preprocessing and FEAT for first (Woolrich et al., 
2001) and group-level analysis (Woolrich et al., 2004). 
2.5.1. Preprocessing 
The susceptibility-induced off-resonance field was estimated by applying topup 
(Andersson et al., 2003), as implemented in FSL, to the two images with reversed phase-
encode blips, so distortions in opposite directions. The resulting image was used in 
preprocessing to unwarp the functional data. We extracted the brain using BET, FSL’s Brain 
Extraction Tool (Smith, 2002). During preprocessing, we applied FMRIB's Image 
Registration Tools MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002) to correct for motion and FLIRT 
(Jenkinson and Smith, 2001) to register EPI images to an expanded functional image (full 
search, 6 DOF) and then to the participants’ structural image (full search, BBR). Registration 
of the structural to standard space (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI152) used FNIRT 
(Andersson et al., 2010) nonlinear registration (full search, 12 DOF).  
We cleaned the unsmoothed data by removing components classified as noise 
following independent components analysis with Multivariate Exploratory Linear 
Optimized Decomposition into Independent Components (MELODIC; Beckmann and Smith, 
2004). Classification was automated using FMRIB's ICA-based Xnoiseifier (FIX; Griffanti et 
al., 2014; Salimi-Khorshidi et al., 2014) trained on manually classified components from the 
same dataset and we checked all classifications. We also generated confound files for motion 
outliers with FSL’s Motion Outliers and used these to remove the volumes from analysis. 
Smoothing with a 5mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel was applied to the 
denoised data. 
2.5.2. First level  
We fitted general linear models (GLMs) for the event-related parameters to the data 
for each participant. These were optimised for the outcome phase, with onsets at the point 
the outcome appeared, although this was only 2 seconds after the presentation, so these 





participants reported a link to or remembered were put into a confound regressor. We 
created a separate confound regressor for trials on which the participant did not respond 
to the classification of the fixation cross at the end of that trial. Regressors and temporal 
derivatives were convolved with the default hemodynamic response function in FSL 
(gamma function, delay: 6s, SD: 3s).  
Event files combined trials within each condition: number bin (1-5) x trial type & 
location (UK, abroad or credits) x outcome valence (positive or negative). 3 versions of each 
were created: a) with no parametric modulator, b) with surprise ratings as a parametric 
modulator and c) with emotion ratings as a parametric modulator. For the whole-brain 
analyses, we used contrast coefficients that created different shapes across the number of 
people or credits. These used the number bin (1-5), creating an equal distance between each 
bin. 
2.5.3. Regions of interest 
To create a-priori regions of interest (ROIs) we used peaks identified in an fMRI 
meta-analysis (Lamm et al., 2011) for vicarious pain responses. We focused our analysis on 
the largest 3 clusters: the medial anterior cingulate cortex (ACC: -2, 23, 40); left anterior 
insula (AI: -40, 22, 0); and right AI (39, 23, -4). For each ROI, we extracted parameter 
estimates from a 5mm sphere, centred on the peak, for each condition. 
We analysed the parameter estimates from the ROIs using lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) 
and afex (Singmann et al., 2019) in R (R Core Team, 2017) with RStudio (RStudio Team, 
2015). Each started with the maximal model (Barr et al., 2013), but these did not converge 
so random-effect structures and some interactions between fixed terms were removed to 
balance convergence and model fit, assessed by comparing the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC; Akaike, 1974). The best model varied for each analysis so is reported alongside the 
results. 
Factors in the model were the average number for that bin (of people or credits; 
transformed with log10), outcome valence (positive or negative) and either a) trial type 
(people or credits) or b) location (UK or abroad). For the number of people, we included a 
linear and a quadratic term based on findings from behavioural research that responses to 
increasing numbers of people may initially rise and then decline again (Dickert et al., 2012).  
We analysed answers to the behavioural willingness to pay questions with a similar 
technique to the ROIs – a mixed model with predictors of number of people (log10 scale) 





2.5.4. Whole-brain second level 
Group-level models were fitted to parameter estimates from each of the lower-level 
analyses, using FMRIB's Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME) 1+2 (Woolrich et al., 
2004). We used cluster-corrected thresholding with a voxel threshold of Z > 3 and cluster 
threshold of p < .05. to protect against false positives (Eklund et al., 2016). Labels for the 
regions identified in these results were generated using the Harvard-Oxford cortical and 
subcortical atlases in FSL. 
3. Results 
3.1. Willingness to pay 
The maximal model included a main effect of number and location and interaction 
between these factors, both as fixed and random terms. This converged and was made 
worse by removing any elements. The linear relationship between the total amount given 
and the number of people (on a log10 scale) was significant (t = 8.70, p < .0001; figure 2A). 
However, when calculating the amount per person, responses showed scope insensitivity. 
An average of £5467.37 was given to save one person but £6.47 for each person in groups 
of over 10,000 people (these averages exclude two participants who gave the maximum on 
all questions; figure 2B). 
 
 
Figure 2. Amounts given on the willingness to pay task to save A: groups of different sizes 







Across participants, more was given to save lives in the UK than abroad, but this effect was 
not significant (t = 1.97, p = .06). Location also did not interact significantly with number (t 
= 1.26, p = .22). Between participants there were large differences in the effect of location. 
12 participants gave more to projects in the UK (up to 7.6 times more), 5 gave more to 
projects abroad (up to 4.3 times more) and 8 participants gave the same amount between 
locations. 
3.2. People vs. credits 
3.2.1. ROIs 
A significant main effect of whether the trial was social or non-social was only found 
in the right AI of the three ROIs statistically analysed (t = 2.25, p = .034). This showed greater 
activity for outcomes affecting participants’ credits than other people. Activity in the right 
AI was also higher for negative, compared to positive, outcomes when averaging across 
people and credits (t = 2.22, p = .027). In the ACC, there was a significant interaction between 
outcome valence (positive or negative) and whether the trial was social (people or credits; t 
= -2.14, p = .033) showing a greater differentiation between positive and negative outcomes 
for people, compared to credits (figure 3). 
 
Table 2 
Results from mixed-models analysis of the 3 ROIs testing the effect of trial type (people or 
credits), outcome valence (positive or negative), number (log10), and interactions between 
these factors. 
 ACC  Left AI  Right AI  
t p  t p  t p 
Intercept -6.15 <.001*  -1.93 .065  -5.62 <.001* 
Number (linear) 3.27 .001*  2.38 .018*  2.70 .007* 
Number (quadratic) -1.70 .101  0.19 .849  -0.04 .970 
Credits – people 0.50 .619  -1.37 .182  2.25 .034* 
Negative – positive 1.50 .145  1.84 .066  2.22 .027* 
Number (linear) x type 3.58 <.001*  1.20 .232  0.79 .431 
Number (quadratic) x type -0.35 .725  -0.13 .893  0.04 .971 
Number (linear) x type 1.01 .312  0.45 .656  1.05 .292 
Number (quadratic) x type 0.30 .764  0.45 .652  0.27 .789 
Type x valence -2.14 .033*  -1.61 .107  -0.92 .360 
N (linear) x type x V -1.32 .188  -1.27 .206  -0.68 .498 
N (quadratic) x type x V -1.90 .057  -1.28 .201  -0.93 .354 
Note. x: interaction, N: number, L: location, V: valence, blank cells: the variable was not 





Figure 3. Average estimated activity in arbitrary units (a.u.) for each condition from the 3 
main ROIs – ACC: anterior cingulate cortex (top row), L-AI: left anterior insula (middle 
row) and R-AI: right anterior insula (bottom row). 
 
Regarding number, analysis of the ACC, left AI and right AI, across trials involving 
people and credits, revealed a significant linear relationship between responses and the 
(log10) number of people in all three regions (see table 2). However, in the ACC this 
relationship significantly interacted with whether the trial was social, with the linear effect 









3.2.2. Whole brain 
Results from the ACC, right AI and left AI showed responses to people and credits 
differed in overall levels of activation, differentiation between positive and negative 
outcomes and relationship with number. We then looked at these contrasts for the whole 
brain to see whether other regions showed the same results as the ROIs. 
Greater responses to outcomes affecting people, compared to credits, were shown 
in regions including the precuneus, vmPFC, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), right hippocampus, 
and left insula. In contrast, increased activity during outcomes affecting credits were shown 
in the bilateral frontal and posterior supramarginal gyri, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC), and distinct areas of the precuneus and insula (table 3). 
Table 3 
Cluster peak details from the whole-brain contrast of people vs. credits 
Label Voxels Z-score p X Y Z 
People > credits 
Precuneus cortex 9068 6.40 <1.0e-30 -4 -58 8 
Frontal medial cortex 3375 6.26 1.4e-30 -2 38 -20 
Frontal orbital cortex 2719 6.07 2.36e-26 -42 32 -16 
Right hippocampus 628 5.36 2.39e-09 24 -18 -18 
Precentral gyrus 332 5.57 8.58e-06 -54 -10 50 
Central opercular cortex 199 4.56 0.000745 -36 2 12 
Temporal fusiform cortex (posterior) 135 4.34 0.00908 36 -36 -26 
Cerebellum vermis VI  124 4.02 0.0145 0 -74 -26 
Lateral occipital cortex (superior) 121 5.31 0.0164 -36 -78 40 
Precentral gyrus 120 4.30 0.0172 -22 -10 64 
Cerebellum right IX 96 4.64 0.0499 4 -56 -44 
 
Credits > people 
Middle frontal gyrus 4381 5.25 1.46e-36 46 14 40 
Supramarginal gyrus (posterior) 4348 6.03 2.25e-36 56 -46 48 
Precuneus cortex 1903 5.52 1.4e-20 10 -78 46 
Cerebellum left crus II 1322 5.44 6.06e-16 -40 -62 -44 
Supramarginal gyrus (posterior) 1007 5.12 3.8e-13 -56 -44 46 
Frontal pole 407 5.31 8.94e-07 -40 50 6 
Paracingulate gyrus 385 4.12 1.73e-06 10 42 18 
Cingulate gyrus (anterior) 380 4.83 1.97e-06 6 -14 28 
Insular cortex 190 4.39 0.00104 40 12 -12 
Temporal occipital fusiform cortex 163 4.25 0.00293 30 -52 -6 
Superior frontal gyrus 152 3.88 0.00453 -24 6 58 






Figure 4. Contrast between people and credits (all numbers and outcomes). Orange: people 
> credits; blue: credits> people. Images in radiological orientation (right = left), coordinates 
in MNI space (mm), threshold Z > 3. 
 
For trials involving people, several regions differentiated between positive and 
negative outcomes (discussed below) but this was not the case for credit trials. The 
interaction between trial type (people or credits) and outcome valence (positive or negative) 
only showed a small cluster in the occipital fusiform gyrus (-32, -82, -14) where positive 
and negative outcomes for people were differentiated more than for credits. 
A positive correlation between activity and number bin (1-5) was found for credits 
in ACC, OFC, frontal gyri and occipital areas. Analysing positive and negative outcomes 
separately for credits showed similar results and no regions showed an interaction between 
number and valence. These results from the whole-brain analysis support the choice of ROIs 
as key areas involved during the task. The specific area of the ACC covered by the ROI is 
representative of a broader area where activity correlates with the number of credits but is 
insensitive to outcome valence.  
In contrast, responses to outcomes involving people do not show this pattern. Few 
regions showed a positive correlation with the number of people. These were mostly in 
occipital areas, likely reflecting the visual aspect of larger numbers. The exception was 
activity in bilateral insula which correlated with number when people died abroad. In ACC 
and dlPFC, activity increased with number significantly more for credits than people (table 






 Table 4 
Cluster peak details from the whole-brain analysis of positive correlation with number bin 
Label Voxels Z-score p X Y Z 
Credits 
Paracingulate gyrus 2405 4.82 1.15e-24 0 42 28 
Occipital pole 614 4.26 2.27e-09 22 -100 -8 
Occipital pole 436 4.03 2.98e-07 -12 -104 -10 
Supramarginal gyrus (posterior) 233 3.83 0.000181 -58 -52 42 
Frontal pole 188 3.95 0.000948 -46 42 16 
Inferior frontal gyrus,  
pars opercularis 
169 3.95 0.00198 -54 18 4 
Superior frontal gyrus 142 3.95 0.00594 12 18 66 
Cerebellum right crus I 141 4.19 0.0062 34 -62 -30 
Frontal orbital cortex 114 4.09 0.0199 -38 20 -18 
Frontal orbital cortex 105 4.04 0.0299 34 20 -12 
Cerebellum left crus I 104 3.82 0.0313 -38 -62 -26 
Occipital pole 103 3.95 0.0328 -34 -92 0 
Left thalamus 101 3.89 0.036 -2 -20 12 
 
People 
Occipital pole 2720 5.01 2.42e-27 26 -92 -12 
Lateral occipital cortex (superior) 192 4.10 0.000686 -24 -70 40 
Inferior temporal gyrus 
(temporooccipital) 
95 3.81 0.0433 48 -52 -14 
Lateral occipital cortex (superior) 95 3.82 0.0433 32 -76 42 
 
Credits > people 
Paracingulate gyrus 562 8.25 5.68e-09 0 38 30 
Frontal pole 145 3.96 0.00447 -26 46 38 
Frontal pole 128 3.80 0.00933 30 54 18 
 
Abroad negative 
Occipital fusiform gyrus 254 3.95 0.000131 20 -84 -4 
Central opercular cortex 167 3.92 0.0029 -38 -14 16 
Lateral occipital cortex (superior) 165 4.10 0.00313 -30 -76 24 
Insular cortex 143 4.09 0.00744 38 -2 12 
Precentral gyrus 112 4.00 0.0271 62 12 12 
Note. X, Y & Z: coordinates in MNI space, credits > people: clusters showing a stronger positive 
correlation with number bin (1-5) for credits than people. Results for credits, people and 






Figure 5. Regions showing a positive correlation with number bin (1-5). Light blue: credits 
(both positive & negative outcomes); dark blue: credits correlation with number > people 
correlation with number; green: negative outcomes abroad. Images in radiological 
orientation (right = left), coordinates in MNI space (mm), threshold Z > 3. 
 
3.3. UK vs. abroad 
3.3.1. ROIs 
When analysis was limited to trials involving people, across the UK and abroad, 
negative outcomes were associated with greater activity than when the people survived in 
all three ROIs (table 5). Mixed-models analysis of parameters in the 3 main ROIs did not 
show a significant main effect of location (UK or abroad) in any of the regions. However, in 
both left and right AI positive and negative outcomes in the UK were differentiated more 
than those abroad (left t = 2.25, p = .025, right t = 2.04, p = .042). 
In the ACC and right AI, a three-way interaction was shown between location (UK or 
abroad), outcome valence (positive or negative) and number. As shown in the graphs in 
figure 3, responses to outcomes in the UK were relatively flat across the number of people, 
regardless of valence. In contrast, for outcomes abroad, responses to positive outcomes 
generally declined as the number increased whereas responses to negative outcomes 
increased over number. This pattern resulted in a point at approximately 100 people abroad 











Results from mixed-models analysis of the 3 ROIs testing the effect of location (UK or abroad), 
outcome valence (positive or negative), number (log10), and interactions between these 
factors. 
 ACC  Left AI  Right AI  
t p  t p  t p 
Intercept 6.13 <.001*  -1.68 .106  -6.29 <.001* 
Number (linear) 0.24 .807     1.65 .100 
Number (quadratic) 1.56 .121       
UK – abroad -0.34 .737  1.35 .178  0.41 .681 
Negative – positive 2.18 .039*  2.53 .018*  2.64 .014* 
Number (linear) x location 0.82 .410     -1.31 .191 
Number (quadratic) x location 0.63 .532       
Number (linear) x valence 1.96 .050     1.49 .138 
Number (quadratic) x valence 1.82 .069       
Location x valence 1.84 .066  2.25 .025*  2.04 .042* 
N (linear) x L x V -2.24 .025*     -2.10 .036* 
N (quadratic) x L x V -0.72 .470       
Note. x: interaction, N: number, L: location, V: valence, blank cells: the variable was not 
included in the best fitting model, *: p < 0.05 
 
Table 6 
Cluster peak details from the whole-brain contrast of UK vs. abroad 
Label Voxels Z-score p X Y Z 
UK > abroad 
Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis 179 4.19 0.0019 -56 20 26 
 
Abroad > UK 
Lateral occipital cortex (inferior) 2338 5.77 3.13e-23 -38 -86 -8 
Occipital pole 986 5.40 1.14e-12 28 -98 -10 
Cingulate gyrus (posterior) 538 4.14 5.96e-08 8 -48 6 
Parahippocampal gyrus 149 4.02 0.006 32 -34 -16 
Right amygdala 133 4.05 0.0114 16 -6 -14 










3.3.2. Whole brain 
Results from the ROIs suggest that the effect of location (UK or abroad) was more 
relevant for interactions with outcome valence and number but we also ran an exploratory 
whole-brain contrast between outcomes and the UK and abroad, averaging across valence 
and number. This revealed greater activity in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) for UK > 
abroad. For the contrast abroad > UK, activity was in the posterior cingulate gyrus, right 
hippocampus, right amygdala and occipital regions. 
Responses to people dying in the UK were greater than when the people survived in 
bilateral insula in the whole-brain analysis, in addition to the ROIs and a more dorsal, 
posterior region of the ACC. Additional regions revealed in this contrast included the right 
amygdala, left TPJ and occipital areas (table 7, figure 7). No regions showed increased 
activity for positive, compared to negative, outcomes in the UK. The same contrast for 
outcomes abroad did not show any areas of significance at our whole-brain threshold in 
either direction. An interaction between the effect of valence in the UK vs. abroad was 
shown in the intracalcarine cortex (24, -64, 6). No regions showed the three-way interaction 
found in the right AI and ACC ROIs between valence, location and number. 
Interestingly, the increase in activity associated with die, compared to live, 
outcomes in the UK was a result that particularly differed when accounting for the post-scan 
ratings of how surprising and emotional the stories and their outcomes were. Including 
surprise as a parametric modulator reduced some of the regions of significance whereas 
accounting for emotion left no significant regions at all (see table 7 and figure 7). 
As the contrasts creating a linear relationship between activity and the number bin 
for people did not seem to capture how this variable is processed, we also created contrasts 
to detect activity that correlated with an inverted ‘V’ shape, increasing from bin 1 (1 person) 
to bin 2 (2-10 people) but then declining across bins 3, 4 and 5. This was based on the graphs 
from the ROIs and also results from skin conductance measures on a similar news stories 
task (paper 3). A relationship would imply a maximum responsivity to numbers near 2-10. 
Correlations with this inverted V pattern was found for outcomes both in the UK and 
abroad in ACC, but in separate, neighbouring regions (figure 8 and table 8). Activations for 
events in the UK were closer to the corpus collosum in the anterior cingulate gyrus whereas 
activations for events abroad were more anterior and larger. This contrast for outcomes in 
the UK also showed activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). The inverse contrast 
abroad, creating a ‘V’ rather than an inverted ‘V’, revealed a cluster in the left superior lateral 





Repeating this analysis with the peak at bin 3 (increase between bins 1 to 3 then 
decline) showed a similar cluster for the UK in the planum temporale (58, -30, 22). No 
activations showed significant associations with the ‘inverted V’ abroad but the ‘V’ (decline 
to bin 3 then increase) showed clusters in the left pSTS (-52, -36, 2), right superior lateral 
occipital cortex (32, -68, 28) and left temporal pole (-52, 8, -16). Overall, these results show 
that different regions respond maximally to different numbers of people. 
 
 
Figure 6. Contrast between the UK and abroad, including both positive and negative 
outcomes. Orange: UK > abroad; green: abroad > UK. Coordinates in MNI space (mm), 
threshold Z > 3. 
 
Table 7 
Cluster peak details from the whole-brain contrast between negative and positive outcomes in 
the UK 
Label Voxels Z-score p X Y Z  
UK negative > UK positive  
Occipital fusiform gyrus 1052 4.12 3.17e-14 -18 -88 -20 † 
Occipital fusiform gyrus 510 4.05 2.04e-08 18 -78 -18  
Superior frontal gyrus 407 4.08 4.17e-07 6 12 62 † 
Inferior temporal gyrus 
(temporooccipital) 
405 4.16 4.17e-07 -48 -64 -20 †+ 
Cingulate gyrus (anterior) 324 4.07 5.66e-06 2 20 20 † 
Frontal operculum cortex 310 4.03 9e-06 -34 24 6  
Frontal operculum cortex 257 4.02 5.56e-05 48 16 -4 † 
Brain-stem 197 3.86 0.00051 -4 -22 -16 † 
Right amygdala 143 3.95 0.00459 18 -6 -14  
White matter / right thalamus 133 3.85 0.00709 10 -2 0  
Lingual gyrus 104 3.74 0.0266 2 -76 6 + 
Angular gyrus 100 3.88 0.0321 -50 -52 24  
Note. X, Y & Z: coordinates in MNI space. †: cluster remains significant when accounting for 
surprise (none remained significant when accounting for emotion) - additional brain-stem 
cluster in this analysis at 4, -30, 0. +: significant interaction between frame and location – 






Figure 7. Contrast between the negative (die) and positive (live) outcomes in the UK. 
Orange/yellow: UK negative > UK positive with no parametric modulator; red: UK negative 
> UK positive after including surprise ratings as a parametric modulator. Images in 




Cluster peak details from the whole-brain contrast modelling an ‘inverted ‘V’ relationship 
between activity and the number of people 
Label Voxels Z-score p X Y Z 
UK inverted ‘V’ 
Planum temporale 541 4.09 5.96e-08 62 -30 20 
Cingulate gyrus (anterior) 151 3.85 0.00655 2 26 20 
Cuneal cortex 144 3.82 0.00859 4 -84 24 
Lingual gyrus 105 4.21 0.0422 -12 -64 -8 
 
Abroad inverted ‘V’ 
Paracingulate gyrus 783 4.04 2.38e-10 6 46 0 
Frontal pole 160 3.98 0.00512 30 52 26 
Paracingulate gyrus 120 4.03 0.0243 4 26 36 





Figure 8. Regions where activity showed an inverted ‘V’ relationship (peaking at bin 2, see 
inset) with the number of people. Orange: outcomes in the UK; green: outcomes abroad. 
Images in radiological orientation (right = left), coordinates in MNI space (mm), threshold 






Using novel stimuli adapted from real news stories, we identify the neural correlates 
of responses to other people’s lives being at risk and finding out whether they survived or 
died. A human life is processed differently to non-social outcomes. This is shown by a 
departure from the linear increase in neural activation with the amount of risk we see in a 
non-social context. Instead, we find that processing of risk to human life is less sensitive to 
the number at risk, and more sensitive to what happened to people. However, these 
attributes of valuing the lives of others are not the same for lives in the same country and 
lives abroad. 
Behaviourally, there was not strong evidence that participants differentiated people 
in the same country from people abroad. Participants also increased the amount they would 
spend to save increasing numbers of people. However, our fMRI results show insensitivity 
to the number of people and that lives in the UK are processed differently to those abroad 
in three important ways. First, the effect of death, compared to survival, is greater in the UK 
than abroad. Second, the effect of number differs between people in the UK and abroad and 
finally, the relationship with number correlates with activity in separate regions.  
Here we discuss differences between experimental conditions in the activation 
patterns shown in three ROIs (ACC, left AI and right AI) taken from a meta-analysis on 
empathy for pain (Lamm et al., 2011) and whole-brain analyses. 
4.1. People vs. credits 
4.1.1. Main effect 
Scope insensitivity to numbers occurs for valuation of both economic and social 
outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 2013; Slovic, 2007). For non-social or financial 
outcomes, a common finding is that each additional unit adds value but not as much as the 
previous one. However, previous work suggests that valuing the lives of other people may 
be affected by additional, emotional processes that can result in decreases in value as the 
number of lives increases (Dickert et al., 2015). One of our contributions is further insight 
into how the valuation of people differs from non-social outcomes, by contrasting people’s 
lives with credits, a financial resource for participants.  
One key difference between responses to outcomes affecting people and those 
affecting credits was the location of activation when collapsing across different numbers 





shown in areas associated with valuation including the vmPFC and OFC (Bartra et al., 2013). 
Activity in vmPFC as well as the precuneus, also revealed in this contrast, were linked to 
empathy for pain communicated through abstract cues, compared to images (Lamm et al., 
2011), and are associated with inferring the mental states of others (Frith and Frith, 2006). 
Finally, several further regions more active during social, compared to non-social trials, are 
linked to episodic memory including the precuneus, hippocampus, and an area of the right 
cerebellum (Jeong et al., 2015). Given that the people trials were taken from real news 
stories in the past, it is possible that participants were remembering or trying to remember 
the event. 
In contrast, trials involving credits showed increased activity in regions associated 
with working memory and attention in the frontal cortex (Majerus et al., 2016). The specific 
region of the superior frontal gyrus has also previously been linked with arithmetic and 
calculation (Fehr et al., 2007). The right AI ROI also showed increased activity for credits 
compared to people, but in the whole-brain analysis, the left insula showed the reverse. 
4.1.2. Number 
In addition to contrasting all trials involving people and all trials involving credits, 
we compared the effect of number between these trial types. Multiple regions had activity 
that positively correlated with the number of credits when put on a scale of 1-5 (similar to 
taking the log10 of the average number in that bin + 1). The ACC showed this pattern in both 
the ROI and whole-brain analysis and linearity was greater for credits than people here and 
into the dmPFC. While the ROIs were selected from research on empathy for pain, the ACC 
has also been linked to experiencing pain, losses and errors (Vassena et al., 2017). Positive 
correlations between activity and the number of credits were also shown in OFC, an area 
linked to value (Bartra et al., 2013). 
Combining all trials about people gives the greatest power to detect a positive 
correlation with number but the only regions found in this contrast were in the occipital 
cortex. While there is some evidence that emotion visual stimuli affect activity in visual 
areas (Vassena et al., 2017), it is impossible to exclude the possibility that this was simply 
due to larger numbers having more digits so being longer on the screen. Interestingly, the 
same areas of ACC and dmPFC that showed a positive correlation with the number of credits 
showed activity during outcomes affecting people that varied in an inverted V shape with 








The final distinction between people and credit trials was a greater differentiation 
between negative and positive outcomes when they affected people, compared to credits, in 
the ACC ROI. Analysis separating people trials into those in the UK and those abroad showed 
this was driven by the UK, so this result is discussed below. 
4.2. UK vs. abroad 
4.2.1. Main effect 
An overall difference between outcomes affecting people in the UK and people 
abroad was not found in any of our ROIs. Whole-brain analysis of this contrast showed 
increased activity in the IFG for UK > abroad. This region has been associated with 
comprehending language and reading (Andin et al., 2015; Citron et al., 2014). Regions 
including the right hippocampus and right amygdala were shown in the inverse contrast 
(abroad > UK). The amygdala has typically been associated with negative emotions but is 
also linked with reward and a range of social processes (Bickart et al., 2014). The increase 
in activity here during outcomes abroad, compared to the UK, may have been driven by the 
fact that this region differentiated positive from negative outcomes in the UK, with a 
deactivation for positive outcomes. 
4.2.2. Number 
In the four combinations of location (UK or abroad) and outcome valence (positive 
or negative), only people dying abroad elicited activity that positively correlated with 
number (scale 1-5), outside occipital regions. As this was in bilateral insula, ROIs that we 
graphed parameter estimates for, we can see that the increase in activity with number is 
only after bin 2 (2-10 people) in the left and after bin 3 (11-50) people in the right. 
Based on the ROI graphs and the relationship between skin conductance amplitudes 
and numbers of people in paper 3, we ran a whole-brain analysis to detect regions where 
activity showed an ‘inverted V’ shape – rising from bin 1 to bin 2 then declining. For 
outcomes in the UK, activity in right TPJ correlated with this shape. This region is linked to 
social processing, particularly theory of mind (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Frith and Frith, 
2003; Schurz et al., 2014). 
As predicted from the ROIs, the ACC also showed an inverted V pattern but in 
separate, neighbouring regions for the UK and abroad. The region showing an inverted V 
relationship with number of people in the UK was in the ACC gyrus (ACCg). The region for 





this overlapped with the region showing a positive correlation between activity and number 
bin for credits. 
One interpretation of these differing activations is based on the idea that the ACCg 
is more specialised for social processing, whereas the ACCs is more domain general and 
responds to stimuli involving the self, other and non-biological agents (Apps et al., 2016). 
Overlap in the less specialised ACCs for the relationship with number, albeit different 
shapes, is one way that responses to events abroad were more like responses to credits than 
responses to events in the UK were. 
4.2.3. Outcome 
A final distinction between responses to outcomes affecting people in the UK vs. 
abroad, and another way in which events abroad were more similar to credits, was that 
positive and negative outcomes were only distinguished when they affected people in the 
UK. The contrast UK negative > UK positive showed a network of regions linked to social 
and emotional processing including bilateral insula, amygdala and left TPJ (see above). If a 
measure of the value of a life is the difference between responses to people living or dying, 
these results suggest this was greater for lives in the same country as the participant. 
4.3. Limitations 
As outlined above, combining our novel news stories task with fMRI gives insight 
into the neural correlates of valuing the lives of others and biases that affect this value. 
However, there are some limitations that must be recognised. 
Like most fMRI studies, our sample size was small, limiting the power to generalise 
results. However, given the sample was politically liberal, the levels of scope insensitivity 
and bias towards outcomes in one’s own country are more likely to be an underestimation 
than an overestimation of these biases in the general population. 
Another issue is whether participants’ expectations about the outcomes affected 
responses. To account for this, after the scan, we asked participants to rate how surprising 
and how emotional they found the outcomes. As shown in table 7 and figure 7 for the 
contrast between negative and positive outcomes in the UK, accounting for surprise did not 
fully explain the results. Instead, in line with the interpretation that these differences were 
due to emotional processes, accounting for emotion did mean no activations met the 
threshold for significance. No regions showed activity that correlated with surprise or 







Responses in the brain when lives are lost are distinct from responses to the loss of 
financial resources. While the value of credits with financial value increases linearly with 
the amount, neural correlates of the value of people show non-linear relationships with 
number. Within people’s lives, those in the UK are valued differently to lives abroad. 
Whether people abroad died or survived did not affect responses overall. In contrast, a 
network of emotion and social processing regions differentiated deaths in the UK from 
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Altruism is crucial for positive interactions between people and cohesive societies. 
Altruistic behaviours range from the low cost, such as holding open a door for someone, to 
the extraordinary, like donating a kidney to a stranger (Brethel-Haurwitz et al., 2018; Marsh 
et al., 2014). In addition to benefits for recipients, altruistic behaviours have been linked to 
increased wellbeing (Aknin et al., 2013a; Dunn et al., 2014, 2008). Anonymous donations, 
to other people or charities, exclude strategic motivations to be prosocial to induce 
reciprocity. Even in these contexts, altruistic decisions correlated with activation in reward-
related brain regions (Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019; Moll et al., 2006).  
Previous work has identified two broad motivations for altruistic behaviours: pure 
and impure (Andreoni, 1990, 1989), also termed outcome-oriented and action-oriented 
(Kuss et al., 2013). We use the terms outcome and action orientation here. Outcome-
oriented altruism is motivated by the positive outcome or public good, independent of one’s 
own contribution. In contrast, action-oriented altruism is motivated by positive emotions 
from the act of giving. This has been described as warm glow giving in the past (Andreoni, 
1990, 1989), but recent uses of the term warm glow do not necessarily exclude outcome-
orientations.  
These motivations are not necessarily in competition and likely work together, even 
within a single decision. However, there are important implications of which is most 
prominent for understanding and encouraging prosocial behaviour. For example, charities 
often tell donors what has been achieved with their donation. An outcome-oriented donor 
would be most strongly reinforced by the change in wellbeing for the recipients. Whether 
this is from their specific donation, or donations from other donors, should not make a 
difference. In contrast, an action-oriented donor would prefer to hear about the impact of 
their personal donation. 
Understanding motivations for giving also offers insight into why prosocial 
decisions show biases, deviations from rationality and the moral rule that all lives are equal 
(Dickert et al., 2012). Some examples of these biases are increased giving to singular, 
identified beneficiaries (Genevsky et al., 2013; Västfjäll et al., 2014) and to beneficiaries who 
are more similar to the donor (Loewenstein and Small, 2007). Often these factors work in 
opposition to having the greatest impact. Impact is more likely to be obtained through giving 
to causes that are evidence-based (statistical) and help people in foreign countries. Perhaps 





oriented altruism), rather than the way that has the biggest impact for the recipients 
(outcome-oriented altruism). 
To study whether the distinction between outcome and action orientations is useful 
for understanding altruism, it is necessary to separate these motivations experimentally. 
Most work on this topic has come from studies of crowding out: whether participants 
reduce their donations if someone else provides the public good (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 
2017). For example, paradigms may give participants the opportunity to contribute to an 
appeal from their own earnings, but the amount they gave would be deducted off a donation 
from the lab. As the total donation remained the same, the outcome for the beneficiaries is 
kept constant and the only possible motivation to give is warm glow from the action of 
giving. While these paradigms provided evidence for action-oriented motivations, through 
incomplete crowding out, they do not isolate, so cannot measure, individual differences in 
outcome-oriented motivations.  
Several studies have developed measures of both outcome and action orientations 
by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the first, participants made 
voluntary charitable donations and also observed tax-like involuntary transfers from their 
money to the charity. The ventral striatum was active in both contexts and more active 
during voluntary donations, supporting the existence of both outcome-oriented and action-
oriented giving (Harbaugh et al., 2007). Between-subjects, whether activation was greater 
during transfers to the charity or money for the participant predicted real-world giving. This 
measure of ‘pure altruism’ was also linked to a general benevolence trait that increases with 
age (Hubbard et al., 2016) and suggested to strengthen following gratitude practice (Karns 
et al., 2017). 
In a different paradigm, participants also made costly charitable donation decisions 
in the scanner but on some trials, donations were discarded. As the action-oriented reward 
of being generous is unaffected by whether a donation is discarded, a reward prediction 
error signal in the nucleus accumbens is evidence for other-oriented motivations. This was 
present, but only for the most generous participants, again supporting a relationship 
between other orientation and giving (Kuss et al., 2013). 
These fMRI studies demonstrate the insight that can be gained in this area but rely 
on expensive methods. To further study how action and outcome orientations relate to 
other traits and behaviours, a behavioural measure of these motivations is required. To do 





Interest in outcomes for us is a normal psychological feature for most people. This 
is expressed through an optimism bias: updating beliefs more in response to positive than 
negative information (Sharot, 2011). Participants also preferred, and even paid, to find out 
information about positive outcomes (monetary wins) and avoid information about 
negative outcomes (losses) for themselves, even though the outcome was fixed. Patterns of 
brain activity further supported the idea that positive information has intrinsic value 
(Charpentier et al., 2018). 
There is also evidence for a vicarious optimism bias and this was linked to concern 
for other people (Kappes et al., 2018). Greater vicarious optimism bias was found for 
likeable and identifiable strangers, factors that also predict concern, and was linked to 
altruistic behaviour. These results support the basis for the current study: that concern for 
others translate into a bias towards information about positive, over negative, outcomes. 
The method used by Kappes et al. (2018) measured updating of beliefs about 
positive or negative life events. The fact that none of these events were caused by the 
participant aligns them with an outcome-oriented concern for others. In the present study, 
we adapt the tasks developed by Charpentier et al. (2018) to create conditions in which 
positive and negative financial outcomes affect either the participant or a third person. In 
our ‘visual perception task’, these outcomes affect either the participant or someone else 
and are caused either by the participant or a third person. This allows us to compare interest 
in positive and negative outcomes for the self and others in contexts where altruistic 
concern could be driven by action-oriented or outcome-oriented interest.  
We present four versions of this paradigm and a fifth experiment using charitable 
donation decisions made by either the participant or a third person. Results show interest 
in outcomes, and the level of bias towards positive outcomes, depend on who is affected and 
who is responsible. We also adapt the ‘probability task’ from Charpentier et al. (2018), in 
which positive or negative outcomes occur with different probabilities and apply this to 
outcomes for someone else as well as the self. In this task, no one is responsible for the 
outcomes. Patterns of interest across the conditions are similar for self and other suggesting 






2. Experiments 1-4 
Experiments 1-4 consisted of two parts: an online questionnaire (20 minutes, see 
below) completed before a single lab session (40 minutes). Experiment 5 was run entirely 
online and used different tasks so is described separately below. All experiments were 
approved by the Sussex University Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics 
Committee. 
The lab sessions across experiments 1-4 involved two tasks, each measuring how 
often participants found out about outcomes in different conditions. The ‘probability task’ 
did not manipulate who was responsible but tested the effect of probability on the 
frequency of finding out about outcomes affecting self and other. Details of the probability 
task did not change between experiments, so analysis and results are across all participants 
to increase power. 
The ‘visual perception task’ manipulated responsibility for the outcomes through 
performance on a simple task (see below). The trials also differed in who the outcome 
affected and positive or negative frame. How these frames were created, and other details 
of the task, differ between experiments 1-4. 
2.1. General method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Across experiments 1-4, a total of 226 participants were tested. For the probability 
task, data from 205 participants is included in the analysis, as data was lost due to technical 
issues or excluded for 21 people. The details for the participants included in each analysis 
of the visual perception task are given below for each experiment. 
2.1.2. Procedure 
Participants for experiments 1-4 were recruited on campus or through social 
networks. Some took part for course credit and all participants were reimbursed for their 
time with the amount depending on the tasks. Adverts for the study said a payment of up to 
£7.50 but the maximum amount was higher for some participants, up to approximately £12.  
Individual difference measures, except the charitable giving preference questions 
(see below) were completed before participants attended the lab, through a Qualtrics Online 





Participants then attended the lab session in pairs and were randomly assigned to 
be Player 1 and Player 2. They arrived at the same time, were given instructions together, 
and asked to introduce themselves but then had no further contact and completed the tasks 
in separate rooms. 
Verbal instructions were provided for the two tasks before the participants 
completed the visual perception task first, then the probability task and the charitable 
giving preferences questions (see below). Both tasks and these questions were presented 
using MATLAB (2017b, Mathworks, Inc., Natick, MA) using Psychophysics Toolbox 
extensions version 3 (Brainard, 1997). 
2.1.3. Probability task 
We adapted the task created by Charpentier et al. (2018), which only concerned 
outcomes for the participant. In the current versions, outcomes affected either the 
participant’s payment or the payment of another player, who the participant did not meet 
but was described as in need. Each trial presented a probability (10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80 or 90%) of the given outcome occurring. These trials were either in a positive (win / no 
change) or negative (no change / loss) frame, with the percentage referring to how likely a 
change in payment (win or loss) was. The conditions of probability, frame (positive or 
negative) and who was affected (for me or for someone else) created a 9x2x2 design. 
Participants could not influence the outcome in any way. 
There was one block for each of the four frame-recipient combination blocks, with 
each probability presented four times. This resulted in 36 trials per block and 144 trials in 
total. On every other trial, the participant could press to find out whether the outcome had 
occurred so whether the payment had changed (increased or decreased, depending on the 
frame).  
Trials were quasi-randomised so each probability-frame-recipient combination 
occurred twice on trials were the outcome could be found out and twice when it could not 
be. This resulted in a measure of finding out between 0 and 2 for each condition. Trials with 
no opportunity to find out took 2s and trials with an opportunity to find out took 6s, giving 
an average trial length of 4s plus a 1s fixation between each trial. 
2.1.4. Visual perception task 
To generate responsibility for outcomes in experiments 1-4, we used correct and 
incorrect answers to a visual perception task adapted from one originally designed to 





two circles on the screen contains more dots. The stimuli were displayed for 0.7s on each 
trial then participants had 3s to answer. A fixation cross was displayed for 1s between trials. 
A one-up two-down method staircased task difficulty through adjustments to the difference 
in the number of dots. This maintained average performance at approximately 70%. 
The visual perception task involved four players, the two participants who 
completed this task during the lab session and two other players. Player 3 was described as 
in financial need and their payment depended on the performance of Players 1 & 2, the 
participants. Player 4 had already completed the task, playing to affect the payment of the 
two participants (see figure 1). Players 3 & 4 were a researcher. In the case of Player 4, they 
genuinely completed the task in advance, with the responses, including reaction times, 
recorded and used in the experiment. All payments and donations were made so there was 
no deception, and this was stressed to participants during the instructions. 
Figure 1. Relationship between players. Arrows indicate an effect on that person’s payment, 
curved arrows indicate playing for oneself. Labels of how the arrows relate to the conditions 
are given for participant 1, for participant 2 these would be mirrored.  
 
The combination of these players created 2 of the 3 main conditions, fully-crossing 
who was playing (I play or they play) with whose payment was affected by the outcome 
(for me or for someone else). Finally, the frame of trials was either positive or negative, 
creating a 2x2x2 design (playing x affected x frame). The nature of the positive and 
negative frame changed between experiment 2 and experiment 3, so is described for each 
below. 
Participants then had the opportunity to find out the outcome of trials in these 8 
conditions, although the detail of this differed between experiments  





of each players’ total, as this could promote a more competitive approach. Finding out 
always required an active button press and not pressing resulted in not finding out.  
Whether participants found out or not did not affect the payments at all or the length 
of the task. If they found out, the outcome was always shown and if they didn’t find out, a 
fixation cross was displayed for the same amount of time. It was stressed to participants 
that whether they found out or not would not affect any of the payments or how quickly 
they finished the study. 
Unfortunately, the nature of the connection between the computers being used by 
the two participants was unreliable, leading to the loss of data from several participants in 
each experiment. 
2.1.5. Questionnaire measures 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) – participants completed the 28-item version of 
the IRI measure. This includes 7 items of each subscale; Perspective Taking, Fantasy, 
Empathic Concern and Personal Distress (Davis, 1983). For individual differences analysis, 
we averaged across the subscales. This measure allowed us to test whether differences in 
interest between conditions were linked to other-focused emotions. 
Charitable giving – following the end of the lab tasks, participants completed a final 
set of novel questions on donating to charities. For each of 7 causes, participants indicated 
the percentage of their winnings from the lab part they wished to donate to the charity. The 
charities were not named organisations but differed in the information given about each. At 
the time of making these decisions, participants did not know how much they had won but 
were told to think of it as £2.50 on average as it could be up to £5. This was to ensure that 
the amount they had won did not affect these choices.  
Participants were told all charities save lives through stopping preventable 
diseases. The first charity formed a baseline measure with no further information about the 
organisation. The next 6 choices were presented in a randomised order for each participant. 
One organisation was 5% towards a £1,000 fundraising target, another was at 95% towards 
an identical target. A separate organisation had a matched funding appeal so participant 
donations would be doubled. A further pair differed in the proportion of donations spent on 
projects (100% compared to 85% projects, 7% admin and 8% fundraising). The final 
organisation was “already receiving a donation from the lab. Anything you contribute will 
be given to the charity, but the lab will give that much less so the overall donation will 
always be the same amount”. For the analysis here, we just averaged the donations made 






We used generalised linear mixed models (GLMM) with lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) in 
R (R Core Team, 2017) with RStudio (RStudio Team, 2015) for analysis of all tasks. A 
binomial distribution was modelled to account for the binary outcome of whether 
participants found out the outcome or not on each trial. Models were fitted by maximum 
likelihood estimation.  
Analysis started with the maximal random-effects model (Barr et al., 2013) but this 
was always too complex so we simplified the models, including by using the Analysis of 
Factorial EXperiments (afex) package (Singmann et al., 2019) to remove correlations 
between random effects of binary factors. However, the pattern of results was the same as 
in the non-converging maximal model, suggesting the lack of convergence may have been a 
false positive and that fixed effects remain significant when accounting for all possible 
random effects. 
Converging models were compared based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC; 
Akaike, 1974) to identify the model that best fit the data. We report results from this model 
in each analysis. For the probability task, which did not differ across experiments 1-4, the 
data were combined and analysed as a single set. For the visual perception task, this process 
was run on data from each experiment (1-4) separately for the main effects. Parameters for 
the fixed effects from all models were converted to odds ratios and their confidence 
intervals calculated. 
Individual differences analysis was run on data from experiments 1-4 together. This 
was to increase power to detect such effects and find results consistent across the versions. 
This model included trial number plus interactions between frame (positive or negative), 
who was playing (I play or they play), who was affected (for me or for someone else) and the 
trait of interest (average donation / IRI average). 
In addition to the variables of interest that form the conditions, trial number is 
included as a predictor in the models. For a blocked design, there is a risk that this captures 
some of the variance due to condition differences, although this is minimised by the 
randomisation of blocks for each participant. We chose this approach as it is the more 
conservative, compared to only modelling block order, which has a much lower resolution, 
or trial within each block, which does not account for changes in interest over the full task. 
For data visualisation and average interest in each condition, we calculated the 
proportion of times participants found out in each condition and took the mean and within-





visual perception task, this was out of 9 opportunities to find out in each condition and for 
the probability task, 2 opportunities in each condition. For reporting the models, Z-scores 
and p values were calculated for each parameter by afex, which uses lmerTest from lme4. 
2.2. Probability task results 
The best model for data on the probability task across experiments 1-4 included 
main effects for all the variables of interest: frame, probability, and who was affected, as 
well as trial number. It also included interactions between a) frame with who was affected 
and b) probability with frame – the key interaction of interest. The model had a fixed and a 
random term for each of these factors. 
Results showed all the fixed terms were significant predictors of whether 
participants found out, except for the main effect of probability and the interaction between 
who was affected and frame (table 1). However, removing this interaction significantly 




Figure 2. Effect of probability on the proportion of positive and negative outcomes 












Model parameters for the probability task, experiments 1-4 
 Odds ratio Lower CI Upper CI |Z| p 
Intercept 2.03 1.46 2.82 4.21 <.0001*** 
Trial number 0.25 0.20 0.32 10.89 <.0001*** 
Positive – negative 0.82 0.75 0.90 4.15 <.0001*** 
For me – for someone else 0.84 0.75 0.94 3.15   .002** 
Probability 1.02 0.83 1.27 0.22   .826 
Affected * frame 1.04 0.96 1.13 1.01   .310 
Probability * frame 0.52 0.37 0.74 3.66   .0003*** 
Note. CI: confidence interval, |Z|: absolute value of Z-score. 
*: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001 
 
Participants found out the outcome more when it could be positive (average 60.95% of 
trials), than when it could be negative (55.53%, mean difference – M.D. 5.42%, |Z| = 4.15, p 
< .0001). Interest was also higher when the outcome affected the participant (for me 
60.23%), than when they were for someone else (56.25%, M.D. = 3.98%, |Z| = 3.15, p = .002). 
Crucially, the effect of probability depended on frame, with an increase in interest as 
probability increased for positive outcomes but a decrease for negative outcomes (figure 2 
& table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the probability task, experiments 1-4 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% all 
Mean %  
 For me  
+ 61.71 61.46 57.80 60.73 61.71 66.83 65.37 62.93 69.02 63.06 
- 60.73 65.12 57.56 57.80 59.02 54.39 51.22 52.68 58.05 57.40 
+ > - 0.98 -3.66 0.24 2.93 2.68 12.44 14.15 10.24 10.98 5.66 
 For someone else  
+ 56.83 58.78 53.17 57.80 63.17 58.29 56.59 60.73 64.15 58.83 
- 57.07 51.95 55.61 56.34 56.10 53.17 46.83 49.76 56.10 53.66 
+ > - -0.24 6.83 -2.44 1.46 7.07 5.12 9.76 10.98 8.05 5.18 
Within-subject standard error  
 For me  
+ 2.29 2.20 2.12 2.04 1.96 2.01 2.31 2.11 2.14  
- 1.95 1.96 1.82 1.79 1.94 2.00 2.13 2.06 2.17  
 For someone else  
+ 2.18 2.16 2.24 1.87 1.96 2.17 2.16 2.00 2.10  
- 2.31 2.18 2.13 2.17 2.09 2.21 2.30 2.22 2.28  
Note. +: positive frame, -: negative frame, + > -: positive frame subtract negative (italicised), 





At the lowest probabilities, levels of interest were not different between positive 
and negative outcomes (average of 0.28% difference between frames across probabilities 
10, 20 and 30%) but at the highest probabilities, participants found out more about positive 
outcomes (average difference 10.69% at probabilities 70, 80 and 90%). Interest declined 
over the course of the task (|Z| = 10.89, p < .0001) 
3. Experiment 1 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
59 people were tested but the data from 8 were lost, leaving 51 participants (39 
female, 10 male, 2 undisclosed) aged 18-42 (M = 25.55, S.D. = 6.03). 
3.1.2. Visual perception task 
In experiment 1, the positive and negative frame was created through the trials 
either being to win money or to avoid losing money for the recipient. If the player got the 
answer right on that trial, the positive outcome (win / no loss) occurred but if it was wrong, 
the negative outcome (no win / loss) occurred. Thanks to the staircasing, positive outcomes 
occurred with approximately 70% probability. Each change in payment was an increase or 
decrease of £0.10, but participants were not aware of the amount. 
Participants completed a block of 18 trials for each of these 8 conditions. In I play 
conditions, the participant responded to a round of the visual perception question. When 
one of the other players was playing, they were told to wait while that player completed a 
visual perception round. After every other trial, regardless of who had just played, 
participants were asked whether they wanted to know whether the round was answered 
correctly or incorrectly, so what the outcome for the payment was. If they wanted to know, 
they pressed a key within 3s. Trials with an opportunity to find out took 8s and trials 
without an opportunity to find out took 4s giving an average trial length of 6s, plus a 1s 
fixation cross between each. 
3.2. Results 
The best converging model for experiment 1 (table 3) included main effects of trial 
number, who was playing, and who the round affected, as well as two interactions: a) who 





factors had a fixed and a random term. Adding whether the outcome was positive or 
negative did not improve the model and was a non-significant predictor when included. 
Results showed significant main effects of trial number (|Z| = 2.08, p = .038) and 
who was playing (I play or they play) (M.D. = 11.11%, |Z| = 2.76, p = .006). Participants found 
out more on trials for which they were responsible for the outcome (on average 61.93% of 
trials) than when someone else was responsible (50.82%). Overall interest declined over 
the task. The main effect of who the outcome affected was not significant (see table 4 p = 
.065) but this factor interacted with who was playing (|Z| = 2.57, p = .010). As shown in 
figure 3 and table 4, the decreased interest when they play, compared to when I play, was 
greater when outcomes were for someone else (decrease of 16.34%), than when they were 
for me (5.88% decrease, M.D. = 10.46%). The fixed term for the interaction between trial 
and who was affected was not a significant predictor (p = .328) but improved the model 
through variance explained by the random term (∆AIC for removing fixed and random term 





Figure 3. Average proportion of times (%) participants found out the outcome in each 
condition in experiment 1. Lower lines indicate the level of significance for the effect of 
frame within that condition, upper lines indicate the level of significance for the effect of 





Table 3  
Model parameters for experiment 1 
 Odds ratio Lower CI Upper CI |Z| p 
Intercept 1.85 0.87 3.97 1.59 .111 
Trial number 0.57 0.34 0.97 2.08 .038* 
I play – they play 0.68 0.52 0.89 2.76 .006** 
For me – for someone else 0.83 0.68 1.01 1.85 .065 
Playing * affected 0.84 0.74 0.96 2.57 .010* 
Trial number * affected 1.27 0.79 2.04 0.98 .328 
Note. CI: confidence interval, |Z|: absolute value of Z-score. 
*: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for experiment 1 
 
For me  For someone else  
For me & 
for someone else 
Plays: I They I & T  I They I & T  I They I & T 
Mean % 
+ 59.69 56.64 58.17  63.62 48.58 56.10  61.66 52.61 57.14 
- 62.09 53.38 57.73  62.31 44.66 53.49  62.20 49.02 55.61 
+ > - -2.40~ 3.27~ 0.44~  1.31~ 3.92~ 2.61~  -0.54~ 3.59~ 1.53~ 
+ & - 60.89 55.01 57.95  62.96 46.62 54.79  61.93 50.82 56.37 
Within-subject standard error 
+ 2.46 2.87   2.73 3.27      
- 2.59 2.62   2.53 3.96      
Note. +: positive frame, -: negative frame, + > -: positive frame subtract negative (italicised), + 
& -: average of positive and negative frame (bold font), I & T: average of when I play and when 
they play, ~: no significant / *: significant difference between positive and negative frames, 
when analysis restricted to that condition. 
 
4. Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 found greater interest in outcomes the participant was responsible 
for. This difference was greater when the outcome affected someone else whereas 
responsibility had a smaller effect on interest when outcomes affected the participant 
themselves. However, there was no evidence that participants differentiated between the 
positive and the negative frames.  
While combining the interest in finding out, across frames, showed effects of who 
the outcome affected and an interaction between who was affected and who was 
responsible, the lack of positivity bias causes an issue for the interpretation of these results. 
The experiment was designed such that a key contrast would the difference between 





recipient (for example I play for me). Comparing these difference scores between conditions, 
or the interactions between frame and other factors, would control for extraneous 
differences between conditions. 
However, when looking at main effects of who was playing and who was affected, 
the results are more susceptible to influence by factors other than concern about the 
outcome. In particular, when participants are deciding whether they want to find out on 
trials in the I play conditions, they have just completed the visual perception task, so their 
attention is on the screen. In contrast, in the they play conditions, the participant has just 
waited several seconds so may have looked away and missed the opportunity to find out. 
Finding out about one’s performance on the visual perception task during the task may also 
have utility for improving performance on the following rounds. Experiment 2 changed the 
design to remove these potential confounds. 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
51 new participants were tested but the data were lost for 13 due to technical 
difficulties leaving 38 participants in the analysis (32 female, 6 male) aged 18-29 (M = 20.50, 
S.D. = 2.84). 
4.1.2. Visual perception task  
The only difference in this task compared to experiment 1 was the separation of 
completing the visual perception task from the opportunity to find out the outcome. The 
visual perception task, staircasing and timings were exactly the same as experiment 1 but 
in experiment 2, participants first completed all the rounds of this task for the 4 conditions 
on which they were playing (for me and for someone else, each in positive and negative 
frames). Each of the 4 conditions had 18 trials, making a total of 72 visual perception trials. 
They were informed the other participant was doing the same simultaneously. 
Each participant’s performance, correct or incorrect, for each trial were then 
shuffled in order, maintaining the number of each. Both participants then were presented 
with 144 trials forming all 8 conditions, as in experiment 1. These conditions combined the 
recipient (me or someone else), frame (positive or negative) and at this point also the player 
manipulation (I play or they play). On every other trial, participants could press a key to find 
out whether the round was answered correctly or incorrectly so what the outcome for the 
payment was. Like in experiment 1, these were presented in 8 blocks of 18 trials, 9 with an 






Comparing converging models led to selection of a model including fixed main 
effects for all three key variables: who was responsible (I play or they play); who was 
affected (for me or for someone else); and frame (positive or negative), plus two fixed 
interactions: a) who was responsible with who was affected and b) who was affected with 
frame. The final predictor in the model was trial number (table 5). Random terms were 
included for all of these factors with the exception of the interaction between who was 
affected and frame, as this term explained so little variance, it led to a singular fit. 
Table 5 
Model parameters for experiment 2 
 Odds ratio Lower CI Upper CI |Z| p 
Intercept 8.94 4.92 16.22 7.20 <.0001*** 
Trial number 0.56 0.30 1.06 1.79    .073 
Positive – negative 0.78 0.59 1.04 1.72    .086 
I play – they play 0.67 0.53 0.86 3.25    .001** 
For me – for someone else 0.75 0.59 0.96 2.28    .024* 
Playing * affected 0.76 0.59 0.98 2.10    .036* 
Affected * frame 1.38 1.20 1.59 4.57 <.0001*** 
Note. CI: confidence interval, |Z|: absolute value of Z-score. 
*: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001 
 
 
Figure 4. Average proportion of times (%) participants found out the outcome in each 
condition in experiment 2. Lower lines indicate the level of significance for the effect of 
frame within that condition, upper lines indicate the level of significance for the effect of 





Table 6  
Descriptive statistics for experiment 2 
 
For me  For someone else  
For me & 
for someone else 
Plays: I They I & T  I They I & T  I They I & T 
Mean %  
+ 85.09 84.50 84.80  84.21 64.62 74.42  84.65 74.56 79.61 
- 76.90 72.22 74.56  78.95 67.84 73.39  77.92 70.03 73.98 
+ > - 8.19~ 12.28* 10.23*  5.26~ -3.22~ 1.02~  6.73~ 4.53~ 5.63~ 
+ & - 80.99 78.36 79.68  81.58 66.23 73.90  81.29 72.30 76.79 
Within-subject standard error 
+ 2.73 2.64   3.18 4.12      
- 3.01 3.33   3.88 4.33      
Note. +: positive frame, -: negative frame, + > -: positive frame subtract negative (italicised), + 
& -: average of positive and negative frame (bold font), I & T: average of when I play and when 
they play, ~: no significant / *: significant difference between positive and negative frames, 
when analysis restricted to that condition. 
 
Results revealed all the fixed effects were significant predictors, except for the main 
effect of frame and trial number. Participants wanted to find out more when they were 
responsible for the outcome (I play: 81.29%, they play: 72.30%, |Z| = 3.25, p = .001) and 
when it affected them (for me: 79.68%, for someone else: 73.90%, |Z| = 2.28, p = .022). These 
factors also interacted, such that the decrease in interest when they play, compared to when 
I play, was greater when outcomes affected someone else (decrease of 15.35%), than when 
they affected the participant (2.63% decrease, M.D. = 12.72%, (|Z| = 2.10, p = .036). There 
was also a significant interaction between frame and who was affected (|Z| = 4.57, p < 
.0001). This showed that the increase in interest when information was likely to be positive, 
over negative, was greater when the outcomes affected the participant (10.23% increase), 
compared to when they affected someone else (1.02% increase, 9.21% difference; table 6). 
5. Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 was designed to control for potential confounds in experiment 1 that 
could have caused a strong effect of who was playing. If these confounds were present, they 
may have dominated the task and overshadowed the frame manipulation. Results from 
experiment 2 support the results from experiment 1 that participants found out more about 
outcomes that affect them and that who is affected interacted with who was responsible. 
Experiment 2 also reveals a main effect of who was responsible and importantly, an 
interaction between frame and who was affected. Participants showed more of a bias 





However, there remains an alternative explanation for increased interest in the 
outcomes for the I play conditions other than being responsible for positive impact. Finding 
out in these conditions also gives participants insight into how good they are at the task 
which may be reinforcing in its own right, rather than in relation to gaining money for 




72 new participants took part in experiment 3 but for 13 the data were not recorded. 
This left 59 participants included in analysis (48 female, 8 male, 1 other, 2 undisclosed) aged 
18-46 (M = 20.89, S.D. = 4.18). 
5.1.2. Visual perception task  
Experiment 3 maintained the change from experiment 1 to 2 in separating in time 
the visual perception task from the questions on whether participants wanted to find out 
the outcome. This experiment further eliminated the possibility that participants were 
finding out to learn about their performance by changing how the positive and negative 
frames were created. In experiments 1 and 2 these were at the point of playing, through 
trials to win and others to avoid losing. In experiment 3, the frame was created by telling 
participants whether that round had been answered correctly (positive) or incorrectly 
(negative).  
Correct answers lead to increases in payment and incorrect answers lead to 
decreases in payment. However, not all trials “counted” towards the actual payment - some 
answers were discounted and did not change the payment. This provided the opportunity 
for participants to find out whether the trial counted or not, rather than whether it was 
correct or incorrect. Like the previous experiments, this was only an option on every other 
trial to prevent tracking of participants own payment, compared to the other players, which 
we thought may induce a competitive approach, rather than wanting everyone to get the 
maximum. 
As the frame was now only introduced at the point of deciding whether to find out, 
the blocks for the visual perception tasks only differed in who the recipient of the payment 
was (me or them). Participants completed 72 trials of the task, to match experiment 2, 





During the second section, where participants chose whether to find out if the trial 
counted, the trials were presented in a quasi-random order. The order ensured that more 
rounds on which they had lost appeared on trials which had an opportunity to find out, than 
rounds on which they had won. This was because the staircasing, to maintain performance 
around 70%, meant that participants won on average 70% of the rounds. Full 
randomisation during the second section would have meant too few loss trials had an 
opportunity to find out on for the contrasts between positive and negative to be balanced. 
Whether trials counted or not was determined for each block of 18 trials in 
experiment 3. This was randomly determined with a 70% probability of the block counting, 
to match the 70% chance of positive outcomes, from the staircasing, in experiments 1 & 2. 
5.2. Results 
In addition to the factors included in the analysis of experiments 1 and 2, analysis of 
experiment 3 included whether trials in that block counted. The best model involved fixed 
terms for 5 main effects: trial number, frame (positive or negative), who was playing (I play 
or they play), who was affected (for me or for someone else), and whether the block counted 
towards the payment (counts or doesn’t count). The model also included 4 interactions: a) 
trial number with frame, b) trial number with whether the block counts, c) who was playing 
with who was affected, and d) who was affected with frame (table 7). Random terms were 
included for all these predictors except for the interaction between who was affected and 
frame, as this didn’t account for any variance and produced a singular fit. 
Table 7 
Model parameters for experiment 3 
 Odds ratio Lower CI Upper CI |Z| p 
Intercept 1.24 0.77 2.01 0.87   .383 
Trial number 0.34 0.20 0.58 3.95 <.0001*** 
Positive – negative 0.71 0.57 0.90 2.90   .004** 
Counts – doesn’t count 0.94 0.82 1.08 0.91   .362 
I play – they play 0.82 0.71 0.94 2.90   .004** 
For me – for someone else 0.74 0.65 0.85 4.30 <.0001*** 
Trial number * frame 0.69 0.53 0.91 2.68   .007** 
Trial number * counts 1.35 0.84 2.18 1.22   .221 
Playing * affected 0.78 0.68 0.88 3.83   .0001*** 
Affected * frame 1.12 1.03 1.22 2.51   .012* 







Figure 5. Average proportion of times (%) participants found out the outcome in each 
condition in experiment 3. Lower lines indicate the level of significance for the effect of 
frame within that condition, upper lines indicate the level of significance for the effect of 
who is responsible. ~: p > .05, *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001 
  
Results show that participants wanted to know more often in the positive frame 
(average of 57.78% of trials) than the negative frame (49.32%, M.D. = 8.46%, |Z| = 2.90, p = 
.004; table 8). There was also greater interest when I play (56.84%), compared to when they 
play (50.26%, M.D. = 6.58%, |Z| = 2.90, p = .004), and when the outcome was for me 
(57.89%), compared to for someone else (49.21%, M.D. = 8.68%, |Z| = 4.30, p < .0001). 
Finally, the effect of trial number was significant (|Z| = 3.95, p < .0001). The fixed terms of 
whether the trial counted and the interaction between this factor and trial number were 
both non-significant predictors (p = .362 & p = .221 respectively). However, these factors 
improved the model through the random terms and removing them completely significantly 
decreased the model fit (∆AIC = 10.8, χ²(4) = 18.82, p = .0009). 
Significant interactions revealed that increased interest in positive outcomes was 
greater when they affected the participant (increase of 13.65%), than when they affected 
someone else (increase of 3.27%, M.D. = 10.38%, |Z| = 2.51, p = .012). As in experiments 1 
and 2, the decrease in interest when they play, compared to when I play, was also greater 
when outcomes affected someone else (decrease of 15.32%), than when they affected the 
participant, which actually showed an increase in interest of 2.16% (M.D. = 17.48%, |Z| = 






Descriptive statistics for experiment 3 
 
For me  For someone else  
For me & 
for someone else 
Plays: I They I & T  I They I & T  I They I & T 
Mean %  
+ 63.86 65.57 64.71  59.97 41.73 50.85  61.91 53.65 57.78 
- 49.76 52.37 51.07  53.78 41.38 47.58  51.77 46.87 49.32 
+ > - 14.10* 13.20* 13.65*  6.19~ 0.35~ 3.27~  10.14* 6.78~ 8.46* 
+ & - 56.81 58.97 57.89  56.88 41.55 49.21  56.84 50.26 53.55 
Within-subject standard error 
+ 2.84 2.66   3.15 3.33      
- 2.56 3.19   3.13 2.89      
Note. +: positive frame, -: negative frame, + > -: positive frame subtract negative (italicised), + 
& -: average of positive and negative frame (bold font), I & T: average of when I play and when 
they play, ~: no significant / *: significant difference between positive and negative frames, 
when analysis restricted to that condition. 
 
6. Experiment 4 
Experiment 3 was the first to show an overall bias towards positive information 
across who was responsible and who benefitted. Levels of this bias and overall interest were 
greater when the outcome affected the participant than when it affected someone else. In 
line with experiments 1 and 2, the drop in interest when they play, compared to when I play 
was greater for outcomes affected someone else, than outcomes for me.  
Determining whether the outcome counted or not for each block, rather than each 
trial, introduces the potential for learning about the blocks. This could mean optimism bias 
is relevant in addition to the bias towards positive information. For example, if an outcome 
is positive but doesn’t count, it is optimistic to check whether that changes on the next trial. 
However, this combination of factors can make the results difficult to interpret. 
Complications for interpretation are particularly relevant if different participants noticed 
this trend at different rates, as suggested by an improvement in model fit when including 
the random term for the interaction between whether the trial counts and trial number. 
Experiment 4 excludes the possibility of learning by randomising whether the trial counts 







44 new participants took part in experiment 4 but the data from 11 were lost leaving 
data from 33 participants for analysis (22 female, 11 male) aged 19-42 (M =25.13, S.D. = 
5.10).  
6.1.2. Visual perception task 
Experiment 4 was identical to experiment 3 except for whether the trial counted or 
not was randomised on each trial, rather than each block. This was still done with a 70% 
chance of the trial counting. The visual perception part and the opportunities to find out 
remained separate and the number and length of trials were both the same as experiment 
3. 
6.2. Results 
Model comparison for experiment 4 resulted in a model including the main effects 
of trial number, frame, who was responsible, and who was affected, plus the interaction 
between who was responsible and who was affected (table 9). All of these were modelled 
with both fixed and random terms. 
 
Table 9 
Model parameters for experiment 4 
 Odds ratio Lower CI Upper CI |Z| p 
Intercept 1.73 0.66 4.52 1.11    .265 
Trial number 0.22 0.11 0.45 4.22 <.0001*** 
Positive – negative 0.96 0.75 1.23 0.29    .769 
I play – they play 0.67 0.50 0.88 2.82    .005** 
For me – for someone else 0.52 0.37 0.72 3.87    .0001*** 
Playing * affected 0.80 0.66 0.96 2.39    .017* 






Figure 6. Average proportion of times (%) participants found out the outcome in each 
condition in experiment 4. Lower lines indicate the level of significance for the effect of 
frame within that condition, upper lines indicate the level of significance for the effect of 
who is responsible. ~: p > .05, *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001 
 
Significant results were found for all the fixed terms, except for frame (p = .769). As 
in the previous experiments, participants found out more often when the outcome was for 
me (64.56% on average) than for someone else (50.56%, M.D. = 14.00%, |Z| = 3.87, p = 
.0001). Interest was also greater when the participant was playing (61.77%), compared to 
when they play (53.35%, M.D. = 8.42%, |Z| = 2.82, p = .005; table 10). However, this 
detrimental impact on interest when they play, compared to when I play, was smaller when 
outcomes were for me (decrease of 3.12%) than when they were for someone else (decrease 
of 13.72%, M.D. = 10.60%, |Z| = 2.39, p = .017). As in the other experiments, interest declined 
over the task (|Z| = 4.22, p < .0001). 
Frame was not a significant predictor in the model but removing its fixed and 
random terms significantly decreased the model fit, suggesting the random term 










Descriptive statistics for experiment 4 
 
For me  For someone else  
For me & 
for someone else 
Plays: I They I & T  I They I & T  I They I & T 
Mean %  
+ 65.04 61.92 63.48  57.55 40.91 49.23  61.29 51.42 56.35 
- 67.19 64.07 65.63  57.30 46.49 51.89  62.25 55.28 58.76 
+ > - -2.15~ -2.15~ -2.15~  0.25~ -5.58~ -2.67~  -0.95~ -3.86~ -2.41~ 
+ & - 66.12 63.00 64.56  57.42 43.70 50.56  61.77 53.35 57.56 
Within-subject standard error 
+ 3.66 3.16   4.44 4.32      
- 3.61 3.47   3.80 4.09      
Note. +: positive frame, -: negative frame, + > -: positive frame subtract negative (italicised), + 
& -: average of positive and negative frame (bold font), I & T: average of when I play and when 
they play, ~: no significant / *: significant difference between positive and negative frames, 
when analysis restricted to that condition. 
 
Table 11 
Model parameter |Z| and associated significance across experiments 1-5 
 Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 Exp 5 
Intercept 1.59 7.20*** 0.87 1.11 3.69*** 
Trial number 2.08* 1.79 3.95*** 4.22*** 1.91 
Positive – negative  1.72 2.90** 0.29 4.00*** 
I play – they play 2.76** 3.25** 2.90** 2.82** 1.60 
For me – for someone else 1.85 2.28* 4.30*** 3.87*** N/A 
Playing * affected 2.57* 2.10*  2.39* N/A 
Affected * frame  4.57*** 3.83***  N/A 
Trial number * affected 0.98  2.51*  N/A 
Frame * responsible     4.66*** 
Trial number * responsible     1.28 
Note. |Z|: absolute value of Z-score. N/A: not relevant for the study design, blank: not included 
in the best fitting model. 









7. Individual differences: experiments 1-4 
The final aspect of the analysis of experiments 1-4 was to see whether any of the 
main effects described above varied with how generous or how high on the IRI the 
participant scored. We ran this analysis on all the data from experiments 1-4 together and 
in table 12 present the full model with all interactions, regardless of their contribution to 
the model, for comparison. 
7.1. Generosity 
Averaging across the 7 questions on which participants could donate some of their 
winnings to charity provides an overall measure of generosity for each participant. The 
main effect of this trait did not predict interest in outcomes overall (p = .264). However, the 
measure interacted with several of the conditions of interest, as we would predict if the task 
is relevant for understanding altruism.  
More generous participants differentiated between who was affected less (|Z| = 
4.35, p < .0001). The decrease in interest when outcomes were for someone else, compared 
to for me, was smaller than for more selfish participants. Interestingly, more generous 
participants also showed a greater effect of who was responsible (|Z| = 4.02, p < .0001). The 
increase in interest when I play, compared to when they play, was larger for more generous 
participants. Finally, levels of generosity showed a three-way interaction with the frame 
(positive or negative) and who was responsible (I play or they play; (|Z| = 2.61, p = .009). 
This showed that the level of differentiation between frames, depending on who was 
responsible, was larger for more generous participants. Less generous participants did not 
show more or less bias towards positive information depending on who was responsible. 
7.2. Interpersonal reactivity index 
Like generosity, average scores on the IRI questionnaire did not predict overall 
levels of interest (p = .844). Like generosity, participants higher on IRI showed less 
distinction between outcomes for themselves and outcomes for others (|Z| = 3.50, p = .005). 
Average IRI scores also showed an interaction with frame (|Z| = 2.20, p = .028) such that 
participants scoring higher on the IRI showed less bias towards positive information than 
participants lower on the IRI. This seemed to be driven by increased interest in negative 








Model parameters for individual differences models with data from experiments 1-4 
 
Odds ratio |Z| p 
 
Odds ratio |Z| p 
 Generosity  IRI average 
Intercept 2.01 4.74 <.0001*** 
 
1.92 4.39 <.0001*** 
Trial number 0.52 11.59 <.0001*** 
 
0.50 12.53 <.0001*** 
Positive – negative 0.83 8.10 <.0001*** 
 
0.84 7.82 <.0001*** 
I play – they play 0.77 10.91 <.0001*** 
 
0.76 11.82 <.0001*** 
For me – for s. else 0.79 10.12 <.0001*** 
 
0.79 10.37 <.0001*** 
Trait 0.95 1.12 .264 
 
0.91 0.20 .844 
Frame x Playing 1.02 0.84 .401 
 
1.02 0.72 .471 
Frame x Affected 1.07 3.00 .003** 
 
1.07 3.01 .003** 
Playing x Affected 0.82 8.64 <.0001*** 
 
0.81 9.19 <.0001*** 
Frame x Trait 1.00 0.57 .567 
 
1.18 2.20 .028* 
Playing x Trait 0.97 4.02 <.0001*** 
 
0.94 0.77 .443 
Affected x Trait 1.03 4.35 <.0001*** 
 
1.30 3.50 .0005*** 
F x P x A 1.03 1.36 .173 
 
1.04 1.91 .056 
F x P x T 0.98 2.61 .009** 
 
1.07 0.93 .353 
F x A x T 0.99 1.49 .136 
 
1.10 1.30 .195 
P x A x T 0.99 1.90 .057 
 
0.88 1.72 .085 
F x P x A x T 1.00 0.29 .773 
 
0.92 1.09 .273 
Note. s. else: someone else, F: frame, P: playing, A: affected, T: trait – charitable giving on the 
left / IRI average on the right, x: interaction, |Z|: absolute value of Z-score, bold font: terms 






8. Experiment 5 
Taken together, experiments 1-4 show people are more interested in outcomes that 
affect them and there is some evidence of bias towards positive outcomes when this is the 
case. For outcomes affecting others, interest was still relatively high (over 40% in all 
experiments). Who was responsible had a greater effect on interest in outcomes for 
someone else, with increased interest when the participant was responsible (table 11). 
Evidence of a bias towards positive outcomes was mixed. A main effect of frame was 
only found in experiment 3 but in both experiment 2 and 3, there was more of a preference 
for positive outcomes for me that those outcomes for someone else. Results from the 
probability task show a similar pattern of distinguishing between frames more at higher 
probabilities, both for outcomes for me and for someone else. 
An issue with relating the results from any of the above results to action or outcome-
oriented altruism is that they were not altruistic decisions, but outcomes based on 
performance on a task without a moral component. Experiment 5 applies the principle of 
bias towards positive outcomes caused by the participant or a third person to charitable 
donation decisions. 
Asking participants to decide whether to donate or not naturally introduces 
variability between individuals in how many times they chose each option so how many 
trials are available in each condition. For example, if a participant never donates, there 
cannot be a positive condition because there cannot be any questions about whether their 
donation had a positive impact. We therefore ran this experiment on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk through TurkPrime and using Qualtrics Online Survey Software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) 
to test enough participants so that there were adequate numbers with choices both to 
donate and not donate. 
8.1. Method 
8.1.1. Participants 
370 participants (196 female, 169 male, 3 identified as other, 3 undisclosed) aged 
18-77 (M =36.04, S.D. = 11.92) completed the online study with satisfactory answers to 
attention checks. Participants were required to be in America although there are methods 
to make an IP address look like the participant is in America when they are not. Data were 





on each day). Participants received a baseline payment of $3 and a bonus of $2, minus the 
amount they had donated to the cause on a randomly chosen trial. 
8.1.2. Proportion dominance task 
Experiment 5 did not use the visual perception or probability tasks. 
25 questions asked participants how much, if anything, up to a maximum of $2 they 
wanted to donate to charity. All questions were in the format “X people are in need of Y” and 
varied the number of people in need (X) and the outcome they need (Y). The numbers of 
people were grouped in 5 bins: 1 person, 2-10 people, 11-50 people, 51-500 people and 501 
– 1000 people. The outcomes were in 5 categories: vaccinations (against 5 different 
diseases), surgery (for 5 different joints), food & water (e.g. rehydration salts), medication 
(against 5 different diseases) and maternal health (e.g. a caesarean). Participants were told 
that the people in all cases could die if they do not get the help they need. Numbers of people 
and outcomes were pseudo-randomly paired such that one number from each bin was with 
one cause from each category. 5 question sets were created in this way and participants 
were randomly allocated to a set. 
After participants had completed all the proportion dominance donation questions, 
they read that the researchers running the study were also donating additional money to 
charity. Whether the participant had donated / not donated to that charity in the first part 
acted as a “vote” for / against that charity which would increase / decrease the amount that 
the researchers gave to that cause.  
The slight dissociation between the moral decision of the participant and the money 
for the charity was necessary to avoid competition between money for the participant and 
money for the charity. If the measure had been whether their own donation would be 
applied or not, participants may have wanted to find out because of their interest in getting 
a larger bonus if the money was not donated. 
In line with the previous versions of the task, participants were told 70% of these 
votes would count and the measure of interest was whether they wanted to know whether 
it counted or not. 28 trials were presented across a maximum of 4 conditions varying across 
the decision made: to donate (positive) or not donate (negative) and whether it was the 
participants own decisions (I decide) or another person’s decisions (they decide).  
These were fully crossed with 7 trials in each condition when possible but 
dependent on the participants’ decisions. If they always donated or never donated, a 





positive self condition had n trials and the negative self condition had 14 – n trials. The 
reverse was true if they didn’t donate on less than 7 trials. In the other conditions there 
were exactly 7 positive and 7 negative trials. No information about the number of people in 
need or outcome they need was presented in this task, each trial just stated for example 
“You donated so voted to increase the donation. Click “find out” to see whether the donation 
will actually be increased or not”. 
Questions were presented in blocks for each condition, like the versions used in the 
experiments reported above. Also, like experiments 1-4, participants had to actively choose 
to find out by clicking “find out” and if they did not do so within 6s the screen moved on and 
they did not find out. This longer time interval was used so that slow internet connections 
did not mean the interval became too short to read the information and because there were 
no screens at the start of blocks indicating a new condition. If the participant did not find 
out, “...” was displayed instead of whether the donation changed or not so that not finding 
out did not speed up finishing the study. 
8.1.3. Questionnaire measures 
Following the main tasks, participants reported the causes they usually donate to, 
the extent to which “I am motivated to give when I hear an emotional story about a person 
or animal in need” on a sliding scale and, separately, the extent to which “I am motivated to 
give when I hear statistics about how many people are in need”. Belief in the study was rated 
on a 4-point scale and participants could specify any aspects of the study they did not 
believe. 
8.1.4. Analysis 
We followed the same process of analysis for experiment 5 as the visual perception 
task in experiments 1-4, but without who was affected as outcomes were always for the 
charity.  
8.2. Results 
The best model for experiment 5 involved main effects of trial number, frame 
(positive or negative), and who was responsible (I decide or they decide) plus interactions 
between a) who was responsible with frame and b) who was responsible with trial number 








Model parameters for experiment 5 
 Odds ratio Lower CI Upper CI |Z| p 
Intercept 1.73 1.29 2.31 3.69   .0002*** 
Trial number 0.90 0.80 1.00 1.91   .057 
Positive – negative 0.81 0.73 0.90 4.00   .0001*** 
I decide – they decide 0.93 0.86 1.02 1.60   .111 
Responsible * frame 1.25 1.14 1.37 4.66 <.0001*** 
Trial number * responsible 1.09 0.95 1.25 1.28   .202 
Note. CI: confidence interval, |Z|: absolute value of Z-score. 
*: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001 
 
 
Figure 7. Average proportion of times 
(%) participants found out the 
outcome in each condition in 
experiment 5. Lower lines indicate the 
level of significance for the effect of 
frame within that condition, upper 
lines indicate the level of significance 
for the effect of who is responsible. ~: 





Descriptive statistics for experiment 5 
Decides: I They I & they I They 
Mean % Within-subject SE 
+ 67.80 55.44 61.62 1.12 0.90 
- 47.75 55.48 51.62 1.04 0.94 
+ > - 20.05* -0.04~ 10.00*   
+ & - 57.58 55.46 56.62   
Note. SE: standard error, +: positive frame, -: negative frame, + > -: positive frame subtract 
negative (italicised), + & -: average of positive and negative frame (bold font), ~: no significant 








Results revealed a main effect of frame such that participants found out more when 
the outcome could be positive (average of 61.62%), compared to when it could be negative 
(51.62%, M.D. = 10.00%, |Z| = 4.00, p = .0001). Importantly, frame also interacted with who 
was responsible (|Z| = 4.66, p < .0001). When someone else made the decision, there was no 
difference between positive and negative frames (0.04% more interest in negative 
outcomes; table 13). However, when the participant was responsible, they found out about 
outcomes on average 20.05% more. The fixed term for the interaction between trial number 
and who was responsible was not a significant predictor but removing the random and fixed 
terms for this interaction significantly weakened the model fit (∆AIC = 6.4, χ²(2) = 10.36, p 
= .006). 
9. Discussion 
Here we present 5 experiments that use different variations of tasks measuring how 
often participants find out about positively or negatively framed outcomes that affect 
themselves or another person. We also manipulated the probability of the outcome 
occurring (probability task) or who was responsible for the outcome: the participant or a 
third person (visual perception tasks and experiment 5). These conditions allow us to test 
for a) the presence of a bias towards finding out information likely to be positive when it 
affects another person and b) the role of responsibility in determining levels of this bias and 
general interest, in the context of separating action from oriented altruism. 
In the probability task, a similar pattern of results was found for outcomes for me 
and for someone else - interest increased for positive and decreased for negative outcomes 
as likelihood of the outcome increased. However, in the versions of the task where a bias 
towards positive information was found for outcomes affecting the self, it was not present 
or decreased for outcomes affecting other people. Overall interest was also lower for 
outcomes affecting other people, particularly when a third person, not the participant, was 
responsible. This effect of responsibility was not found for outcomes affecting the 
participant themselves – interest remained high regardless of who was responsible. 
9.1. Differences across experiments 
The pattern of results described above was found in experiments 2, 3 and 5 but not 
in experiments 1 and 4 for the visual perception task. This could indicate unreliable results 
but there are also explanations based on differences between the versions of the task, as we 
were developing and improving it across the experiments. For the original design in 





contrasted with a loss frame through trials where the player had to get it right to avoid 
losing money. However, no bias towards outcomes in the positive frame was found for any 
of the conditions.  
One possible explanation for the lack of positivity bias in experiment 1 is that 
participants were finding out whether they were right or wrong immediately after the 
relevant round of the visual perception task. Interest in this context could have been 
determined by how ambiguous that round of the perception task had been. This could 
explain the main effect of responsibility for the outcome and this effect may have led to the 
frame as positive or negative being overlooked. Experiment 2 separated the phase of 
completing the rounds of the visual perception task from the opportunity to find out. 
Experiment 2 shows the expected pattern of results as described above. However, a 
limitation is that finding out about the result of the trial in conditions where the player 
themselves were playing also gave information about how good they were at the task. Only 
having the opportunity to find out on every other trial does minimise participants’ ability to 
keep track of performance. This confound also could not explain the differences between 
conditions in the levels of bias towards positive frames. However, we cannot confidently 
rule out that it contributes to the main effect of responsibility for reasons other than those 
linked to altruistic concern. 
Studies 3 and 4 further separated the performance by changing how the gain and 
loss frames were created. At the point of deciding whether to find out about the outcome, 
participants were now told whether they had got the trial correct or incorrect but were 
asked whether they wanted to know if it was one of the 70% of trials which actually counted 
towards the final payments. Keeping this to every other trial prevented tallying of payments 
to avoid a more competitive mind-set of which player had gained the most money overall. 
9.2. Bias towards positive information 
The first aim of the research was to test whether people prefer to find out about 
outcomes likely to be positive, compared to negative, when they affect other people. This 
builds on existing literature establishing this bias in relation to outcomes affecting oneself 
(Charpentier et al., 2018). Related to this bias is an optimism bias, an overestimation of 
positive outcomes and increased updating of beliefs in a positive, compared to a negative 
direction (Sharot, 2011). This optimism bias also applies to other people, depending on 
concern for them (Kappes et al., 2018). Our research is the first to extend this work to 





increasing distinction between positive and negative frames, as the outcome gets more 
likely, is the same for other people as it is for one’s own gains and losses. 
9.3. Action and outcome-oriented motivations 
The second research question was the role of responsibility in determining levels of 
bias towards positive outcomes and general interest. This was motivated by the aim of 
developing a behavioural task to separate action from outcome-oriented altruism (Kuss et 
al., 2013). In the probability task, no one was responsible for the outcomes, they were 
determined by the computer. That participants differentiated between positive and 
negative outcomes suggests they were interested in outcomes for other people, 
independent of responsibility, to some extent. 
However, in the visual perception tasks and donation decision task, responsibility 
had a significant effect on interest in outcomes for others. This suggests an additional value 
of being responsible for outcomes, in line with action-oriented motivations. The presence 
of both action and outcome-oriented motivations in our results supports previous findings 
from fMRI measures (Harbaugh et al., 2007; Kuss et al., 2013). In turn, this suggests our 
tasks are measuring processes relevant for altruism. 
Further evidence of the relevance of these new tasks for understanding altruism 
comes from our individual differences results. Participants who were more generous on the 
charitable donation questions in the experiments and those higher in empathy showed less 
of a decrease in interest for outcomes affecting others, compared to themselves, than those 
lower on these traits. However, for more generous participants, being responsible for the 
outcome had a greater effect. If the importance of responsibility reflects action-oriented 
motivations, this result contrasts with the fMRI studies, which found outcome orientations 
were more relevant for more generous participants. 
9.4. Limitations and future directions 
In addition to the limitations of early versions of the task that later versions were 
designed to overcome, there are further improvements that could be made. We are 
currently collecting more data on the version of the task presented here in experiment 4 to 
check whether the lack of evidence for a bias towards positive information is robust or due 
to low quality data. 
Data collection is also currently ongoing for a further experiment which changes the 
decision to find out from active to forced. In all of the experiments presented here, to find 





onscreen button (experiment 5). If they did nothing, they did not find out and instead saw a 
fixation cross for the length of time the outcome was displayed for to keep the length of the 
experiment the same, regardless of choices.  
We chose this design for two reasons. First, it most accurately represents real-world 
situations which often require an action or effort to obtain more information. Second, as 
finding out was not costly, we were concerned about a ceiling effect if the choice were forced 
between find out or not as finding out provides more variety in the task. However, there is 
evidence of a relationship between positive frames and action, compared to negative frames 
and inaction and there is a risk this accounts for increased interest in the positive 
conditions. Results from the final experiment where participants are forced to press one key 
to find out or a different key to not find out will provide insight on this issue. 
Another issue to note is that the change in how the frames were created causes a 
difference in the payoff matrix probabilities between 1 & 2 (can win / might lose) and 3 & 4 
(won or lost). However, there are no quantitative comparisons between the experiments 
and changing the payoff matrix allowed us to maintain the 70% probability of an outcome. 
Probability was shown to be an important factor in the results from our probability task. 
Finally, only experiment 5 studies interest in outcomes caused by moral decisions. 
Removing the moral aspect in experiments 1-4 was the only way we found to create 
balanced conditions between positive and negative conditions. However, in the visual 
perception task, participants chose to put effort into completing the task correctly to earn 
more money for other people. This reflects real-world situations of investing effort to 
benefit others (Lockwood et al., 2017). 
10. Conclusion 
Participants showed a bias towards positive information affecting other people 
when outcomes were randomly determined. This bias increased as the likelihood of the 
outcome increased, just like outcomes affecting the participant themselves. This provides 
evidence of outcome orientations for interest in other people. However, when outcomes 
were either caused by the participant or another person, and affected the participant or 
another person, interest dropped if the participant was not involved at all. Increased 
interest when the participant was responsible for outcomes affecting others suggests 







In this thesis, I have presented a literature review then five research chapters, in 
which I applied neuroimaging, physiological and behavioural methods to the research 
questions: when and why do we value the lives of others? In addition to different methods, 
the papers consider different aspects of these questions and use different tasks. In this 
section I will bring together the findings from all the papers in relation to the research 
questions, before considering the contributions and limitations of the work as a whole. 
1. Summary 
1.1. Research questions 
As outlined in the literature review, there are many reasons that other people can 
have value to us. The first key distinction is whether other people only provide value 
through how they can increase our own resources, such as money. This is separate to 
valuing other people in their own right. Such a distinction is captured in the comparison 
between strategic and altruistic decisions in our fMRI meta-analysis (paper 1). Before 
answering the main research questions of when and why we value the lives of others, it is 
first important to establish whether people do in fact value the lives of others, independent 
of outcomes for themselves. 
1.1.1. Do we value the lives of others, independent of strategic motives? 
As outlined in the literature review, if it is the case that people value the lives of 
others, or in other words care about their wellbeing, we would predict that people would: 
i. Get distressed when bad things happen to others 
ii. Feel good when good things happen to others 
iii. Take actions to improve outcomes for others 
iv. Be interested in what happens to others 
v. Show similar biases in valuing outcomes for self and other (on the basis that people 
value their own life and wellbeing) 
 
Adding to existing evidence covered in the literature review, the studies in this thesis 
support the idea that people do value the lives of others. I will now outline this evidence 





People are distressed when bad things happen to others 
The idea of empathic distress when others are suffering is certainly not new (Batson, 
2014). The findings here extend evidence of empathic distress through physiological 
distress responses, in the brain and body, to brief written descriptions of other people at 
risk and dying. In the body, skin conductance responses (SCRs) are a proxy for arousal and 
the findings show this responded to lives being at risk and the outcomes. In the brain, we 
saw responses to the deaths of other people in the anterior insula (AI) and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), regions that respond to experiencing pain and observing more vivid 
depictions of other suffering (Lamm et al., 2011). 
A trait measure used in the studies is the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 
1983), often considered synonymous with empathy. Several of the items in this 
questionnaire, particularly on the personal distress subscale, measure self-reported 
distress responses to negative events affecting other people. The fact that participants rate 
themselves as above minimal on these items complement our findings of physiological and 
neural responses in the tasks. Patterns of SCRs and fMRI results also differed between those 
high and low on this trait. 
Finally, in the behavioural task measuring interest in outcomes for others, there was 
some evidence that negative information was avoided, compared to positive information, 
suggesting negative utility. This pattern did depend on whether the participant was 
responsible for the outcome, as discussed below.  
People feel good when good things happen to others 
Like empathic distress, the experience of vicarious reward, a positive feeling when 
good things happen to other people (Mobbs et al., 2009), is supported by the studies in this 
thesis in different ways. The news stories task was designed in a negative frame, such that 
the best outcome was simply surviving the risk of death. Despite this, findings from fMRI 
and SCR, suggest that people surviving, compared to dying, was less distressing or arousing 
in some contexts. This shows participants were differentiating the ‘positive’ outcomes from 
the negative ones. Participants from the fMRI scope insensitivity study also rated how 
emotional they found the stories and clearly differentiated between positive and negative, 
rating outcomes where people lived as above neutral. 
In the fMRI meta-analysis, participants in the original studies were able to create 
positive outcomes for others by giving them money. Results show activation during these 





neural basis of ‘warm glow’ experienced when helping others. Positive feelings and reward 
activity during altruistic decisions could be attributed to a range of factors, depending on 
the motivations for helping, as described below. Finally, as mentioned above, the interest in 
positive outcomes for other people, shown by finding out more often than for negative 
outcomes, suggests that good things happening to others has a positive value. 
People take actions to improve outcomes for others 
Experiencing empathic distress and vicarious reward provides motivations to 
minimise suffering and maximise positive outcomes for others. Helping behaviours are not 
sufficient evidence that people want to improve outcomes for others, as there are 
alternative explanations as discussed below. However, actions to improve outcomes for 
others are arguably necessary to make the claim that people value the lives of others.  
Helping can be non-costly but our findings support the idea that prosocial 
motivations are powerful enough to promote effort and sacrifices to help others. The 
existence of an altruistic condition in the fMRI meta-analysis was only possible because 
participants in the studies we included made costly donations to other people and charities. 
Participants across the other studies were given opportunities to make donations as part of 
the individual difference measures and many did donate from their payment for 
participation. 
People are interested in what happens to others 
If positive outcomes for others are rewarding and negative outcomes are 
distressing, people should be interested in what happens to other people, to the extent to 
which they think the news will be positive. We showed evidence for this in results from 
paper 5 on interest in outcomes affecting others, although the level of interest depended on 
responsibility for the outcome. 
In the news stories task, the positive outcome was really a baseline of avoiding the 
risk of death. The fact that responses, in brain activity and physiological responses, were 
different between live and die outcomes suggests that participants were paying attention to 
the outcome and interested to some extent. Similarly, the phrasing of the stories as “at risk 
of death” would only generate an arousal or negative emotional response if the outcome 





People show similar biases in valuing outcomes for self and other 
While the focus of papers 3, 4 and 5 was on outcomes for other people, our control 
conditions measured responses to outcomes for the self that varied on the same factors as 
the social stimuli. For example, in the scope insensitivity tasks, trials presented different 
amounts of money or credits that could be lost, to match the numbers of people. Positive 
outcomes were keeping these resources while in negative trials they were lost. In paper 5, 
the condition of who was affected (me or someone else) was fully crossed with the positive 
and negative manipulation and either who was responsible (visual perception task) or the 
probability of the outcome (probability task). 
Results showed mixed evidence for whether the biases of scope insensitivity and 
towards positive information were the same for self and other outcomes. In the probability 
task in paper 5, the change in interest over different probabilities was similar for outcomes 
affecting the participant and someone else, although interest in ‘for me’ trials was generally 
higher. However, in the visual perception task, who was responsible for outcomes did not 
matter when they affected the participant but did matter when they affected someone else. 
In the fMRI study, the pattern of responses to credit trials had some similarities with lives 
abroad, but lives in the UK were more distinct.  
1.1.2. Why do we value the lives of others? 
As I have outlined above, the results in this thesis contribute to the evidence in the 
literature review that other people have value. This section considers the possible sources 
of that value. These align with the different categories of motivations for prosocial 
behaviour as separated in the literature review. 
Other people can increase our own extrinsic gains 
The focus of this thesis and the section above is the value of other people’s lives, 
independent of whether they contribute to our own extrinsic resources such as money. 
However, this is a key element of prosocial behaviours that involve reciprocation or 
cooperation (Camerer, 2003; Camerer and Fehr, 2003). Extrinsic reward as motivation for 
prosocial behaviour is only considered in the fMRI meta-analysis in paper 1 through the 
strategic group. Results show strategic prosocial decisions correlate with activity across 
reward-related regions. The fact that this was greater than during altruistic decisions shows 
the additional or stronger reward of strategic decisions that can enhance both intrinsic and 
extrinsic rewards. We purposefully excluded the possibility of strategic motivation in all the 





It is distressing when other people are suffering 
In contexts where the strategic motivation to help is not available, help is commonly 
in response to the suffering of others. As outlined above, results from the news stories tasks 
show negative emotional responses in the brain and body when others are at risk of death 
and die. 
Evidence that people experience distress when others are suffering could be 
considered as both evidence of valuing other people and a reason that other people have 
value to us. If the wellbeing of others affects our mood, then their lives are important and 
relevant so valuable. For example, considering the people we value the most, it is hard to 
distinguish cause and effect: does their wellbeing affect our mood the most because we 
value them the most, or do we value them because their wellbeing affects our mood? The 
answer to this question may just be in the semantics of how value is defined. 
We can personally make a positive difference 
The opportunity to reduce the suffering of another person is an opportunity to have 
a positive impact on something and this could be rewarding, independent of the change in 
the other person’s wellbeing (Aknin et al., 2013b). This is the key difference between action 
and outcome-oriented altruism as described in the literature review (Kuss et al., 2013). 
Altruistic decisions in the fMRI meta-analysis could be driven by either or both motivations, 
as the participant was always directly responsible and actively chose to donate. Two of the 
eligible studies (Harbaugh et al., 2007; Kuss et al., 2013) had designs able to separate these 
motivations and showed an additional value of being responsible for the altruistic outcome.  
The behavioural studies measuring interest in positive and negative outcomes for 
self and other, caused by either the participant or a third person, were specifically designed 
to separate these motivations behaviourally. Results from some versions show greater 
interest and bias towards positive information when the participant was responsible for the 
outcome. This supports action orientation and the idea that other people have value through 
providing an opportunity to make a positive difference. 
It is rewarding when other people are better off 
In contrast to action-orientated altruism, where value comes from personally 
making a difference, outcome-oriented altruists should also value positive outcomes for 
other people that they are not responsible for. In the news stories tasks, the participants 
were never responsible for the outcomes, but we still found a reduction in negative 





outcomes caused by a third person was still above 40% on average. In the donation decision 
version of the task (experiment 5), participants were more interested in outcomes caused 
by others than negative outcomes they caused. In the probability task, the increasing 
interest in positive, over negative, outcomes at higher probabilities was found for others as 
well as the self. 
In summary, other people have value as they can contribute to increasing our own 
resources, provide an opportunity to make a positive difference and affect our mood, both 
positively and negatively. In the real world, these are likely to work together in many cases 
and be indistinguishable from each other based on behaviour alone. A key contribution of 
this thesis is to combine novel tasks with measures of physiology, neural responses and 
interest in outcomes to separate and measure these components of the value of other 
people. 
1.1.3. When do we value the lives of others? 
Situational factors 
As touched on above, the different ways that other people are valuable depend to 
some extent on the context, as certain motivations are only possible in certain contexts 
(indicated in parenthesis below). There are also contextual factors that can increase or 
decrease the value we attribute to a life. These differences are labelled biases because they 
diverge from the belief that most people hold at a moral, cognitive level that all lives are 
equal (Slovic et al., 2011). Several such factors are considered in this thesis and results 
suggest that the value of another person increases when: 
i) They can return the favour (strategic motivation) – demonstrated by strategic 
prosocial decisions correlating with increased activity in reward-related regions 
(paper 1). 
ii) When we can personally make a difference (action-oriented motivation) – supported 
by increased interest in and bias towards positive over negative outcomes when 
personally responsible for the outcome (paper 5). 
iii) When they are in the same country – shown through increased overall arousal, and 
differentiation of live from die outcomes, for lives in the UK, compared to abroad 
(papers 3 & 4). 
iv) They are in a medium sized group – suggested by non-linear relationships between 
responses in the brain and body and the number of people at risk and affected 





v) When the news is likely to be positive – supported by greater interest in outcomes for 
other people that could be positive, compared to those in a negative frame (paper 
5). Note this is specific to our measure of wanting to find out and other measures, 
such as donations, can be increased through negative frames (Erlandsson et al., 
2018). 
Individual differences and interactions with situational factors 
In addition to the situational factors studied in this thesis, there are also individual 
differences that affect whether and how much someone values the lives of others. Some key 
examples of these traits are described in the literature review. In the studies presented here, 
we focused on the relationship between individual differences in interpersonal reactivity or 
empathy (Davis, 1983) and the situational factors of interest. 
The relationships between interpersonal reactivity and the effect of the variables on 
physiological responses to news stories and interest in outcomes affecting other people 
suggest that processes linked to empathy may be relevant for these effects. An ongoing 
question in relation to empathy is whether it promotes prosocial behaviour in a fair and 
more utilitarian way or only towards certain people or groups (Bloom, 2014). Our results 
show that participants higher on this trait showed levels of interest in outcomes affecting 
others that were closer to the level of interest in outcomes affecting themselves. As the 
others were strangers, this could be interpreted as a general increase in prosocial emotions. 
However, in the news stories task, the maximal response of high empathy participants was 
to smaller groups of people than those lower on the scale. This greater scope insensitivity 
suggests biases may be stronger for more empathic people.  
1.2. Contributions of the thesis 
The above summary of the research findings brings together the conclusions of the 
4 main empirical papers, in relation to the research questions of when and why we value 
the lives of others. The fifth paper, paper 2, is a methodological paper. Overall, the thesis 
contributes to the related literature and methodology, as well as having practical 
implications for prosocial behaviour in the real world. In the following section I will expand 






1.2.1. Methodological contributions 
Technique to account for variable coverage in fMRI meta-analysis 
As part of the fMRI meta-analysis on prosocial decision making (paper 1), we also 
developed a new technique to account for the issue of variable coverage, a problem affecting 
all studies using this method. This technique is described and demonstrated in paper 2 and 
the code, alongside example data, is freely available at doi.org/10.25377/sussex.c.4223411. 
A recent review highlighted the importance of our adjustment in detecting activity in the 
subgenual ACC during moral decision-making tasks (Zahn et al., 2019). Our technique is also 
being used by other researchers currently working on an fMRI meta-analysis project. 
Novel tasks and stimuli 
To achieve the theoretical contributions described below, we designed several new 
paradigms across the studies in this thesis. Developing the news stories task involved 
creating a large novel set of stimuli, all from real news stories, that are balanced across 
conditions, based on ratings from pilot participants and the type of risk (natural disaster, 
disease etc.). This task also had to meet requirements for SCR measures – maximising risk 
and uncertainty – and fMRI, both of which require many trials within subjects. In sharing 
these stimuli, alongside the paper when published, we hope that other researchers may 
utilise them. 
Another aspect of developing the tasks was to create paradigms suitable for within-
subject designs. Between-subject designs are less powerful, particularly to measure 
individual differences in the effects. The task we developed for the behavioural study on 
finding out about outcomes for others allowed within-subject measures of both action and 
outcome orientations. 
Dynamic causal modelling of SCRs in a social task 
As part of the analysis of our SCR data, we applied dynamic causal modelling to 
separate responses with an interstimulus interval shorter than the time for responses to 
return to baseline (Bach et al., 2010). To our knowledge, this was the first application of 
such a method to responses during a social task. Given the novel task, with advice from the 
software creators, we decided on a method to fit different models to the responses, blind to 
condition, and compare these to identify the best timings. Our results benefitted from being 
able to analyse sudomotor burst amplitude and dispersion separately, as these showed 





researchers wanting to apply this advanced technique to SCRs during similarly new 
paradigms. 
1.2.2. Theoretical contributions 
The literature review at the start of this thesis and discussion section of each paper 
highlight the contribution of specific findings and how they link to the rest of the field. Here, 
I focus on the theoretical contributions of the findings as a whole, as described in the 
summary of research findings in the previous section. 
Moving from a psychological to a biological understanding 
There is a considerable amount of existing research on the topics covered in this 
thesis, as described in the literature review. The first paper, an fMRI meta-analysis, was only 
possible thanks to previous work and the generosity of authors in sharing their data. While 
this was a summary of neuroimaging findings on the topic of prosocial decision making, for 
other topics, the studies in this thesis are the first to apply physiological and neuroimaging 
techniques. 
Previous work on scope insensitivity and physical proximity, related to prosocial 
behaviour or valuing other people, has only used behavioural measures (Dickert et al., 2015, 
2012; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Friedrich et al., 1999; Slovic, 2010; Slovic et al., 2011; 
Small et al., 2007; Touré-Tillery and Fishbach, 2017; Västfjäll et al., 2014; Zagefka, 2018). 
These often rely on self-report and between-subject designs, which have several limitations. 
By integrating techniques from neuroscience to study the brain and body with within-
subject experimental designs, the current studies contribute unique insight.  
Issues with self-report of giving socially desirable answers or being unaware of 
one’s own biases are particularly relevant given the subject matter (Fernandes and Randall, 
1992). This is demonstrated by our findings that participants in the scope insensitivity 
studies do not report differences between the value of a life in the UK compared to abroad. 
In self-report, participants also increased their willingness to pay to save an increasing 
number of lives, albeit not on a linear scale. In contrast, results from the neuroimaging and 
physiological measures showed a collapse in responses at the highest numbers of people 
and greater responses to events in the UK, compared to abroad. 
Moving from the economic to the social domain 
Several of the concepts in this thesis have roots in economics and here I have applied 





insensitivity; economic games, as used by studies in the fMRI meta-analysis; and the concept 
of valuation or value-based decision-making in general. To measure these concepts in 
relation to people has involved the creation of multiple new tasks and stimuli sets, as 
outlined above in the section on methodological contributions. The results from these tasks 
also contribute towards an ongoing theoretical shift away from the neoclassical economic 
view that people are selfish and only motivated by extrinsic rewards for themselves 
(Adamus, 2017). 
Talking about other people having value to us could be interpreted as supporting 
the selfish view of human nature, rather than the existence of altruistic motivations. 
However, I argue this is a false dichotomy, as an action will only ever be taken, particularly 
reliably and repeatedly, if it has some value. Given that prosocial behaviours are common in 
the real world (UNICEF, 2018) and in experimental settings (Engel, 2011), being prosocial 
must have value. 
In understanding prosocial behaviour, the question is not whether valuing others is 
selfless but what the source or nature of the value is. The results presented here show 
evidence for many different sources of value, some of which are more self-focused and some 
of which focus more on the other person. Traditionally, a key distinction has been drawn 
between other-focused empathic motivations for helping and selfish relief of one’s own 
distress at witnessing suffering (Batson et al., 1987; Schroeder et al., 1988). However, 
insights from neuroscience, including our fMRI results, challenge this clear distinction. 
Empathy for suffering is likely processed in the same brain regions as experiencing pain or 
distress (Lamm et al., 2011), although distinctions within these regions have been identified 
in some studies (Lamm et al., 2019). 
The idea that altruistic motivations are not necessarily undermined if we experience 
reward or warm glow from being prosocial is reflected by people’s perceptions of others 
(Barasch et al., 2014). Given the likely role of reinforcement learning in prosocial behaviour 
(Gęsiarz and Crockett, 2015), it is possible that warm glow generalised from helping close 
others (Telzer et al., 2010), who could have reciprocated, to more distant others. 
1.2.3. Practical implications 
Prosocial behaviour and altruism outside the lab is vital for positive social 
functioning and has the power to save and improve lives (UNICEF, 2018). Research on these 
topics therefore has important implications for maximising the benefits of prosocial 
behaviour. This may be particularly useful for fundraising organisation appealing to 





could suggest a way to increase prosocial behaviour. However, these should be interpreted 
with caution until future work can test factors in more realistic settings. Taking each 
situational factor from above provides suggestions to increase charitable giving: 
i) Providing extrinsic rewards (strategic motivation) – recipients of charitable 
donations are unlikely to ‘return the favour’ to the donor but the organisations 
themselves can provide extrinsic incentives, such as membership benefits or small 
gifts. However, there is a risk that extrinsic motivations ‘crowd out’ or replace 
intrinsic ones (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2017), rather than complementing or adding 
to them. This could in fact decrease altruism. 
 
ii) Opportunities to personally make a difference (action-oriented motivation) – at the 
appeal stage, requests for donations can be framed as what that potential donor can 
personally achieve, for example by donating a certain amount. Making an impact has 
been shown to increase positive feelings associated with altruism (Aknin et al., 
2013b). Feedback on what was achieved by a donation can also be tailored to the 
impact of the individual donor, rather than donors in general (even if this is in 
principle - for example, every donor who gave the same amount receives the same 
message). 
 
iii) Physical and social closeness with recipients – our results show increased arousal 
responses to events affecting people in the UK, compared to abroad. This does not 
necessarily mean that charities should focus on appeals for physically close 
recipients, particularly as a larger personal impact (see above) may be possible for 
causes abroad. We cannot differentiate between explanations based on social or 
physical proximity but based on studies covered in the literature review, both may 
play a role. In general, it may be beneficial for appeals to emphasise similarities and 
shared identities between donors and recipients (Azevedo et al., 2013; Håkansson 
and Montgomery, 2003; Mobbs et al., 2009). Crucially, our news stories task 
measured passive responses, not donations, so more work is needed to measure 
how these responses relate to behaviour. 
 
iv) A number of people that maximises emotion – in line with previous behavioural work, 
we find a collapse of compassion in responses to large numbers of people in need 
and suffering. Charities should be aware of the possibility of this happening in 
response to fundraising appeals that include statistics about many people. Like the 





unclear whether the peaks of responses to numbers in the tens or hundreds will be 
the same across contexts. Instead, perhaps the main implication of these results, and 
those on proximity, is to consider how to maximise emotional reactions without 
overwhelming potential donors. 
 
v) Information likely to be positive can increase interest – often potential donors have 
choices whether to engage with appeals before they see the appeal content. For 
example, opening an email or envelope from the charity. This requires a desire to 
want to find out more information. Our results suggest that this is increased by the 
belief that information is positive, particularly if it relates to a donation decision 
made by the individual. 
 
In addition to these situational factors, our findings on trait measures could also 
have practical implications. However, there is an issue of how charities know what traits 
their donors have, as the information held by charities is often almost exclusively 
demographic. Future work is needed to translate research on individual differences into 
specific insights for charities. More relevant at this stage are the interactions between 
situational and trait factors. These demonstrate the importance of recognising differences 
between how individual donors will respond to appeals that manipulate the factors listed 
above. 
I have focused this section on implications for fundraising organisations and 
therefore the beneficiaries they support, but increased prosocial behaviour also benefits the 
person being prosocial (Aknin et al., 2013a; Crocker et al., 2017; Dunn et al., 2008). The 
different ways in which we value the lives of others can be conceptualised as different goals 
of prosocial behaviour, for example making a positive difference or increasing the wellbeing 
of others. Acting in line with one’s goals is rewarding and improves wellbeing (Zaki and 
Mitchell, 2016). Increased reward from being prosocial in the way that achieves our goals 
is likely to mean prosocial behaviour is repeated (Gęsiarz and Crockett, 2015), creating a 
positive feedback loop for all involved. 
2. Limitations and future directions 
Directions for future research to maximise the practical applications are mentioned 
above. There are also improvements to, and extensions of, the work for academic and 
theoretical reasons. Specific limitations and future directions of each study are provided in 





2.1. Lab environment 
All the studies in this thesis except one online experiment were conducted in a lab 
setting, some inside the fMRI scanner or involving attaching wires to the participants’ hand. 
While these physiological and neural measures move the experience further from the real 
world, they also overcome some of the issues associated with social desirability in 
experimental settings as highlighted above. 
While the studies incorporated into the meta-analysis all used an artificial economic 
game in a laboratory setting, the prevalence of these games is thanks to their relevance to 
real-world settings. In many instances outside of the lab, more can be gained or achieved 
through working together than any party could achieve alone. This could be through 
simultaneous, bidirectional generosity such as in the prisoners’ dilemma or more linear 
interpersonal decision-making, where one party may use generosity to elicit reciprocity in 
the second player to make a decision. 
2.2. Measuring prosocial behaviour 
The practical implications of the work in this thesis described above relate to 
prosocial behaviours, donations in particular. However, most of the main tasks in the 
studies did not measure prosocial behaviour. This could be considered a criticism as more 
work is needed to test whether the identified biases, such as scope insensitivity and interest 
in positive outcomes, translate into prosocial behaviours. The current research provides the 
basis to take this research forward, while giving insights that may not have been possible 
with behavioural measures, as demonstrated by the difference between willingness to pay 
and physiological or neural response patterns. 
2.3. Behaviours over time 
Another aspect of prosocial behaviour not covered by this thesis is the role of 
learning processes in changing behaviour over time. Paper 3 measured changes over time 
in physiological responses and the impact of number on these but this was still within a 
single session. Learning processes are involved in prosocial decisions, as with other 
decision-making processes (Gęsiarz and Crockett, 2015). This involves the experienced 
utility of previous decisions determining prediction errors for upcoming decisions (Lin et 
al., 2012). For moral behaviours specifically, being prosocial initially can lead to decreases 
in prosocial behaviour at the next opportunity (Merritt et al., 2010). Studying learning 
processes benefits from the application of computation models and this would be a 






Making sacrifices to help others is evidence that their lives and wellbeing have value 
to us. The studies in this thesis further our understanding of a) how this happens through 
biological processes, b) the possible reasons for this value c) the factors which affect how 
much we value a life. By understanding differences between motivations to help other 
people, and how these vary between individuals and contexts, the research supports ways 
of helping that provide the greatest rewards for both the giver and the receiver. Results 
show that people do value the lives of others, but this value can be biased by factors 
including the number of people at risk, where they are, and whether the participant is 
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1.1. Additional analysis details 
In addition to the criteria for inclusion, studies with coordinates were required to 
use the same statistical threshold for all brain regions, often meaning coordinates 
identified in whole brain analysis rather than more liberally thresholded ROIs, although 
studies could have employed different thresholds to each other (Radua et al., 2012).  
If t-values were not available, we calculated them from the z-values or p-values in 
the manuscripts. If a threshold p-value was given, rather than an exact one, this provides a 
minimum t-value (e.g. if p < 0.01 then the t-value will be at least the value which 
corresponds to p = 0.01). 
Two studies in the altruistic group (Izuma et al., 2010; Weiland et al., 2012) were 
identified as also having data eligible for strategic decisions. However, data from the same 
participants in different groups violates independence assumptions, which would make p-
values inaccurate in the meta-analysis. We allocated these studies to the altruistic group, 
as the group with fewer papers identified, to make the groups as equal as possible. 
1.2. Covariate coding 
A covariate for comparator complexity was used in the analysis with codes ranging 
from 1 to 4. Rest contrasts were coded 1 as minimum complexity. Contrasts with selfish 
decisions were coded 4 due to the multiple processes involved and consequences for the 
self and another person. Within the group of visuomotor controls, there were differences 
in whether the control condition had no consequence or a consequence coded 2 and 3 
respectively. For example, some studies used dictator game trials without an opportunity 
to be altruistic as controls, which affect the participants’ winnings, whereas other controls 
had no consequence (e.g. simply press a button). 
We chose consequence as the determining factor for coding visuomotor controls as 
it links to some of the key processes of interest, including intrinsic / extrinsic motivation, 
and anticipatory processes linked to reward certainty and reward timing. However, there 
were also differences in the degree to which the control task was cognitively taxing, for 
example playing a lottery requires non-social risk calculation, which is more difficult, 
compared to controls that simply required participants to click a target on the screen. 
Codes based on this level of difficulty did not always align with consequence i.e. some 
controls were difficult but had no consequences, others were easy but had consequences 
etc. Results for the two sets of analyses showed very similar results and we only report 
those based on consequence here to avoid repetition. 
1.3. Subgroup of studies with a selfish contrast 
In addition to contrasts that included all data, we also ran specific contrasts on a 





the most common control provided. This was to enable the use of additional functions of 
AES:SDM that are not possible when including covariates. These included the examination 
of heterogeneity of findings was assessed using between-study variance analysis, with 
significance showing larger between-study variance than would result from sampling 
error alone. Whether areas of significant activation showed significant heterogeneity was 
tested through a simple overlap analysis. Robustness of findings was estimated using 
jackknife sensitivity analysis which repeats the analysis as many times as there are 
studies, excluding one each time to test replicability. This analysis was quantified as a 
proportion of replications voxel by voxel using SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) to give significant voxels in each jackknife repeat a 
value of 1, summing maps and dividing by the total number of repetitions. 
Some studies in the strategic group provided maps for two control conditions e.g. a 
rest contrast and contrast with selfish decisions. As selfish decisions were the most 
common control, rest and visuomotor alternatives were favoured for the analysis using 
the covariate to better match the altruistic group which had more of these non-selfish 
contrasts. However, data from the selfish contrast was included in this subgroup analysis. 
1.4. ROI analysis 
To test the anatomical prediction that altruistic decisions would be associated with 
greater posterior and strategic decisions more anterior vmPFC activity, activation 
estimates were extracted across an anatomical axis. The location of the axis was defined 
by spheres used previously (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2016). These 10mm spheres 
spanned the superior medial gyrus, dorsal to the gyrus rectus. The axis began in area 10 
m/14 m (Mackey and Petrides, 2010; Öngür et al., 2003), at MNI coordinates [0 mm, 32 
mm, −16 mm] and ended at the frontal pole at MNI coordinates [0mm, 64mm, 8mm], the 
approximate centre of ventromedial area 10 (Supplementary Figure 1). 
As effect sizes should not be averaged from related voxels, we created an axis of 
single voxels following the line of the spheres down the midline (x = 0, see Supplementary 
Figure 1). The posterior end of the axis was therefore within a region associated with 
choice value (Bartra et al., 2013; Levy and Glimcher, 2012) whereas the anterior end was a 
region associated with abstract reasoning about mental states (Amodio and Frith, 2006). 
Values were also extracted at x = 4 and x = -4 to better represent the area covered by the 
spheres and as the longitudinal fissure at x = 0 means there is no data for the most 
anterior 3 spheres. 
For plots, effect sizes (Hedges’ G) were extracted from the meta-analytic maps for 
each voxel for every study. To formally test these relationships, the weighted effect sizes 
were examined by mixed-effect linear regressions using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 





original analysis (in which spheres for some studies had values of 0 due to dropout) and 
also only including voxels with data present. 
Supplementary Figure 1. vmPFC ROI analysis: location of voxels and spheres 
 
1.5. Adjusted analysis accounting for dropout 
Maps recreated from coordinates were not adjusted as 0 values represent too 
greater distance from a peak to receive an effect size estimation, rather than missing data. 
However, it is possible that the original datasets missed peak activations in vmPFC. 
Missing data were assumed to be at random as no factor showed significant differences in, 
an effect on, or correlation with the number of voxels covered (date of the study, number 
of participants, control condition, task used, MNI / Talairach space; all ps > 0.1). 
As the adjusted analysis resulted in voxels having differing numbers of studies 
included in the calculation of their effect size, the permutation test for significance was not 
appropriate. Maps of vmPFC were instead thresholded at an uncorrected SDM-Z value of 
2.3. This common value for thresholding is close to the average of the critical z values 
generated in the permutation tests for the original analyses and AES:SDM analyses run 
with the 50% of maps with the best coverage. This uncorrected threshold may initially 
seem liberal. However, as noted by Radua et al. (2012), the fact that coordinate studies 
have large numbers of voxels with null effect sizes from being far from any peak makes z-
values under the empirical distributions given by the permutation tests associated with 
lower p-values than they would be under the normal distribution. Reported values are 








Supplementary Table 1.  
Peak activations from modelled contrasts using complexity coordinate for altruistic vs. rest 
Peak label BA* coordinates SDM-Z  Vox 
  x y z   
Altruistic > rest       
L inferior occipital cortex  -32 -82 -12 7.26 3037 
R inferior occipital cortex  38 -86 -6 7.83 2296 
L superior lateral occipital cortex 7 -26 -70 46 5.48 1127 
Paracingulate gyrus 32 0 14 48 5.29 947 
L middle frontal gyrus 48 -42 28 24 5.60 813 
R superior lateral occipital cortex 7 36 -64 38 4.55 379 
R insula 48 32 20 8 4.67 151 
L thalamus  -6 -22 14 4.21 63 
L thalamus 27 -20 -32 0 4.41 52 
R hippocampus  28 -30 -4 4.64 48 
R thalamus  16 -18 18 4.72 43 
R frontal pole 45 46 36 24 3.93 16 
Cerebellum vermic lobule IV / V  2 -44 0 4.34 10 
       
Rest > altruistic       
L superior lateral occipital cortex 39 -48 -76 22 6.52 2696 
Frontal medial cortex 11 4 54 -12 5.32 2655 
R middle temporal gyrus 21 66 -48 6 4.84 2603 
Posterior cingulate gyrus  -8 -36 42 4.05 1948 
L middle temporal gyrus  -52 -26 -12 4.9 956 
R middle temporal gyrus 20 56 -12 -16 4.79 924 
L precuneus cortex  -30 -56 8 4.11 419 
L superior frontal gyrus  -24 22 38 4.50 269 
R inferior frontal gyrus 45 52 34 0 4.02 147 
L orbitofrontal cortex  47 -30 34 -14 4.03 113 
L inferior frontal gyrus 45 -50 32 4 3.37 83 
L occipital pole 18 -6 -94 24 3.19 74 
R frontal pole  22 34 -10 3.51 22 
R cerebellum, hemispheric lobule IV / V 30 16 -34 -18 2.63 17 
R postcentral gyrus 3 30 -38 70 2.36 17 
L parahippocampal gyrus 30 -14 -36 -14 2.83 14 
Note. L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z= SDM 
z-value of activation, Vox = number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than 








Supplementary Table 2.  
Peak activations from modelled contrasts using complexity coordinate for strategic vs. rest 
 
Peak label BA* coordinates SDM-Z Vox 
  x y z   
Strategic > rest       
L occipital cortex  -34 -64 -14 8.06 4825 
R occipital cortex  38 -84 -6 8.49 3646 
Paracingulate / anterior cingulate cortex  12 28 24 6.08 1341 
L inferior frontal gyrus 45 -46 34 16 6.21 1004 
R insula 48 32 20 6 5.46 340 
R caudate  16 -12 22 6.15 224 
R frontal pole  28 38 20 5.09 219 
Posterior cingulate gyrus  4 -32 24 5.33 182 
R frontal pole 45 48 40 22 4.81 115 
L frontal pole 10 -28 50 10 4.97 80 
R hippocampus  32 -24 -8 5.72 51 
Anterior cingulate gyrus  6 -6 32 4.95 39 
L putamen  -24 0 2 4.80 35 
Cerebellum, vermic lobule VI 18 6 -68 -14 4.77 30 
L insula 48 -32 16 4 4.70 29 
R precentral gyrus 44 48 8 30 4.50 24 
R frontal operculum cortex 38 50 18 -4 4.55 16 
R frontal pole 10 30 52 10 4.49 16 
Brainstem  8 -40 -28 5.02 13 
L thalamus  -20 -30 0 4.63 10 
       
Rest > strategic       
L superior lateral occipital cortex 39 -56 -62 26 6.49 3625 
R middle temporal gyrus 21 60 -8 -18 5.71 3027 
Frontal medial cortex 11 4 54 -12 4.44 2577 
R precentral gyrus 6 8 -14 78 4.02 2061 
L inferior frontal gyrus 45 -50 32 2 4.44 481 
L middle frontal gyrus  -26 28 44 3.99 367 
L precuneus cortex  -26 -52 8 2.80 265 
R cerebellum, crus II  24 -84 -36 3.44 116 
L parahippocampal gyrus  -28 -44 6 3.94 104 
R parahippocampal gyrus  22 -20 -24 4.22 91 
L parahippocampal gyrus 30 -20 -20 -28 4.52 82 
L precentral gyrus 6 -8 -14 78 3.72 58 
L cerebellum, hemispheric lobule IV/V 30 -14 -36 -16 3.57 40 
R lingual gyrus  32 -52 4 2.37 30 
R central opercular cortex 48 40 -18 22 1.95 24 





Note. L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z= SDM 
z-value of activation, Vox = number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than 
one BA, none is reported either by AES:SDM software, or here. 
 
2.1. Results from the subgroup of studies with a selfish contrast only  
2.1.1. Means, heterogeneity & robustness 
Limiting altruistic studies to those with a selfish control showed activity in right 
nucleus accumbens (NuAcc), vmPFC, ACC, left AI, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), bilateral 
precuneus, left inferior dlPFC, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Selfish decisions activated 
bilateral posterior insula, left dlPFC (area 46D), bilateral putamen, right caudate nucleus, 
bilateral pSTS and left amygdala (Supplementary Figure 2a & Supplementary Table 3).  
Jackknife sensitivity analysis showed these clusters were robust with the majority 
of voxels replicating in most repetitions of the analysis with one study removed. 
Heterogeneity analysis showed no significant between-study variation in any of the voxels 
significantly active in either direction (Supplementary Figure 3a). 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 2. Mean activations from A: altruistic and B: strategic 
meta-analytic maps from specific contrasts; only those with a selfish control 
(thresholded with permutation analysis run in AES:SDM). Coronal images in 








Supplementary Table 3.  
Peak activations from specific contrasts (studies with a selfish control only) for altruistic vs. 
selfish 
Peak label BA* coordinates SDM-Z Vox 
  x y z   
Altruistic > selfish       
Anterior cingulate cortex 11 -2 38 -6 3.94 1738 
R striatum 25 14 0 -12 3.05 276 
L frontal operculum cortex 47 -38 24 4 2.31 42 
Posterior cingulate cortex  0 -48 18 2.66 25 
L precuneus cortex  -10 -66 36 2.17 23 
R supramarginal gyrus  60 -36 50 2.42 16 
L middle temporal gyrus  -60 -54 -8 2.37 13 
L frontal pole 46 -48 50 -4 2.20 11 
R precuneus cortex  8 -68 36 2.05 11 
       
Selfish > altruistic       
L central opercular cortex  -42 -14 22 3.84 433 
L postcentral / precentral gyri 6 -50 -10 50 2.97 232 
L lingual gyrus  -26 -58 -4 2.88 142 
L middle frontal gyrus 46 -28 36 30 2.83 105 
L inferior lateral occipital cortex 37 -40 -64 0 3.05 90 
R parietal operculum cortex  46 -26 24 2.80 88 
R middle temporal gyrus 21 48 -32 -2 2.75 85 
L precentral gyrus 6 -32 -12 54 2.58 85 
L middle temporal gyrus 21 -48 -48 6 2.69 74 
R caudate nucleus  18 -16 26 3.05 67 
R putamen 48 30 2 6 2.73 71 
R superior lateral occipital cortex  34 -74 14 2.68 61 
L supramarginal gyrus 41 -46 -40 24 2.68 51 
R temporal occipital fusiform cortex  34 -46 -8 2.60 25 
L postcentral gyrus 3 -34 -32 58 2.36 25 
R inferior temporal gyrus  46 -54 -4 2.42 22 
R hippocampus 20 36 -14 -18 2.69 21 
L inferior temporal gyrus  -48 -14 -26 2.64 20 
L precentral gyrus 4 -6 -26 60 2.33 20 
R intracalcarine cortex  30 -62 6 2.80 17 
L postcentral gyrus 3 -44 -24 58 2.27 16 
L postcentral gyrus 48 -62 -10 16 2.45 15 
R precentral gyrus 6 22 -14 66 2.31 15 
R superior parietal lobule 1 30 -44 68 2.46 14 
R superior parietal lobule 5 20 -52 64 2.23 13 
L superior temporal gyrus  -44 -8 -18 2.44 12 
L lingual gyrus 18 -10 -78 -10 2.29 11 






Note. L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z= SDM 
z-value of activation, Vox = number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than 
one BA, none is reported either by AES:SDM software, or here. 
 
Isolating the studies with a selfish contrast for strategic decisions showed 
significant activation in left NuAcc, right dlPFC (area 46), left precuneus, left amygdala, 
right cerebellum, right AI and right frontal pole. Selfish decisions in strategic tasks, 
compared to prosocial ones, showed activation in left TPJ, bilateral posterior temporal 
sulci, left temporal pole, left hippocampus, right supplementary motor area, right 
cerebellum and right posterior insula (Supplementary Figure 2b & Supplementary Table 
4).  
No heterogeneity was found in these significant voxels and activations for strategic 
> selfish were robust. Some peaks for where selfish > strategic showed a small, robust 
region surrounded by voxels only replicated in a small number of jackknife repeats 
(Supplementary Figure 3b). 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 3. Jack-knife analysis for A: altruistic decisions and B: 
strategic decisions. Number of jack-knife runs the voxel was significant in, n = 12 









Supplementary Table 4.  
Peak activations where strategic > selfish from specific contrasts (studies with a selfish 
control only) 
Peak label BA* coordinates SDM-Z Vox 
  x y z   
Strategic > selfish       
L occipital pole  -14 -92 18 4.47 77 
R frontal pole  38 44 2 4.60 71 
R middle temporal gyrus 37 58 -54 -10 4.17 48 
L striatum  -6 8 -8 5.14 34 
L occipital pole 18 -26 -96 -12 4.77 34 
R frontal operculum cortex  32 26 10 4.58 16 
Brain stem  -2 -30 -22 4.39 17 
Occipital pole 18 -2 -98 14 3.91 17 
L striatum  -10 20 -8 4.45 15 
Supracalcarine cortex 18 -2 -74 18 3.78 14 
L precuneus cortex  -18 -68 32 4.20 13 
R cerebellum hemispheric lobule IV / V 19 10 -48 -16 4.40 12 
R inferior lateral occipital cortex 18 30 -88 -4 4.02 12 
L amygdala  -12 -12 -14 3.74 11 
L inferior lateral occipital cortex 19 -46 -80 -2 4.34 10 
R inferior lateral occipital cortex 19 50 -72 -12 4.20 10 
       
Selfish > strategic       
R precentral gyrus  8 -16 52 4.59 250 
R parietal operculum cortex  40 -24 24 5.21 92 
R parietal operculum cortex 48 52 -28 18 3.19 81 
L superior temporal gyrus 22 -54 -12 -8 3.81 53 
R middle temporal gyrus 21 60 -40 -2 3.56 53 
R postcentral gyrus 4 22 -34 66 3.50 36 
R precentral gyrus 4 16 -26 70 2.91 32 
L middle temporal gyrus 21 -58 -44 0 3.09 31 
R insula 48 36 -12 6 2.95 21 
L middle temporal gyrus 20 -58 -26 -14 2.97 19 
R middle temporal gyrus 20 58 -14 -18 2.85 18 
L angular gyrus 22 -60 -60 22 3.04 17 
R cerebellum, crus II  30 -82 -36 3.32 15 
L superior temporal gyrus  -50 -20 -4 3.10 15 
R inferior temporal gyrus 20 44 -22 -22 3.42 15 
R insula  34 -8 18 3.51 13 
R postcentral gyrus 4 50 -12 38 2.90 13 
L angular gyrus  39 -40 -56 22 2.95 13 
R central opercular cortex  46 -8 20 3.10 13 
L temporal pole 21 -50 8 -26 3.40 12 





Note. L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z= SDM 
z-value of activation, Vox = number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than 
one BA, none is reported either by AES:SDM software, or here. 
 
2.1.2. Comparisons and overlap 
We found overlap between altruistic and strategic decisions in the specific 
contrasts in left NuAcc for prosocial > selfish and a small area of parietal operculum cortex 
was common for selfish > prosocial (Supplementary Figure 4a).  
Like the modelled contrast, altruistic decisions showed greater activation in sgACC 
and left TPJ and additionally in this analysis, right pSTS and left lateral occipital cortex. 
Strategic decisions showed greater activation in the right caudate nucleus, right frontal 
pole, right dlPFC (area 46) and left posterior insula than altruistic decisions. Several 
sensorimotor regions, including the fusiform face area, also showed more activity during 
strategic decisions (Supplementary Figure 4b & Supplementary Table 5). 
 
Supplementary Figure 4. A: overlap and B: comparisons between altruistic and 
strategic decisions using specific contrasts; only those with a selfish control 
(thresholded with permutation analysis run in AES:SDM). Coronal images in 










Supplementary Table 5.  
Regions showing significantly greater activation in altruistic or strategic studies in the 
specific contrasts (studies with a selfish control only) 
Peak label BA* coordinates SDM-Z Vox 
  x y z   
Altruistic > strategic       
R middle temporal gyrus 21 66 -44 0 2.88 58 
Anterior cingulate gyrus  -6 34 0 2.97 43 
L superior lateral occipital cortex 39 -46 -74 42 2.97 29 
L angular gyrus 22 -60 -58 24 2.76 22 
Strategic > altruistic       
Intracalcarine cortex  -6 -74 16 3.79 102 
L precentral gyrus 6 -42 -8 62 4.38 78 
L postcentral gyrus 3 -32 -38 58 3.81 64 
L central opercular cortex  -50 -18 20 3.59 55 
L central opercular / insular cortex  48 -40 -4 12 3.91 49 
L superior lateral occipital cortex 18 -20 -82 32 3.52 48 
R frontal pole 10 28 52 10 3.50 35 
L occipital pole 18 -16 -92 20 3.51 24 
L inferior lateral occipital cortex  -42 -64 6 3.63 21 
L lingual gyrus  -18 -68 -2 3.59 17 
L precentral gyrus 6 -28 -22 62 3.17 15 
L superior parietal lobule 5 -22 -52 72 3.38 13 
R caudate  18 6 20 3.33 13 
L occipital fusiform gyrus  -30 -78 -8 3.31 13 
R inferior lateral occipital cortex  34 -76 10 3.39 12 
Note. L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann area, coordinates (x, y, z) in MNI space, SDM-Z= SDM 
z-value of activation, Vox = number of voxels in the cluster. *If cluster falls within more than 
one BA, none is reported either by AES:SDM software, or here. 
 
2.2. Additional ROI results  
As with the results at x = 4 reported in the main text, linear models on vmPFC voxel 
effect sizes at x = 0 and x = -4 showed interactions between vmPFC location and decision 
group. Activation for altruistic decisions was greater in posterior voxels whereas strategic 
activation was greater in anterior regions (Supplementary Figure 5). Models were run using 
(i) all the data, including zero values and (ii) only the studies with data in that voxel, on a 
voxel-by-voxel basis. In all cases, a mixed-effects model outperformed a fixed-effects model.  
At x = 0, both models showed significant interactions, (i) t(22)=2.27, p=.032; (ii) 
t(20.8)=2.83, p=.010. For x = -4, the model only including studies with data present (ii) 
showed a significant interaction, t(22.2)=2.42, p=.024 but when all data was included (i), 






Supplementary Figure 5. vmPFC ROI results for A: x = 0, B: x = 4 and C: x = -4. Left 
column: using all the data, including zero values, right column: using only the 
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